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
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
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
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
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368
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EUROPE.

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
OF
THE CHEVALIER FRED. GENTZ;

Just Published.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR M. FELTIER, 18, WARWICK-STREET,
GOLDEN-SQUARE.

1806.



ERRATA.

Page	Line	
iv,	1,	<i>for</i> and which rises, <i>read</i> and rises.
vi,	6,	— will dwell, <i>read</i> will not dwell.
viii,	14,	— was, <i>read</i> were.
xiv,	13,	— or to see, <i>read</i> for to see.
260,	3,	— in itself, <i>read</i> in itself.
265,		first line of the note, <i>for</i> on <i>concilieroit</i> les intérêts des deux peuples amis avec les intérêts bien <i>intendus</i> des puissances <i>limitrophes</i> , <i>read</i> <i>concilieroit entendus & limitrophes</i> .
296,		first line of the note, <i>for</i> ne sera plus <i>ac-</i> vouloir les franchir, <i>read</i> ne sera plus <i>accusée</i> de vouloir, &c.
296,	20,	<i>for</i> le regle, <i>read</i> la regle.

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[C. Stron...

INTRODUCTION.

THE following sheets are fragments of a work which, after a preliminary developement of the notion generally entertained of a political balance, and of certain ideas connected with it, was to have contained a representation of the existing political situation of the different European states in their mutual relations, and in the respective relation of each individual state to the whole. The object was to show how, the former federal system of Europe, after having existed and flourished down to our times under many various forms, in all of which the same spirit was preserved, was sapped and shaken by abuse and violence on one hand, and by carelessness and indifference on the other; and how, since the unfortunate peace of 1801, its fall became so probable that nothing remained for us but either to wait its total ruin in torpid inactivity, or to avert it by manly resolution and daring enterprize. To demonstrate the truth of this position, it

would have been necessary to extend the elucidation, which will be found in the following pages of the relations between FRANCE and AUSTRIA since the conclusion of the peace of Luneville, both in a historical and political light; to the relations between FRANCE and PRUSSIA, between FRANCE and the GERMAN EMPIRE, between FRANCE and RUSSIA, between FRANCE and ENGLAND, and so forth; and to have illustrated as distinctly as possible their respective interests, by which means we should have arrived at an induction of the principles on which we ought to act, the object to which our exertions ought to be directed; and the new constitution which ought to be framed for the purpose of remedying the present evil, and of obtaining security for the future.

This attempt necessarily supposed that the political distempers of Europe had arrived at a decisive crisis, at the time when AUSTRIA and RUSSIA prepared for battle with the overgrown power; and that it was only by energetic means and bold operations, that it could be discovered whether the principle of life, or the principle of

death was to prove victorious. Had the former triumphed but in part, or had at least the event of the contest for a considerable period of time remained in doubt, the abovementioned enquiries would have been of some use, first in the way of impressing on the minds of contemporaries the immense importance of the object for which we were contending; and secondly, as a mode of circulating clear and distinct notions of what was to be acquired before our efforts could be rewarded by that true political regeneration at which we aspired. But as an unhappy destiny blasted the fairest hopes upon earth in their first blossom, as the contest was decided and terminated, lost and given up when people scarce believed that it had commenced; as events such as no age ever witnessed, in less than three months inflamed the disease in the vital parts of the system to such a pitch of virulence, that all we had hitherto suffered vanished like a shadow before what was present; the execution of the original plan could have produced no good effect. For though the few amongst us whose courage is superior to fate, and

which rises in proportion even as their fortunes droop, do not on the brink of impotency, where we are now brought, despair of the possibility of salvation, it will least of all escape *them* that under this new form of ruin which presents itself to us in consequence of the retreat of the RUSSIAN army, the PRESBURG treaty, and the PRUSSIAN negotiations, there are much greater difficulties to vanquish, and far different problems to solve than there were in that earlier period of the disease, when the peace of Luneville, and its immediate results, seemed to call forth the utmost energies, and to defy the most powerful remedies. In such circumstances no one can be astonished that he who undertook such a work, after being interrupted in the execution of it by the catastrophes of the time, resolved not to pursue it agreeably to his original plan, but to give that part of it which he had already executed in the form of *fragments*, as a specimen of what he would have performed under more fortunate circumstances, or at all events as an historical monument to perpetuate the recollection of a state of things

INTRODUCTION.

which the rapid growth of the evil seems already to have left half a century behind.

In this point of view alone the following sheets must be considered, in order to their being fairly and justly estimated, and in order even to their being received with indulgence. Their numerous deficiencies and gaps will not escape the penetrating eye. Though much of what they contain will, by those who approve the sentiments, be found to be truths of much importance, independent of their reference to the time of their being written; yet upon the whole they bear the character and colour of that particular period.*

* They were written in the months of September and October, 1805. Many passages the Author now would not write in the same tone which he then thought himself authorized to adopt. Truth is always the same; but there is a certain language appropriated to every situation of things; and it is one thing to describe intolerable evils and the scourges of humanity, when arms are taken up to contend with them; and another to lament their devastation, when the neck is bent to the yoke, and when from motives of consideration and delicacy to those with whom we stand or fall, nay, even from respect to ourselves, and from pride, we strive to conceal our pain, impose bounds to our discontents, and endeavour to suffer with dignity what we were not strong enough to combat with success.

Perhaps this very circumstance sometimes produces a beneficial effect. He who lost not entirely all feeling for the disgrace of his country, for the calamities of his contemporaries, for the convulsive struggles of a sinking world, will dwell with indifference upon the complaints we then uttered, and the hopes we then entertained, when he reflects that those were scarcely heard, and these scarcely expressed; when we were overtaken by a fate of which the unfathomable woe extinguished all recollection of former sorrows, like that of an unpleasant dream, and made hope disappear like an imaginary phantom.

The most detailed part of this collection, that which contains an exposition of the relations between FRANCE and AUSTRIA previous to the war, will, it is hoped, be considered in a point of view which will render it not altogether unworthy of attention. With the exception of two or three pamphlets of some merit, but which seem to have been composed in haste; and the authors of which appear to have been provided with scanty materials, that were published a short time before the com-

mencement of hostilities; nothing yet has been written, either historically or politically; upon the origin of the war which is now ended. The wildest French Manifestos, the most abominable misrepresentations of facts, accusations of the foulest nature against all who supported or wished well to the common cause, have as usual remained unanswered; and if facts did not speak loud enough—loud enough let it be understood for a wiser posterity, though always too low to be heard by contemporaries—the future historian confined to the fabulous materials at present existing, could not represent the events of this unexampled epoch in an intelligible, much less in a credible, form. The little therefore which can here be said towards the elucidation of these events, (for much must be passed over in silence,) derives some value from the circumstance that it is the only attempt of the kind which has yet been made; and that, for reasons known to every one, it will long possess this recommendation.

It was neglected to instil into the Public sound and tenable notions of the nature of

the war. The few even who ventured through the channel of the press to maintain the cause of the Combined Powers against the unrighteous accusations of the enemy, have chosen false grounds. They have described FRANCE as the *attacking party*, and the undertaking of the Allies as a WAR OF DEFENCE. The Public nevertheless seeing the AUSTRIAN and RUSSIAN armies not merely fully prepared for war, but actually upon the theatre of hostilities; while the FRENCH government hardly believed, or pretended to be able to believe, that serious projects was formed against it; what was more natural than that the unreflecting and giddy multitude found a contradiction between the words and actions of the Combined Powers; and at last considered their most incontestible grounds, as so many artifices employed by craft for the purposes of deception? A cause is seldom so good that it cannot be hurt by ill-chosen arguments, particularly in the eyes of the weak. Whoever has courage to carry a manly resolution in an honest way into effect, must renounce half confessions, mean evasions, and ambiguous representation.

The war which was determined on against FRANCE was a WAR OF ATTACK, in the best sense of the word; was to be concerted as such, conducted as such, and as such it ought to be represented. It was a just, necessary, and in its origin, (which must not be confounded with the plan on which it was carried on,) wise; and what is more, a highly obligatory attempt to resist Colossal power, and to set bounds and limits to the subjection of Europe, to the decay of its ancient constitutions, and to the plagues and cares of a whole generation groaning under a weight of oppression. The authors of the general disorder had, without much penetration, discovered that there was nothing more desirable for them, than under the deceitful mask of a hollow, perfidious, nominal—peace, to carry their unceasing endeavours to the point of completion, by the maintenance of this peace—which would be better denominated by a state of war; and that of the most destructive kind, because it raged only on one side and found no resistance—at a time when it only required one decisive blow to spring the frail barriers which remained between them and universal dominion.

This system, which was certainly the surest and the most convenient, they preferred to an open declared war, the issue of which is always doubtful, and for this reason they did not wish for a rupture. For a similar reason the other party must wish for war; and as their adversaries endeavoured to *preserve* the existing relations, or in other words, the omnipotence of their will, and the defencelessness of their victims: so nothing remained for them, whose object it was to introduce a more favourable system, in order to prevent total destruction, but attack. That considered generally, in reference to the whole of their situation, the attack was only a measure of resistance to unjust and intolerable oppression; and was in this view an act of self defence is manifest of itself. But on this very account, they should have ventured without fear for a word to have expressed the true character of their undertaking with frankness and precision. A just and necessary war is at all times a DEFENSIVE WAR, whoever be the first to take up arms.

A just and necessary war! That the one which has laid us prostrate on the ground

was such, is a consolation of which no man shall rob us; the harder and more violent has been our fall, the more we require the solace of this reflection. From rashness, presumption, and insanity, to have rushed into a new abyss of misery; to have forged still more galling fetters than those we wished to break, is a thought intolerable even to those, who, without any immediate influence, were partakers in what has passed only by assent; and who, though merely inactive spectators, were content to share in their will, wishes and dispositions, the terrible responsibility. Whoever oppressed by the weight of these chains, has so much as believed the release promised us by the war for a moment possible; whoever has felt his heart expand with the slightest sentiment of joy at the approach of happier times, has believed with fear and hoped with doubt, must feel how important it is to be acquitted in this grand and complicated process, not merely of every unhallowed, but likewise of every inconsiderate motive. He must therefore hold him to be his benefactor, who now

undertakes to prove, that at least his wishes were upright, and his efforts blameless; and that, never since war was waged on earth, has there been a more satisfactory cause of hostility, a more worthy object, a more holy incentive. This point is besides the only one in the history of our days, on which we can dwell without painful feelings, and with some complacency. It is only reflection upon the origin of the war which can afford subject of content and exultation, all the rest is dark and disheartening. This is not the place to examine how an undertaking so commendable in itself, from the moment that it was put in a train of execution, was baffled by false calculations; and was in so short a time, by improper measures, thwarted, frustrated, and undone. That this precipitate and cruel overthrow, supposes not simply decisive faults, but a heap and chain of blunders, a fatally crowded tissue of variegated error, is clear, independently of all inductions; and presses itself on the mind of every one, who, without any other acquaintance with the march of events, only

knows the commencement and conclusion of the drama of which we have been spectators.

Is then every thing lost? Is hope become a crime? Shall the menacing predictions of those, who in earlier disasters and earlier punishments, read what is now present, as well as what is still future; who were at first accounted atrabilarious dreamers, afterwards fanatical prophets; and who have at all times been treated with coldness and disrespect, often with marked displeasure: shall these in the end be literally fulfilled? Shall that which in the corrupted dialect of the present time, and in the disgusting gibberish of the press, is called "THE NEW FEDERAL SYSTEM," take the place of the remains of that glorious edifice which our fathers reared, the old magnificent constitution of Europe, THE TRUE FEDERAL SYSTEM? Shall all, which with so much art divided, and with so much skill united the nations, be confounded by a decree of general servitude, and sink into a common grave, where its spirit will never revive? Shall GERMANY—

all the rest is lost, excepting what either lies out of reach, or what can only then be reached when we are lost beyond redemption—Shall GERMANY become in its whole extent what the half of it is already; what HOLLAND, SWITZERLAND, SPAIN, and ITALY are at this moment?

The answer to these questions belongs to those in whose hands is placed our ambiguous destinies, our divided and languishing strength, our last capital of defence. To us powerless suffering spectators, to us it is only permitted to maintain—or to see, and feel, and reckon, is not denied to the meanest—that however difficult the problem of salvation is rendered by the disasters of these days, the possibility of finding an outlet is even yet undeniable; and that the aggregate of the means, which in the last extremity may be collected, in support of the most generally interesting of all causes of general interest, that of an independent existence, is still considerable enough to banish unconditional discouragement. How these means, if they are to be called forth, and called forth so as to save, are to be first of

all united, then properly arranged and directed—how the pressure of the moment is to be overcome,—how, during the never-ceasing progress of the evil, and in the continual presence of danger, so long a respite, and so much tranquillity is to be obtained, that the walls of the tottering fabric do not fall in before the buttresses are raised for their support—how to keep the middle path between the caution and passiveness which the most threatening conjunctures prescribe as a law, and then to attain a happier condition, which the duty of self-preservation imposes upon us as obligatory—how what is now scattered is to be collected, what is now overthrown is to be reinstated, what is now dead is to be reanimated, and first a futurity, and then a happy and honourable futurity secured?—all this must be the concern of the governments.

What is obligatory upon us who wait the unfolding of our destiny, our breasts straitened with anxiety; upon us who have no power to resolve, but who can strengthen those whose resolutions carry with

them a sentence of life or death, by unwavering confidence and steady support, or weaken them by unworthy fears and unfounded dismay, is to cultivate a temper of mind which can neither capriciously or intentionally add to the difficulty of solving that hard problem. When rulers and their immediate assistants see nothing around them but dumb despair, or culpable indifference to the highest interests of states, or satisfaction at their dissolution, they must possess more than mortal energy, and more than human wisdom to preserve the people from ruin. How shall they be succoured who do not long for help, to whom it is quite alike to flourish or decay, who prefer peaceful slavery to active exertion in the defence of liberty, and who less dread the destruction of their rights than the cares attendant on their preservation? From this disposition we have experienced the most baneful effects. For a long series of years the seducers of a heedless age left no art untried to ridicule, or render suspicious, the few who had courage enough to draw aside the curtain which covered the horrors of futurity,

and recommended those very maxims which were calculated to cut off all possibility of improving our situation. "We should," such was their lesson, "remain quiet, tranquil, pacific, and above all things inactive; the stream which has overflowed its banks will soon of itself return into its regular channel; universal dominion is a chimera; of what importance is it to Europe whether France have a few provinces more or less? There are several states which have received accessions of territory, population, and revenues, and commercial facilities, and so on, to the end of the whole statistical rhapsody; we may enjoy tranquillity just as well under the treaties of Luneville and Ratisbon as under that of Westphalia; the French empire has moreover reached its natural limits; the new regent is too wise to think of extending it farther; there is no immediate danger, and time will do the rest."—To this sleepy perfidious doctrine the people and the courts lent an attentive ear. Its influence has been felt more strongly than that of any other cause in producing the present calamities; for from

this source—it cannot be explained here, but the well informed understand it sufficiently—proceeded a great proportion of those unconnected projects, of those garbled measures, of those political and military blunders to which are to be ascribed the misfortunes of the last campaign. When the evil had grown to a gigantic size, first by the natural march of a continually encreasing dominion, (for what had FRANCE left stable when AUSTRIA and RUSSIA took up arms?) and afterwards by the necessary inefficacy and impotence of a feeble attempt at salvation, which could only be compared to a building raised on a swamp, and constructed with the most spongy, incohesive, and unamalgamating materials; the persons who had inculcated these treacherous motives to repose, had recourse to a new sophistry, in order to conciliate those whom they had duped, concealment being no longer practicable. It cannot now be denied that the so much ridiculed predictions have been justified, have been accomplished with the clearness of day, that that system which for centuries protected the liberty of Europe,

with all its ornaments and excellencies, its constitutions and laws, its archives, its territorial limitations, and its adjudications of rights, has fallen to pieces; and that an arbitrary will “has removed the bounds of the people, robbed their treasures, and put down the inhabitants,”* that there are scarcely three independant princes to be found between the Tagus and the Volga, and that the distance between universal empire being actually acquired, and its being regularly proclaimed and solemnly recognized, may be measured not by years, but by months and days. This is now so awfully manifest as to flash conviction on the dullest perception; the veil which folly or craft threw over futurity has been rent by the terrors of the present; but the magazines of deception are still unexhausted. What can no longer be scouted as fanciful, or rejected as fabulous, is now

* Isaiah, Chap. 10th. But to finish the picture, we must subjoin in the words of the prophet, “His hand hath found as a nest the riches of the people, and as one gathereth eggs *that are left*, hath he gathered all the earth, and there was none that moved the wing, or opened the mouth or peeped.”

described as a supportable evil, nay even as an advantage. And also in this desperate construction of things, the frivolity of the age is ready to acquiesce. Whoever will take the trouble to observe with attention the predominant sentiment of the day, the character of political conversations, the tone of society, the tendency and bearings of public opinion, will soon be convinced that, with the exception of a very small number indeed, who, with genuine patriotic and true cosmopolitical feelings, (which in the higher sense are the same,) lament the ignominious fall of the European commonwealth, the great mass of the public in every country may be divided into two classes; the one of which, and by far the largest, views the events of this wasteful period with more or less **INDIFFERENCE**, while the other beholds them with **SATISFACTION**. The same classification comprehends, with two or three exceptions, all the writers particularly in **GERMANY** upon political subjects.*

* Political writing, if we set England aside, to which these observations in general are not to be considered as applicable,) is become much less frequent throughout

The word-mongers of the *indifferent* party, rich in dispiriting encouragements, and desolating consolations, in order to sooth the discontent of their contemporaries, at one time represent the evil as unavoidable, and at another they describe the advantages which are still left us. "Now," say they,

Europe than in former times, and will soon be entirely given up, or will at least be confined to some miserable newspapers, or a few newspaper-like journals equally insipid. Any thing that is written on this subject at present, either breathes a spirit of absolute POLITICAL INDIFFERENCE, which generally assumes the mask of impartiality, or is decidedly favourable to the universal dominion of France. The suggestion that many an author whose productions we now read with indignation, would go very differently to work, if he were not under the influences of compulsion or fear, deserves no regard. He who has not courage, or whom particular circumstances do not permit, to write upon great affairs, in a great manner, that is, with precision, freedom, an honest interest in the matter, respect for his subject, and without seeing at the end of every line a sentence of imprisonment or exile float before him, ought at least, from conscientious motives to be silent; or if he must write he should choose one of the many *harmless topics* which, in modern times, are included in the science of POLITICAL ECONOMY. The article of STATISTICAL BALANCES alone comprehending the loss and gain arising out of exchanges, purchases, and sales of princes, must now, varying as it does every month, furnish sufficient abundance of stuff for book-makers for many years to come.

that Europe by an irresistible destiny is reduced to a situation in which hardly a shred of its ancient political constitution is left, it is no longer worth while to treat or fight about it. Experience has clearly demonstrated, that every attempt to stem the torrent of destruction has been attended with a contrary effect; when power has attained a certain pitch it is madness to resist; in such a case wisdom prescribes to us to capitulate on the best possible terms, and instead of defending the entrenchments, an early surrender, deference to the will of the conqueror, assiduity in courting his favour, so that all that can be saved may be saved. Besides our lot, taken even in its most threatening aspect, is far from being intolerable. "The balance of power among states has always been a chimera; in all times the weak have received laws from the strong; whether the law is pronounced by one individual, or twenty, is the same to him whose fortune it is to obey." To live under the sceptre of a stranger, and to see all the appurtenances of an independent constitution swallowed up in the vortex of a prodi-

gious monarchy, where every thing is engorged, and mingled, and sunk, and forgotten, has, to be sure, something repulsive in it; but in whatever hands the chief authority may be placed, there will always be local regents, and whether these be men of ancient race, or upstarts, whether they be called presidents, or prefects, or stadholders, or electors, or kings; of what consequence is this to the subjects? No one can be robbed of those things which he values the most, his house, his land, a part (who will be insatiable!) of his hereditary or acquired fortune; and let the worst happen, no despot can disturb what constitutes the real enjoyments of this passing life, the pleasures of the table, and of love, musick, the theatre, good instructive reading, a friendly game at cards, a comfortable restoring sleep. The rest consists merely of accessories of imaginary, rather than real goods, which are not to be rejected, it is true, when they can be obtained by moderate exertion, or even by temporary sacrifices; but which we should cease to pursue as soon as they endanger the possession of more sub-

stantial advantages, the enjoyment of which is always sufficient to console us for the want of the others."

Every person must perceive after a moment's reflection, that it would be a fruitless undertaking to combat such a system with argument. For between what lies within its sphere, and what lies without it, a common basis is wanting, without which no discussion can lead to any right conclusions. Must it be formally demonstrated that every member of a state, however low and insignificant he may be, besides the common wants of life has other desires of a higher nature, among which national honour, a respected name, an independant constitution, a fixed and well assured interest in the political system, hold a principal place? These truths must be felt, and those who are insensible to them can never be convinced of them by argument. When a people or a generation is so far degraded by egotism, by unworthy maxims, and by a low and contracted manner of thinking, as to have lost all sense of public interest, to con-

sider the country as a name without a meaning, to weigh the value of an independant existence in the same balance with the commonest benefits, and to view the loss of liberty, and honour, as an event of indifference; then it is no longer time to appeal to the nobler feelings; slavery is compleat before the oppressor has appeared; the state is dissolved before being the object of violence; and when the first trying catastrophe arrives, those who were no longer able to endure the light of the sun will be delivered over to the minister of darkness.

The only tenable position from which the defenders of unconditional subjection can be attacked, and harassed with any hope of happy results, is one which has a sort of connection with their favourite calculation. That there never was a widely extended empire, which, after in the first place destroying the public property of nations, such as their forms of government, their laws, their privileges, their local constitutions, did not afterwards invade their manners, their charac-

ter, their habits of thinking, nay, even their language; and finished at last with destroying their private property, their professional pursuits, their domestic relationships, their personal liberty, and security, is manifest both from ancient and modern history. That the empire in which Europe is about to be overwhelmed, as far as it has proceeded hitherto has not only subverted thrones and dignities, demolished laws and forms of government; but that it has brought in its gloomy train, misery in every form, the robbery and plunder of the rich, the starvation of the poor, the most vexatious insecurity of all property, the ruin of all public institutions, the obstruction of industry, commerce, and particularly of foreign trade, the annihilation of capital and credit, and a load of most oppressive taxes, which extinguishes every hope of recovering them; and, besides all this, to complet the catalogue of evils, the pressure of arbitrary power; continual anxiety and fear for the loss of personal liberty; the impossibility, either in speech or writing, of imparting any consolation to the

sufferers, and a hopeless prospect for futurity—all this is disclosed by the notoriously undeniable situation of so many ruined nations; and many powerful reasons might be adduced, which cannot here be explained, however much they merit being fully developed, and deeply laid to heart, to prove that this new empire must retain its desolating and pestilential character to the last moment of its existence. But such warnings, however terrible and loud, cannot rouse us from our lethargic slumbers; even these considerations, so nearly allied to the commonest interests, so powerfully addressing themselves to the security and welfare of individuals—and mortifying it is to be obliged to confess it!—require too much public spirit, too much participation in the sufferings of others, too much exaltation and expansion of view to operate with effect upon our contemporaries. They are still not personal enough. Each individual contents himself with casting up the amount of his own particular loss, supposing things come to the worst, and how many advantages, and how much enjoy-

ment he will then have left ; and with this calculation, as foolish and deceitful as it is unworthy and inhuman, he shuts himself up in his chamber, and gives his country, contemporaries, and posterity, to the winds of destruction. Thus does eternal justice punish a degenerate and deeply corrupted generation ! Thus does the supreme good of social existence, mistaken, contemned, and rejected, avenge itself on the commonest possession. After a blind and obstinate selfishness has sacrificed every thing to one only idol, from which amidst rubbish and ruin it expects salvation ; an inexorable arm seizes at last on the contemptible image, breaks it before its trembling votaries, and dashes them to the ground, to wallow in the dust for which they were made.

But if reason and experience compel us to pronounce that indifference to the public good, which characterizes a very great proportion of the people of our time, an incurable evil ; what are we to think of another error, which, though less frequent, is still more revolting than that, (for it

would be going too far to call it more destructive,) I mean the *satisfaction* with which some amongst us hail the dissolution of all the old constitutions, the more than half finished, and soon to be completed, subjection of Europe! Here it is, not grounds of consolation which they offer us to sweeten a bitter and inevitable destiny; it is formal congratulations, it is a call to joy and exultation. One informs us with philosophical profundity, that what in appearance is so frightful, if considered in a just point of view, is the best and most convenient way to attain an everlasting peace; war, the only evil—for human wisdom will ere long get the better of earthquakes, pestilence, and famine—will soon vanish from the earth, when every thing is subjected to one master. Another is of opinion, not quite without ground, if the conclusion followed from the premises—that the old political body is become so weak, the joints which unite the different members so feeble, and the spirit which animated the whole so exhausted, impotent and scant, that its dissolution should not occasion much regret; but on the con-

trary, as opening a better prospect for futurity, that it is more to be wished for than deprecated. The vigorous creative hand of one individual of an absolute sovereignty will restore to every thing life and youth. A third dwells on the greatness of the man, whom Providence has chosen to govern the world according to his will; when the struggle is once finished, and every obstructing obstacle removed, then will his mighty genius put us again in possession of what we have lost, and convert united Europe into a scene of comfort and abundance, of splendour and bliss.—The public hear this language, not indeed with unqualified confidence, but without any symptom of disgust; and in the minds of most people, there is something which predisposes them favourably to receive it. They pant after repose. They think it impossible but the present painful, embroiled, and tumultuous state of things, must tend to a speedy and determinate issue; leading either to the re-establishment of order, or to the completion of that disorder, where every thing must begin anew. But as the road which con-

ducts to the former of these results is much more long and rugged than that which leads to the latter, they accustom themselves, by little and little, to consider the very abyss of evil as a sort of haven in which their hopes repose; and thus become familiar with the most criminal wishes, of which they were originally quite unaware.

Such a temper of mind as that here described we cannot be expected to combat. In so far as it has obtained an ascendancy among the great mass of the people, it originated either in childish credulity, or in dark despair. In so far as it has been occasioned, encouraged, and cherished, by a baneful class of writers; it is sufficient to point to its sources. Some were actuated by secret motives; and as such a conduct surpasses in criminality all ordinary depravation, by the most impure of all motives; others, and probably the greater number, (for the former class we must suppose to be but small, and no one should be ranked in it without the most convincing proof of his really belonging

to it, have been carried away by a perversion of intellect, by a love of fanciful speculation, by an abuse of ideal principles, and a total ignorance of real life. Whoever recalls to his mind what this class of political writers have inculcated and affected, for the last fifteen years, particularly in GERMANY; how they have found out illustrations and apologies for every one of the thousand forms, which the Proteus-like monster of the revolution assumed in such an incredibly rapid succession; and with what shameless effrontery they defended, more changeable even than their stars, systems the most inconsistent, admired the most contradictory forms, and oftener than once idolized to day what yesterday had been the objects of their execration—whoever will bear this in mind, can not be much surprised that “ABSOLUTE DESPOTISM,” and “THE NEW FEDERAL SYSTEM,” are at present the objects of their veneration; and that the avenging demon, which, as a punishment for their presumption, has whipped them round the wide and wearisome circle of political frenzies, has metamorphosed them from

enthusiasts of liberty, a justly fervent liberty, into panegyrists of the most perfect slavery: to which the nations were ever subjected.*

* Not to enter the lists with such men, (this they neither deserve nor expect!) but merely to mark more distinctly the point at which they are now arrived, I shall simply mention, *en passant*, the tone which several of their writers have lately adopted relative to ENGLAND (26)

It is well known, with what intimate acquaintance with their subject, and with what regard to truth, others have entertained, even to satiety, their credulous readers upon the BRITISH COMMERCIAL TYRANNY—upon THE OPPRESSION OF THE NEUTRAL NAVIGATION—upon ENGLAND'S MONOPOLY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE—upon the fatal consequences of the EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF INDIA, and other calamities of a similar nature. They never minded refutation; to instruct them was impossible. They either did not know, or did not wish to be thought to know, that ENGLAND, in time of peace disturbs no fisher boat at sea; and molests the trade of the republic of RAGUSA as little as that of FRANCE; that *in time of war* it acts towards neutral states in strict conformity to existing treaties, the only standard of national rights; that it justly resists the cancelling of these treaties by violence, and the more so, because the only power which has an interest in their being cancelled, is one which has sworn the destruction of England—that in the view of those streams of wealth which, notwithstanding the restrictions of treaties, flow through the channels of trade into neutral countries, to set up a try of robbery and oppression is the worst of all absurd-

The ascendant which apathy and indifference to the highest interests of Europe, or an immediate predilection for what

dities; that FRANCE, the uncalled for vindicator of the *liberty of the seas*, as it is termed, in fact asserts no one's rights, because all the European powers, with the single exception of Denmark, in consequence of the treaty of 1801, against which it never made any remonstrance, are either united with, swallowed up, and lost in France, (as Spain, Holland, Geneva, &c.) or, (like Russia and Sweden,) are the allies of England;—that to describe British industry and commerce as a destructive, ruinous monopoly, and a burthen upon Europe, is disgraceful, in an age pretending to have investigated the true principles of national economy—that England holds the sceptre of India, in no other capacity, than as the first agent of the whole European league; that the confirmation of its power in that quarter of the globe, in a political view, is harmless; and in an economical view, highly advantageous, and in perfect consonance with the interests of every nation when well understood. Instead, however, of persisting in these common place calumnies, they prepared themselves for bolder undertakings.

They have at last found out, that the root of the whole evil lies in *the fundamental principles of the British constitution*; and in those very qualities too which have been considered as constituting it a model of government. Out of this constitution springs the system of finance, the national debt, the bank, and so forth; and from these again is derived the *absolute incompatibility* of England with all other nations. The result of these profound speculations is, that *England must be ruined if Europe is to be saved.*

tended to prejudice these interests, obtained in the minds of our contemporaries, was not only, as is frequently believed, an accessory to greater evils, a figure in the back ground of the gloomy picture of the decay of Europe, it was the innate active principle, the original source of the decay. The governments have exposed themselves to much well merited censure; they have done much to precipitate their fate, but the greatest and most decisive share in the work of devastation is ours. Their mistakes would have been fewer, shorter, and

When for years past, books appear in Germany, which, upon this pinnacle of folly, construct with unheard of audacity a whole political system; when among others a journal, pretty generally read, (called the EUROPEAN ANNALS,) seems almost entirely devoted to familiarize the public with such views; it does not seem unfair to infer, that there is something more at work here than the insanity of paradox, or the passing delirium of intemperance. But as no one can deny, and it is impossible for the most determined sophist to snatch it from the comprehension of the silliest of his hearers, that if *England's economical influence* were as *prejudicial* to the other states as it is *beneficial* and *necessary* to them, England is nevertheless the only *political power* which can oppose the incessant progress of France to universal dominion; so it is clear, that the object of these worthless writers is to promote, facilitate, and complete this sovereignty.

more susceptible of remedy, if the utter blindness of the nations, the perversion of public spirit, the dormant state of all genuine sentiments, the dominion of the lowest motives; and to say all in a single word, the moral corruption of the world, had not infected, poisoned, and preyed upon every thing around it. Every age may suffer from some political faults, or some unsuccessful enterprizes. But when, for a series of years in every quarter of the world, we see the same spectacle of littleness and impotence, of false and nerveless policy, of worthless plans and paltry means of execution, and a straight undeviating march to inevitable destruction, we may rest assured that the evil does not lie in accidental anomalies, in the incapacity of individual organs; or in passing obstructions; but that the heart is affected and diseased, that the blood of the political body is corrupted and dried up. Princes, it is said; stamp their character upon the nations which they govern, and in a certain sense it may be so; but in a higher and more comprehensive sense, nations stamp their characters upon the princes to whom they

are subject. They are constituent parts of the whole, and when viewed from the central point of the world's relations, they are, at every given moment, necessarily and precisely what surrounding objects make them. After all the faults and blunders of rulers have been described and illustrated fully in detail, the history of the dreadful disturbances which Europe has experienced in the course of the last ten years will remain for posterity an unintelligible mystery, a riddle not susceptible of explanation; the very echo of a fable. The state of the nations must be represented, their participation in the common ruin, their progress in good and evil, their wishes, their aims, their errors, their moral and political decay, must be held forth to view and elucidated. All partial complaints against regents, all exclusive accusations brought against them, are the productions of blindness and injustice; the mildest and the hardest, the best and the worst that can be said of them is, they have given a faithful representation of their age.

From what quarter shall we now expect relief? the governments and the public opinion are the common responsible authors of our present cruel situation. The former neither hear nor understand us, and what is still more discouraging, they can no longer listen to us; because the overmeasure of their embarrassments has robbed them of their freedom: to attempt to operate upon them is to no purpose, because the possibility of a fortunate issue, at least supposes as granted, what here has vanished without hope of return, a longing after a more happy state, a sentiment which detests chains, and a courage which dares to break them. One bright prospect still remains, and this, which is a mighty consolation, no malice of fate can darken. The brave, the upright, and the good, how small soever their number may be, must remain stedfast and inseparable, must mutually instruct, admonish, bear with, support, and inspirit one another. A league between them is the only power, the only invincible coalition, which can still at this day defy the force of arms,

restore liberty to the nations, and repose to the world. Even this sacred league may succumb in individual combats; but all that it has to lose is the field of battle, a glorious retreat is open to it. When all around it falls off, it entrenches itself upon an inaccessible eminence, shuts itself up, with the fairest treasures of humanity, beyond the reach of the conqueror, and guards the deposit for a happier generation.

Ye who, in the wreck of time, live surrounded with death and desolation, who have saved the first or most precious of all goods, a free enlightened mind, an honest and sensible heart, an affection for the sacred relics of humanity, and courage to sacrifice every thing for them; ye proved and valiant heroes of the age, whom adversity has not been able to vanquish, who in mind and in truth have been always victorious, whose character is mistaken by the multitude, and who, fortunately perhaps, are despised and detested by those blustering disturbers of the world's peace whom the people adore.—But above all, ye to whom these words are particularly

addressed; distinguished ornaments of your country, magnanimous Germans, worthy of your name, invincible to misfortune; fatigued; but not—dispirited! He who hath selected you to reconcile posterity with the present generation, has doomed you to the hardest troubles and most fiery trials. Wherever you turn your eyes you are surrounded with the images of desolation, and with invitations to discouragement. Our country is depressed, trampled upon, torn to pieces, and profaned; a part of its princes openly and avowedly bear the yoke of a foreign power; more than one, enticed with vain titles, or imaginary aggrandizement, became fellow-workers in the common ruin, which overtook them in the very hour even of apostacy; in the moment of fancied enjoyment, before they had gathered the fruits of their treachery, or brought them into security. Of those who still have an existence, who still retain the name of powers with some shadow of independence, the greater part are ripe for destruction; by their selfish or cowardly policy, by their voluntary and shameful capitulations, by steps which

have deprived them of the esteem of the world and the confidence of their people, they invited the fate to which they are doomed. The few who retain pure, noble, just, and German sentiments—for such there are and you know them—are either, in consequence of still bleeding wounds, or of the proportional smallness of their territory, or of a thousand considerations and restrictions, so fettered, and weak, and helpless, that almost all they can give us is their good will. The energies of our great nation are scattered, divided, turned aside into feeble rills, or into corrupt and stagnant pools, or into exhausting drains, and lost for every national object. All the protecting bulwarks of our land are overthrown; our confines, if confines we can be said to have when the enemy is still among us, are bared of every means of defence; our most flourishing towns and provinces are daily like so much merchandise without an owner, cut up, parcelled out, sold, exchanged and again exchanged; and given away to natives and foreigners. Property honestly acquired vanishes or

migrates, industry is sick and crippled, our ports and markets are shut up.

But not merely the body of the empire is maimed, maltreated, and dishonoured, its soul also is mortally wounded. In vain you seek in the great mass of the people, in vain at courts, in vain among those distinguished for their rank in the country; that exalted feeling of melancholy, that deep, but manly sorrow, that piercing, but hopeful grief, which engenders saving resolutions. Your lamentations are spent in the air, your descriptions of the general ruin are considered at best as matter of idle amusement, or literary curiosity; there where you are still permitted to disturb the slumbers of the public, men think they do a great deal when they tolerate you as tiresome friends, or well meaning enthusiasts; the greater part listen to you with uneasy feelings, nay, even with fear; and the moment is visibly approaching, when a long gloomy silence will be the law of your social existence, and the hard, but imperious condition, of your personal liberty.

All this and more than this,—for who can ascertain where the evil will end,—you will support not merely with steadfastness and equanimity qualities which are not denied to beings lower than you; but with the pride-inspiring consciousness of incontestible superiority, if you have greatness and strength enough never to prove untrue to yourselves. As long as you remain upright, there is nothing fallen which may not be reinstated. Even the grave opens, and death is only apparent when the vital principle still exists in the heart. Whether you will live to receive the reward of your constancy, to celebrate the public triumph of your cause, and the regeneration of all things, depends upon inscrutable decrees. For you, however, if you remain steadfast in what is good; and for your posterity and heirs, to live and conquer is but one thing. In you what appeared to be sunk, rises with renewed splendour; in you what seemed to be lost, is again recovered; our native country, the commonwealth of Europe, the liberty and dignity of nations, the reign of law and order, the productions of all the ages which are passed, continue to flourish in your

spirit; there where no destiny can reach, no tyrant approach, the world is restored to youth and vigour. Your immediate influence may be thwarted, the circle of your operations circumscribed by narrow bounds, your hands laid in fetters, and your mouth forcibly shut; but these are only the outworks of your power. Your firm intrepid purpose, the acknowledged steadfastness of your principles, your constant, though calm protestations, against whatever guilty violence may attempt to effect or justify; the lively conviction ever present to your enemies as well as to your friends, that the war between you and injustice, will never be compromised by false negotiations, interrupted by imaginary truces, or terminated by an insincere treaty; the dignified, manly, constantly upright, constantly prepared posture in which you appear to your contemporaries, these are your everlasting weapons. Your bare insulated existence is a perpetual terror to the oppressors, and for the oppressed an eternal consolation.

Never forget that wherever you are is the true central point of all the un-

dertakings, by means of which Europe sooner or later must be delivered from servitude; the arbitrary code of laws to which it is at present subjected torn to pieces, the imposing edifice of a temporary might thrown down, and a new immortal league formed between liberty, order and peace, for the happiness of future times: neither England nor Russia can accomplish it; desirable as both are as allies, invaluable as they are as a counterpoize, and in the relation of co operating powers; but the proper work of liberation must be accomplished on German soil. Here the re-establishment must take place, as it was here that the building was overthrown, and its destruction completed. Germany has been the cause of Europe's fall—Germany must lift it from its state of ruin. Not all the energies or arts of France, not that wild convulsive force which sprung like a tempestuous cloud from the poisoned abyss of the revolution; not the personal prowess or dexterity of any creature of this revolution could have heaved the world from its socket; the defencelessness of

Germany alone has done it. Our unhappy eternal discords, the division of our force, the mutual jealousy of our princes, the want of unison in our people, the extinction of every generous feeling for the common interest of the nation, the slumber of every patriotic sentiment, these have been the spoilers, these the destroyers of our liberty, these have been our mortal enemies, and the enemies of Europe. If we unite, if we forget our family feuds, if, in the hour of danger, in the hour of general pressure, we can resolve to be Germans, *we* shall thus defy every assault—never will a foot's breadth of German territory become a prey to an insolent stranger, never will the weakest, and most distant member of the great European system be struck off from its compact and vigorous body; nay more, we shall have the credit of restoring France, which has been so deeply convulsed, and which still remains in a distempered condition, to a state of true and hopeful convalescence; for who can compare its present situation, its bloated and unnatural corpulence, to a state of health! and

of conducting it to a tranquil, harmonious existence, and a happy reconciliation with itself; a measure which, if performed with wisdom, and with well-chosen instruments, would have established and protected, for many centuries to come, the civil constitution of Europe in the whole and in each of its parts. So much was in our power, brothers, and so much we have most culpably neglected. But if any thing can extricate us from this abyss of misery in which we are now doing penance for our sins, it is the same resolution by which, at an earlier period, we might have avoided falling into it. In a state of division we have been subjected, in a state of union we must rise from subjection; this mode of salvation is now, it must be confessed, become more difficult to realize than it was; but so much is incontestably true if the *political energies* of Germany, are ever to act in concert, the *national will* must be previously united. Here high spirited and magnanimous Germans, scattered but undivided in spirit, allied by identity of sentiment and of aim, constitutional representatives of the nation, here an

honourable field opens before you. To remain true to yourselves was your first duty, but desert not now your native country. Let every one in the circle in which he moves, in the station which he holds, through whatever medium it may be, set up the lights of his wisdom, of his strength, and unwavering perseverance; let his voice be heard as far it can reach, calling upon the slothful to renewed exertions, the hopeless to fresh courage, or the torpid to renovated life. Cultivate peace and concord, and mutual confidence, and harmony of views and wishes, and interests and zeal for the common cause, and readiness to sacrifice every private advantage to a great national object; and inculcate the same sentiments on all to whom your influence extends. Exclude none from the benefit of your cares, not even those you have given up as irretrievably lost; not even those who, on the brink of destruction, and subject to fear and terror, you may think inaccessible to your influence; not even those whose deluded rulers have added to our calamities, introduced the enemy within our walls,

and surrendered the country to his discretion. In the hearts of the most degraded Germans there lives still something which will understand your meaning, and return you the tribute of esteem and approbation: why should you not win over such who, without any love of shame, but from the traiterous counsels of others, fell the victims of weakness, indecision, or of wavering resolutions? Never inquire after immediate effects, nor after the extent of the good you have done, nor after the number of the minds you have gained! It requires not a great number to bring about matters of the highest moment; consider that a single word spoken in a happy moment can awaken nations from a state of death, and rekindle the sacred fire of patriotism, though quite extinguished, in whole generations! It is impossible that a people like ours, however it may have been punished and mortified, deserted and betrayed; however it may have been misled by hellish artifices, or stunned by defeats and calamity; however it may have forgot itself for a time, must not at last rise

from its degradation; and from the cruel state of humiliation to which it has been reduced; impossible that so much force of mind, so much personal superiority, so much isolated, but energetic power, such an affluence of natural talents improved by various and profound instruction, as are to be found amongst us, should not sooner or later collect into a focus which will enlighten and animate the whole; impossible that out of this venerable stem of multifarious excellence and virtue, out of this cradle of European dominion, out of so many families illustrated by ancient reputation, by great and honourable names, and obliged, as it were, to transmit to their heirs the inheritance which they have received from their ancestors; out of so many races of princes shining with antique splendor, even in this twilight of all greatness, a perfect hero should not spring forth as a saviour and avenger to wipe the tears from all faces, to re-establish us in the possession of our eternal rights, and again build up Germany and Europe. To prepare for this protecting genius, appear when he will, fit and useful instru-

INTRODUCTION.

A

ments with which to act, to train up subjects with a spirit of resistance to governments founded in usurpation, determined foes to tyrants, and an obedient and willing people to returning legitimate dominion; to preserve regularity in religious observances, to educate intelligent and worthy ministers of virtuous liberty, and of that wisdom which comes from God, and to breed up for posterity a class of hardy spirits and valorous combatants, that similar calamities may be prevented from again breaking in upon the world—that is your mighty calling.

If Providence has irrevocably decreed that the evil, the iron times in which your lot is cast shall extend beyond the limits of your days, and that the darkness shall be completed before the enlivening influence of the sun again is felt, retire within yourselves, and enjoy through faith and hope what the troubled realities of the present deny you. But let your enjoyment be fitting minds influenced by the most serious impressions. The grounds of consolation with which persons such

as you should arm themselves against the terrors of the present, have nothing in common with those by which selfish and shortsighted weaklings endeavour for a time to escape from the feeling of misery, the sentiment of shame, till at last the miserable bolster on which they thought to forget the loss of every thing that is great and good, and to slumber out existence, sinks into the all devouring gulph. Yours are of a higher nature, more active, quickening and balsamic, but they must be purchased at an incomparably higher price, and enjoyed on much harder conditions. It is not permitted for you to shut yourselves up in sloth, cowardly to withdraw from the field, to retire with Cynical disgust, or monkish apathy, from the world; and to indulge in inactive and inglorious repose. You must contend as long as you have breath with the enemy, how great soever his might, how menacing soever his violence; you must not surrender a foot breadth of the sacred territory which you are appointed to defend without resistance, and without a struggle, you must yield to no danger, to no difficulty, nor must

you give up the cause entrusted to you under any pretence or probability, not even when, to all human appearance, it seems irremediably lost. That is the law of your being; it is only thus you can insure peace with yourselves, tranquillity during the raging of the storm, and an exaltation above every fortune. It is fortunate that what duty enjoins your advantage requires, and that your interest is in perfect harmony with your obligations. Recollect that in past scenes every moment of repose proved dangerous to those who engaged in the race, and that restless redoubled endeavours to attain their object was always the maxim of those who were familiarized with victory. In your career to stop is to lose the prize. As soon as you stand still your strength abandons you, the sleep of discouragement overcomes you, and the night comes and mantles you with its terrors. With the more constancy and determination you advance, the more certainly you will escape this feeling of fatigue, the more hope will fan

you with its freshest breezes, the sooner
you will be saluted by the purple dawn
of morning.

Written in the beginning of April 1806.

FRAGMENTS
UPON
THE PRESENT STATE
OF
THE POLITICAL BALANCE
OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.

The true acceptation of a Balance of Power.

WHAT is usually termed a balance of power, is that constitution subsisting among neighbouring states more or less connected with one another; by virtue of which no one among them can injure the independence or the essential rights of another, without meeting with effectual resistance on some side, and consequently exposing itself to danger.

The allusion in the term to corporeal

objects has given occasion to various misconceptions. It has been represented that those who recognized the principles of a combination among states founded on an equal balance of power, had in view the most perfect possible *equality* or *equalization* of powers, and required that the different states composing a great political league should, in respect of extent, population, riches, resources, and so forth, be exactly measured, squared and rounded by a common standard. Out of this false hypothesis, according as it has been applied by credulity or scepticism to the relations between states, have sprung two opposite errors, the one almost as hurtful as the other. Those who adopted that imaginary principle in its full extent, were thereby led to believe that in every case in which a state gains an accession of strength, either by external acquisitions, or by the developement of its internal resources, the rest must oppose, and contend with it till they have either obtained an equivalent or reduced it to its former situation. A different set justly persuaded of the impossibility of such a

system have, on the other hand, declared the whole idea of a political balance to be a chimera invented by dreamers, and artfully made use of by designing men as a pretext for disputes, injustice and violence. The former of these errors would banish peace from the earth; the latter would open the most desirable prospects to every state which, under the influence of ambition, aspired to universal dominion.

Both errors proceed from the same mixture of ideas, which, in the province of the interior economy of states, have produced all the visionary and airy theories of *civil liberty*, and the failure of all the practical attempts to carry them into execution. In every well ordered state the collective body of citizens, and in every well ordered commonwealth of nations the collective body of states should be *equal in rights*, (that is) their *rights* should be *equally respected*; but it by no means follows that they should have the *same rights*, that is, *rights of equal quality and value*. True *equality*, and the only equality at-

tainable by legitimate means, consists, in both cases, in this, that the smallest as well as the greatest is secured in the possession of *his right*, and that it can neither be forced from him nor encroached upon by *lawless* power.

As it is a fundamental principle in every well organized state, and the triumph of its constitution, that a multitude of persons in the greatest degree unequal in rights and powers, in talents and capacities, in acquired and inherited possessions, so happily exist together under common laws, and a common government, that no one can arbitrarily thrust himself into his neighbour's sphere; and that the poorest can as little be molested in the enjoyment of his cottage and his field, as the richest can be in the possession of his palace and domains; so the proper character of a union of states, such as has existed in modern Europe, and the triumph of its constitution, is, that a certain number of states, possessing various degrees of power and wealth, shall each remain untroubled within its own confines, under the pro-

tection of a common league, and that, that state whose whole territory is encircled by the walls of a single town, shall be held as sacred by its neighbours as any other, whose possessions and power extends over lands and seas.

But as the best constitution of a single state which can be devised by man never completely answers its purpose, and always leaves room for individual acts of violence, oppression, injustice; in the same manner the most perfect federal constitution is never sufficiently strong to prevent every attack of a more powerful state on the rights of a less powerful. Nay more, if the conditions are in other respects equal, a league between states will, in a certain proportion, be more defective in protecting the independence and security of its members, than a single state is in defending the legal equality and security of its citizens. The security of the citizens of a single state rests upon the unity of its legislation and administration. The laws all proceed from one central point, their maintenance is the work of one and the same authority, and

those who are disposed to infringe them can be checked at the outset by legal coercion; or those who have actually transgressed them, can be made responsible to a tribunal of justice. The law which binds states together consists in their mutual compacts; and as these, from the endless diversity of the relations out of which they spring, are susceptible of an infinite number of differences in their principle, spirit, and character, the nature of their origin excludes, in the strict sense of the word, a higher common sanction. Among independent nations there is neither an executive nor a judicial power; to create the one or the other has been long a fruitless, pious wish, and the object of many a vain, well-meaning effort. But what the nature of these relations prevented from ever being perfectly accomplished was, at least, obtained in approximation; and in the general political system of modern Europe, the problem was as happily solved as could be expected from the endeavours of men, and the application of human wisdom.

There was formed among the states of

this quarter of the globe an extensive social commonwealth, of which the characteristic object was the preservation and reciprocal guarantee of the rights of all its members. From the time that this respectable object came to be distinctly and clearly recognized, the necessary eternal conditions, on which it was attainable, unfolded themselves by degrees. Men were soon aware that there were certain fundamental principles, arising out of the proportional power of each of the component parts to the whole, without the constant influence of which order could not be secured; and the following maxims were gradually set down as a practical basis, which was not to be deviated from;

That if the states system of Europe is to exist and be maintained by common exertions, no one of its members must ever become so powerful as to be able to coerce all the rest put together;—

That if that system is not merely to exist, but to be maintained without constant perils and violent concussions; each

member which infringes it must be in a condition to be coerced, not only by the collective strength of the other members, but by any majority of them, if not by one individual;—

But that to escape the alternate danger of an uninterrupted series of wars, or of an arbitrary oppression of the weaker members in every short interval of peace; *the fear* of awakening common opposition, or of drawing down common vengeance, must of itself be sufficient to keep every one within the bounds of moderation;—and

That if ever a European state attempted by unlawful enterprizes to attain to a degree of power, (or had in fact attained it,) which enabled it to defy the danger of a union of several of its neighbours, or even an alliance of the whole, such a state should be treated as a common enemy; and that if, on the other hand, it had acquired that degree of force by an accidental concurrence of circumstances, and without any acts of violence, whenever it appeared upon the public theatre,

no means which political wisdom could devise for the purpose of diminishing its power, should be neglected or untried.

These maxims contain the only intelligible theory of a balance of power in the political world.*

The original equality of the parties in such a union as is here described is not an accidental circumstance, much less a casual evil; but is in a certain degree to be considered as the previous condition and foundation of the whole system.† It is not *how much power* one or other possess, but whether he possess it in such a manner that he cannot with impunity encroach upon that of the rest; which is the true

* It perhaps would have been with more propriety called a system of *counterpoise*. For perhaps the highest of its results is not so much a perfect *equipoise* as a constant alternate *vacillation* in the scales of the balance, which, from the application of *counterweights*, is prevented from ever passing certain limits.

† Had the surface of the globe been divided into equal parts, no such union would ever have taken place; and an eternal war of each against the whole is probably the only event we should have heard of.

question to be answered, in order to enable us to judge at every given moment of the proportion between individual parts and of the general sufficiency of the structure: hence even a subsequent increase of that original necessary inequality, provided it has not sprung from sources, or been introduced by practices, which contravene one of the fundamental maxims above-mentioned, may be in itself blameless.

It is only when a state with open wantonness, or under fictitious pretences and titles artificially invented, proceeds to such enterprizes as immediately, or in their unavoidable consequences, prepare the way for the subjugation of its weaker neighbours, and for perpetual danger to the stronger, that conformably to sound conceptions of the general interest of the commonwealth, a rupture of the balance is to be apprehended; it is only then that several should unite together to prevent the decided preponderance of one individual power.

By this system, which has been acted

upon since the beginning of the sixteenth century, with more or less good fortune, but, with great constancy, and often with uncommon prudence; at first, more in a practical way, and, as it were from political instinct, afterwards with clear, reflecting, and methodical constancy, two great results were obtained, in the midst of a tumultuous assemblage of the most decisive events. The one was, that no person succeeded in prescribing laws to Europe, and that, (till our times,) all apprehension, even of the return of a universal dominion, was gradually banished from every mind. The other, that the political constitution, as it was framed in the sixteenth century, remained so entire in all its members till the end of the eighteenth, (when all ancient ordinances were abolished,) that none of the independent powers, which originally belonged to the confederacy, had lost their political existence.

How these two important results were obtained, amid cares and dangers of various sorts, amid many storms and tempests, to the credit of the European states-

manship, and to the no small advantage of humanity, is to be learnt in the history of that period.* It was only at the commencement of this period, before experience and deeper observation had spoiled the phantom of its terrors, that the possibility of an universal monarchy obtained belief.† But wiser men afterwards perceived, that though a complete universal

* Few writers have illustrated modern history in this point of view with more learning and ingenuity than Mr. Ancillon, in his *Tableau des Revolutions du Systeme Politique de l'Europe*.

† The extent of the possessions of Charles the Fifth had suggested the idea of such an event, and had given it a certain importance; but it has never been made even probable that this monarch entertained this project, or pursued it under any form. Posterior to his time, when the power of the house of Austria was divided into two separate branches, it was indeed attempted to revive the terror, but it was merely an artifice of hostile powers. It is remarkable that Hume, one of the most dispassionate, soberest, and most impartial of our modern historians, pointedly maintains that the house of Austria, particularly from the scattered situation of its provinces, was by no means so well calculated to establish a universal monarchy as France, “ which possessed all the advantages of the Austrian power, and laboured under none of its defects.” See *Essay on the Balance of Power* in Hume’s *Essays and Treatises*, Vol. I.

dominion, such as the Romans established, might on sufficient grounds be declared impossible in modern Europe, this was by no means the only danger: they perceived that by extraordinary circumstances, and by neglecting to oppose the proper obstacles, one great kingdom or another might attain to such a degree of preponderance as might gradually draw upon the whole system, if not immediate sudden destruction, at least the loss of its independence; as might change substantive parts of its territory, (under whatever title it might be,) into provinces of the principal state; as might convert regents into vassals, and whatever other evils might arise out of such a constitution, they clearly and with utter abhorrence recognized in its eventual establishment, the unavoidable ruin of the smaller, the oppression and degradation of the greater, and the constant peril of the middling states.

But by the arrangements adopted by the statesmen of better times, and less by individual measures than by the general

vigilance, alertness, energy, and true political spirit which guided them at every step, they succeeded in most successfully solving their second problem, in preserving inviolate the whole structure committed to their care, even in its lowest compartments, and in protecting with eminent dexterity those weaker parts which were in danger from time to time of being undermined. It is certainly a remarkable occurrence, that in the course of three most eventful centuries, amid so many bloody wars, so various and decisive negotiations, so frequent changes of power, so great and extended revolutions, amid a general anarchy of all social, civil, religious, and political relations, not one independent state was annihilated by violent means. Neither Switzerland, nor Holland, nor any spiritual nor temporal German prince, nor the most insignificant imperial town, nor Venice, nor Genoa, nor the small Italian republics, though surrounded on all sides by states of gigantic greatness, nor Malta left to itself, nor the weak, though flourishing Geneva pressed by France on one side, and Savoy on the

other ; nor even the power of Savoy, at one time threatened by Austria, at another by France ; nor Portugal, enclosed on all sides by the Spanish territory ; nor Sweden, nor Denmark, both endangered by the prodigious extension and aggrandizement of the Russian and Prussian powers ;—not one of all these states disappeared. Several of them certainly maintained themselves by their own courage and strength, or by superior wisdom, or by the recollection of those achievements by means of which in earlier times they had attained to independence and dignity. But the greater part of them, if not all, would, to the vast prejudice of the whole, have gone to ruin, had they not been supported and protected by the general interest of Europe, and those great enlightened principles, by which that interest was conducted.

The whole of this excellent system has now at length, like all the works of man, seen the hour of its fall approach ; and it has sunk under those maladies which gradually prove fatal to all the productions of the moral world, *abuse of form* on one

hand, and *apathy of spirit* on the other, How this has happened will be shewn in the following chapters, and, at the same time, we shall conscientiously enquire, whether because much is lost, and much irretrievably lost, we should on that account, with cowardly indifference, give up that which still remains ; or, whether we ought not rather to do our utmost to save what can yet be saved, and from the ruins of the old building to rear a new and more substantial edifice ?

CHAP. II.

*Of the Shock given to the Balance of Power
by the Introduction of the Partition
System.*

IN the physical world, a system, the operations of which are regulated by weights and counterweights, can only be shaken by one or more of these losing their original power, and thus producing the preponderance of the others, and the ruin of the machine. A similar system, when applied to human relations, is exposed, besides that now mentioned, to another danger. As its powers in this case are endowed with freedom, a part of these may combine to the prejudice of the rest, and effect what would have been impossible for any one singly to have produced, the ruin of the devoted member, and thus the destruction of the whole machine.

A system of political counterpoise, has

both in its structure and operations, a remarkable analogy with what, in the internal economy of states, is called a mixed constitution, or constitutional balance. When this, as in England for example, has attained to the highest pitch of perfection of which it is susceptible; when every thing is arranged and constituted in the wisest manner, when none of the different powers of which it is composed can surpass the bounds of their respective spheres, or in any way transgress their limits without encountering a repelling force, there is yet another danger which baffles all human skill to avoid. As the divided powers must necessarily act in concert for good and salutary purposes, they can also, in extraordinary cases, voluntarily combine for bad ones; and thus, what would have been impossible for any one singly to operate had the principle of mutual counteraction continued, may be effected by a fatal understanding between them, to the prejudice of the state, and the ruin of its constitution.

In precisely the same manner it is

possible that the members of a great confederacy, which, in the natural course of things, should act as a counterpoise the one to the other; and in times of common danger, by common measures of prevention, oppose the preponderance of one individual, may be misled by extraordinary conjectures, may unite for the oppression, humiliation, or annihilation of a weaker member, and thus employ for the purposes of attack and destruction the same powers which were destined for protection and preservation. To such a perversion of a system grounded in wisdom, and calculated for beneficial purposes, by the constant action and re-action of reciprocal limitation; to such an *abuse of form*, the partition system is indebted for its origin.

The possibility of an abuse of this kind arose so clearly out of the particular construction of the European national league, that, as it strikes us at present, a mind reflecting on futurity must have dreaded the contingency of the evil long before its approach. But in all human things there are certain outrageous extremes, it would

seem, which even the mind most capable of combination does not take into its calculation till the evil actually arrive, brought on as it were by a fatal influence of the stars ; such is the case with that unfortunate perversion by which the most salutary political principle was converted into a tool of unrighteousness. It was not known, it was not counted upon, it was scarce ever dreaded, when in the year 1772 the partition of Poland took place.

This event belongs entirely to history. It is in every sense of the word concluded ; its results have passed into the province of right and order, into the constitution of Europe, as it is recognized, prescribed, and established by treaties, into that system which has been consecrated by the public sanction of nations.—Besides this, its authors and those who took a part in it have disappeared from the theatre, posterity now pronounces judgment on their transactions. If we regard them with a rigorous eye, it is not only for the purpose of ascertaining with correctness the causes of the shock sustained by the social

constitution of Europe, and of the means of remedying the evil, we are actuated by another and more pressing motive. The partition of Poland is now pleaded as a just pretence for compleatly overturning what still remains of the old constitution, and of forcibly and violently knocking to the ground its pillars and supporters. It is explicitly maintained, not merely by private writers, who must first clear the path, but by the French government and its immediate acknowledged organs, that France is justified even now in demanding indemnity for what the neighbouring powers gained by the partition of Poland, and that by just analogy, as they carried their plans into execution without the consent of France, so France must pursue its advantage, without regarding their remonstrances, wherever it can carry its arms. In order to strip this pretence of every thing which has a tendency to blind the weak, to mislead the wise, to encourage and to favour the enemies of the public weal, it is proper and necessary attentively to consider it. In great transactions like these, a contempt of all little aids and an undisguised

representation of truth, is always the surest way to one's object. With the more frankness and sincerity that we pronounce upon past injustice, so much more undoubted is our right not to spare those who have called it back into existence for the purpose of building upon it a new and more extended system of iniquity and still wider devastation.

What rendered the project of a partition of Poland so incomparably more destructive to the higher interests of Europe than any former acts of violence of apparently a more aggravated character, was the decisive circumstance of its originating in that very sphere from which was expected to flow nothing but benefits and blessings, security in time of peace, and salvation in periods of danger. An union between several regents had been always considered as a beneficial barrier against lawless power, and the passions of an individual oppressor; it now appeared, to the terror of the world! that such an union could be formed for the purpose of bringing about precisely that evil against

which it seemed destined as a bulwark of defence. The impression made by this detestable discovery must be still deeper and more painful, when we reflect that the framers of the wicked project, in the whole course of their undertaking, adopted the principle of the political balance as a star to conduct them through it; that they acted conformably to this principle as far as circumstances would admit in the adjustment of their respective interests, and that while they inflicted upon its spirit the most frightful wounds, they borrowed its attire, its forms, and even its language. *Corruptio optimi pessima.* To witness such an abuse of the noblest mean which the European commonwealth possessed for assuring its safety and welfare, was, in itself, a revolting spectacle; but the malignant character of the deed was first compleatly brought to light in its consequences. The cause of public justice was on all hands abandoned and betrayed. A horde of jabbering sophists who, at that time in France, were striving to shake the foundations of all principle, and to undermine every existing constitution now that

the mighty of the earth had broken into the sanctuary of national right, not under the impulse of incendiary passions, but deliberately and systematically turned the most respectable political ideas into ridicule without fear or reserve. Even among the enlightened and upright of the time only a few escaped the dreadful contagion. Notwithstanding that what is purest in its nature may be profaned, and what is most wholesome may be poisoned--notwithstanding that the fatal blow which the federal constitution of Europe had received called upon them the more loudly to unite, to establish the foundations of the building on a firmer basis, and more vigorously to exert themselves in its defence; they either gave themselves up to a comfortless incredulity in the inefficacy of political maxims, or to a systematic indifference. The multitude misled by the former, or not sufficiently warned against the latter, sunk every day deeper in the bottomless void, and became more and more accustomed to expect their law from violence, and their salvation from chance. How much this fatal habit

of thinking must have contributed to facilitate crime, and spread desolation, when at last the evil days arrived when all right was trampled under foot, the ruin of all order conspired, and the whole social machine disjuncted and broken, can have escaped only the inconsiderate observer.

But we have at last suffered enough; ruins heaped on ruins, disaster on disaster, and a mass of violence and crime, such as no age ever witnessed, has covered up that old act of injustice. To bring it again forward to view; for the sake of grounding upon it new usurpations, is a pretension so repulsive in its nature, that all Europe must unite in raising its voice against it. This becomes so much sounder policy, and so much the more a sacred obligation, because that unhallowed and wicked pretence, after a long interval of silence, is again brought forward at a moment of crisis and great confusion, so that no one can determine where in the course of time it may lead, and whether at last it may not be explicitly declared, that *Europe* must go to ruin because *Poland* has gone

to ruin. It is time to set this whole process aside; France alone still rakes up its ashes: let us unite satisfactorily to prove that France has no right in any political discussion, in the defence of any present measure, or in preferring any claim, whether in other respects well or ill grounded, to bring what formerly happened in Poland into reckoning and account. By these means at least if we are not able to impose eternal silence upon all present and future sophists, we shall at least set to rest the sound part of public opinion upon this captious question.

1st. The fate of Poland is long ago decided, not only in *fact* but in *right*. By a number of treaties of peace and conventions concluded between the partitioning powers, and all the other European states, their old and new possessions are recognized and guaranteed; the former Polish provinces are now so completely united and incorporated with their old territory as to make it impossible to separate the one from the other; the re-

establishment of Poland is therefore impracticable, either in *fact* or *right*. Had France by the partition of this country been immediately and essentially injured, had it suffered and lost more than the other neighbouring states, had it alone lost and suffered by the transaction, had it the justest claims upon indemnity for this loss, and had it not extended its territory a single foot's breadth,—were all these suppositions as true as they are collectively false, it would be no less firmly established that after France had kept silence so long, had kept silence on so many great occasions; nay more, after it formally acknowledged and confirmed the present constitution in all its treaties of peace, its right is for ever extinguished, forfeited and cancelled. The French government has lately * made the romantic proposal, to appearance indeed by way of joke, but who can mistake the omen! that all the powers should respectively give up what they have acquired for the

* In an article of the *Moniteur* of the 24th July, which I shall often have occasion to mention.

last fifty years: but if every thing is to be settled in this way, and if all that has been transacted and agreed upon for half a century is to be undone and retracted, why not go further back? Why not go at least a hundred or a hundred and fifty years back? Thus would France give up Alsace, the three bishoprics of Lorraine; or if it kept them, give an equivalent to the Emperor of Germany in Italy. With much about the same right, indeed, the King of Sweden might take possession of the states of Denmark, because his ancestors lost Livonia to Russia; or the King of Spain indemnify himself in Portugal for the loss of Holland.

2d. But if all that has been concluded, decided, and ratified by the law of nations, still remained in a state of uncertainty, and a negotiation were now, for the first time, to be set on foot on the question of the interest of France in the partition of Poland, there is no enlightened tribunal of public law which would not decree, that the transaction which took place in Poland did not afford the

slightest pretence for the smallest aggrandizement of France. Not now to dwell upon that senseless doctrine on which France has oftener than once grounded her late pretensions, because a *first* violated the rights of a *second*, a *third* is justifiable in avenging them on a *fourth*; we consider the case merely in its influence on the collective body of states. Could Europe have been indemnified in any way by the gain of France for the loss which it sustained in the partition of Poland! Would not every attempt of this nature instead of healing the wounds rather have irritated them, and made them mortal? If the King of England, in a critical conjuncture, should combine with both his houses of parliament to adopt some unjust and oppressive measure, tending to the ruin of his land; what would we think of the man who should have the audacity to maintain *now* the House of Commons is at liberty to pass the first arbitrary law that may be proposed *without* the consent of either the King or the Lords? The appeals of France to the transactions of Poland

have precisely the same degree of logical force; because the system adopted for the common security experienced a violent shock in consequence of an unfortunate combination of certain powers, shall every power be henceforth at liberty to attack it when it shall think proper? Had such a pretension been brought forward immediately after the partition of Poland, the partitioning powers even ought not to have hesitated a moment to take the field to combat it; for though one has been guilty himself of injustice still it is always proper and laudable in him to prevent others from committing similar injustice. It was the province and duty of France to stifle the project in the birth, and to prevent its execution in every possible way; but after it was compleatly accomplished, had the French cabinet at that time under pretence of re-establishing the balance of power, attempted the conquest of a neighbouring country, Holland for example, Austria, Prussia, and Russia would not only have neglected to exercise their rights, but

would have exposed themselves to a new reproach, if they had not employed their force in frustrating the undertaking.

3d. In as far as *political* grounds can be separated from grounds of *justice*, it is indisputably certain, that the aggrandizement of France in consequence of the partition of Poland could not *politically* have been either justified or excused. The powers which were, to use the expression, *personally* interested in this event, were the Ottoman Porte, Sweden, and Denmark: in a more distant degree, and as it were in a second instance, on account of its future possible consequences, the German empire, the States of Italy and Switzerland. What France suffered from it, it suffered in the first place as a party in the common interest of Europe, and secondly in virtue of its near connection with those who were the immediate sufferers. The security of France, its proper personal interests, its prosperity, importance and splendour, remained uninjured and untouched. For France had been for more than a century so fortunately rounded, in-

closed, and, as it were, perfected, that there was nothing wanting to render it flourishing, nothing that could bring it into danger. Richly endowed with all the gifts of nature and of Heaven, equally well calculated for a military and maritime power, covered from the danger of hostile attack by strong natural boundaries, prodigious fortresses, and the experience of three centuries, envied only by a single power, if by any; feared and beloved by all the rest. France could behold with indifference, as far as its own interests were concerned, the extension of all the European states. It had under Louis XIV more than once made head against the half of Europe (which then did not attack its rights but opposed its ambition); it possessed a century afterwards—who at this time of day can contest it!—more real sources of power, more means of resistance and attack than it ever possessed under Louis XIV. What it might have obtained with these means, by a regular and judicious system of energy, may be clearly seen from what it has been able to effect in a long fit of feverish delirium. Even

its external political relatives were not hurt by the partition of Poland. For the union of the three partitioning powers was manifestly only a passing phenomenon; and what for France, more than any thing else, was then the surest ground of its security, and what afterwards has produced its preponderance, and favoured its usurpations—the rivalry between Austria and Prussia—remained unaltered.

4th. Hitherto we have only had the first partition in view, but what we have said of this will, with a few alterations, apply also to the second;* the result of this also

* France has so much less reason to complain of the last partition of Poland, that had it not been for her accursed revolution which threw every thing into confusion, it would probably never have taken place; besides it must be confessed, without retracting any thing that has been said against the principle, it has become, through extraordinary and unexpected conjunctures, a protection for Europe; for it is easier to imagine, than to point out with precision, what would have become of Europe after the frightful turn which the war with France took, after the last treaty of peace and the dreary days that followed this peace, if in the middle of the only three kingdoms which could oppose a dam to stem the torrent of destruction, there had existed a weak, tumultuous, distracted state, continually and *necessarily* the theatre of French cabals.

is ratified by public instruments; it also, however unjust it may have been, furnished France with no legitimate ground for extending its dominion at the expence of its neighbours. The only point which, at first sight, appears at all doubtful, is, whether on account of the extent of the territory gained, France was entitled to indemnity in a *political* view. We firmly maintain, and hope that every enlightened statesman will agree with us, that if France were now limited by its old boundaries, its individual interest would not be at all injured by the final dissolution of Poland; that notwithstanding the consequent aggrandizement of the three powers, it was not threatened more than any other state by a contingent league between them; and that it was much less vulnerable than any other in its vital parts, protected as it is from without by the intervention of the neighbouring kingdoms, fortified as it is internally by its wealth, its great and various industry, the military spirit of its inhabitants, and extraordinary resources of every sort which qualify it for the greatest undertakings; and possessing

Every thing, in short, which the warmest and most discerning patriot could wish for to complete the prosperity of his country. But how distant is the hypothesis upon which we maintain this position from the truth! What an increase of territory, of population and revenue, has France acquired in the course of the last ten years? In reference even to an equal distribution of power, though we always protest against this as the true theory of the constitution of a balance of power, it had acquired before the year 1801,* in political strength, more than any one of the three partitioning powers gained by its share of Poland. So that when we hear it said on every occasion, "France has derived less advantage than any European state from the changes which have taken place in the course of the last fifty years," we are in doubt whether this is meant to impose on the simplicity of the reader, or whether it is thrown out by way of banter.

If the division of Poland was the first

* Its later unjust and lawless usurpations we shall not here bring under consideration.

event which by an *abuse of form* deranged the political balance of Europe, it was likewise one of the first which begot an *apathy of spirit*, and stupid insensibility to the general interest. The silence of France and England, the silence of all Europe, when a measure of so much importance was planned and executed, is almost as astonishing as the event itself. The weakness of the French cabinet toward the conclusion of the reign of Louis XV, throws some light upon the circumstance, but does not sufficiently explain it. No effectual resistance could have been expected from England alone, and still less from the other powers after France declined to interfere. But it will not escape the observation of the future historian, that the omission on that occasion of any public measure, of any energetic remonstrance, of any serious protest, nay, even of any expression of disapprobation, was an indubitable symptom of general debility and relaxation.

And yet how unimportant and trifling appear these passing clouds, when com-

pared with that thick darkness in which we are now involved! The preponderance of the mighty league by which the partition of Poland was effected; the surprising novelty of the transaction; the mystery in which it was long wrapped up; the prudence with which it was concerted; the boldness with which it was executed; all taken together explain how those who naturally might have been expected to oppose it, stunned and petrified, as it were, by sudden terror, forgot their allotted parts. The events of the last ten years were stamped with a different character.

CHAP. III.

*Of the Decay of Political Feeling in the
Course of the Revolution War.*

THE history of the French revolution war, viewed in almost every possible light, is a dark and gloomy picture; but for him whose sensibility to great calamity has not been blinded by ordinary vexations, and who has not lost in passing afflictions all feeling at the sight of deep disaster and widely extended ruin, there is nothing so terrible in this picture as the total and hopeless oblivion of all the principles and maxims, on which rested, not only the stability and greatness, but the bare possibility of a federal constitution; the fatal dissolution of all ancient ties, of all reciprocal attachment and fidelity, of friendship and good neighbourhood, and natural and political relationship, of all public and national spirit and European family sentiment, in the governments and nations of this

quarter of the globe. If one durst without peril* throw the whole mass of evils into a single groupe, even those would stand appalled in beholding it, who must recognize their own features in the prominent figures of the picture. It was not enough that distant danger, that forebodings of the approaching storm, that the most pressing solicitations of friends, that the encreasing troubles of neighbours, that the cries of anguish uttered by deserted allies, were disregarded by princes and their ministers; not even the most hideous and frightful catastrophes, the actual fall of states, the dissolution of governments, the dethronement and banishment of dynasties, the devastation and overthrow of ancient constitutions, the

* The only danger here meant is, in such an undertaking, that of exciting disgust and irritation by a too faithful representation of the past, in many whose feelings must be spared, because on them depend our hopes of a better futurity. On the other hand, a total silence would be a sort of treason against the public welfare; for if we do not sometimes trace the present state of Europe to its true sources, the frivolity of the age will at last believe, that it is to be ascribed to an unfortunate accident, or to inevitable destiny, and entirely forget its real origin.

invasion of the most important adjoining provinces by the common enemy, the most bloody combats a few miles distant only from their residences, the destruction of their last bulwarks of defence; nothing could rouse them from their lethargy. To escape the common danger in any possible way;—when resistance could no longer be avoided to confine themselves to the most paltry and ineffectual means—and as soon as an outlet could be found to desert the field on any condition—this seems to have been the sum of all state policy in that eternally to be lamented period, when it was reckoned fortunate, even when indifference and selfishness did not give place to still more detestable principles of action; and when the hope of catching in the general confusion some flying booty before the fire reached their own house, did not convert egotists into secret adversaries. Accounts of the most melancholy results of desperate treaties of peace were received with the same stupid insensibility as reports of defeats in the field, and provided that the storm could only be conjured from bursting on their heads, provided

the vexatious complaints of the sufferers, and the still more vexatious admonitions of duty, could be but for a moment silenced; they saw with less regret than would have been felt in other times at the surrender of a citadel, or in consenting to an inconsiderable change of limits, whole lines of fortresses given up, and nations and kingdoms pass into subjection.

The state of public opinion corresponded with this unheard of state of disorder. Whoever at that time attempted to talk of a common cause, of the necessity of common measures, and of salutary alliances, was, if favourably dealt with, denominated a well meaning enthusiast, but was commonly treated as the hired instrument of another government. To expose his personal safety, to break in upon his treasures, or to march out his troops and fly to another's help, was conceived in a prince to be a species of madness. The highest panegyrics were passed on those who most carefully avoided making a trifling or momentary sacrifice to the general good. Posterity will scarcely believe, that the

oracle of this memorable period, and what authors, orators and statesmen quoted, when they wished to point out a pattern of political wisdom, was the Danish government.* The perversity of thinking arose to such a pitch, that those were most firmly admired and beloved, who were most determined never to take the smallest interest in the contest against the common foe. The conquest of Holland, the loss of all the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, the base subjugation of Switzerland, the fate of Italy, the danger of the Austrian monarchy, scarcely ruffled the surface of the public mind.—Very many—who can have forgotten it!—were mad enough to rejoice over the victories of France; others took care of themselves, and left the rest to the care of heaven. This monstrous conduct was arraigned in a few unpopular papers, which were little

* What is here said is not at all meant as derogatory to the character of the government of Denmark. It had certainly much better motives for the line of conduct which it then held, than those ascribed to it by its shallow admirers. But the enthusiasm with which they spoke of it *in their views of things*, was highly characteristic of the general folly.

read from curiosity, and which were only tolerated out of decency, but no person paid any regard to them.

It is true that this unparalleled delusion was in a considerable degree owing to the pestilential influence which the apostles of the French revolution, and their wretched maxims of liberty, had obtained over the public of every country; but that the evil did not arise solely from this source, became evident after the enthusiasm of liberty had destroyed every thing within its reach, and after the principle of liberty was itself extinguished in consequence of an unexpected change which had taken place in the interior of France, (unexpected at least by the giddy multitude, though not by those who are acquainted with the progress of human error;) for even then, the same indifference to the public good, and the same insensibility to the common interest continued to exist. To select only one from the many examples which might be given, how little was the public of Germany affected by the disgraceful negotiations at Ratisbon, and

their lamentable issue? With what cold disgusting levity did people witness the dissolution of so many old political ties, the ruin of all the spiritual princes, the abolition of the immediate tenures of so many Imperial towns, and the general overthrow of the constitution of the empire? How few were there that felt the mortifying circumstance, that in this cruel revolution we had not even the consolation of its being effected by ourselves; but that we received the law from strangers; that strangers formed the plans; and that strangers carried them into execution in all their most minute details? Germans contented themselves with private negotiations, embassies and journies to Paris, emulation in little tricks, and low arts to curry favour; with complaints of their own neglected situation, and of the unmerited good fortune of others; with projects of sales and exchanges, and anecdotes from the secret history of the intercourse between foreign ministers! The only gracious feature in the whole revolting spectacle, (and this almost no one observed,) was the perfect resignation and calmness with which

the spiritual princes supported their misfortunes ; if we except this, we do not find in the whole course of the transaction one magnanimous or disinterested trait, not one patriotic act, not one word which merits being recorded, not even a complaint over the general calamity. In such a state of stupor, in such a disgraceful absence of public spirit, we cannot be surprised at any of the humiliations which Germany experienced in so great abundance ; the only wonder is, that we still exist, that we are still in a situation to deliberate upon the means of salvation.*

Had he, whom an unexampled fortune—favoured more by the unexampled failings of his contemporaries than by any thing else—seemed willing to conduct to universal dominion, in addition to all the advantages which he enjoyed, possessed the quality of moderation ; had he only kept pace with the gradual, but visible decay of all inclination to resist him, Europe would in a few years have lain at his

* September, 1805.

feet; he has himself checked his own progress; and Providence has so ordered it, that good should spring from the excess of evil. By the feverish restlessness of his spirit, by repeated and accumulated acts of violence, by a precipitate disclosure of projects dictated by unbounded ambition, he outran the general alacrity to serve his views, and created a spirit of resistance to himself, when people were only seeking for decent pretences for continual subjection. About a year and a half ago the dawn commenced of a salutary revolution, in the wishes, dispositions and temper of the public; and even before AUSTRIA and RUSSIA resolved on war, on *a just and holy war, originating in the purest motives, and undertaken for the most noble cause,** this change was making a visible and daily progress. The most indolent are at length roused; the most spiritless are become impatient of suffering; the most selfish have begun again to take to heart the general interest; delusion is at an end; people feel that things must go differ-

* We pronounce it to be so even at this day.

ently if all is not to be given up as lost.

The transition from the present state of things to another founded upon a balance of power, and leading to a permanent amelioration of the political system, and to durable order and tranquillity, intelligent men have long perceived cannot be brought about, without strenuous exertions and sacrifices of every sort. The first duty obligatory on us in the present circumstances, is to pour forth the most ardent wishes for the successful progress of those arms which have been taken up in our great cause. But in order that we may not want a foundation on which to build for the future, supposing our efforts to be crowned with success, our undivided attention should be directed to what a true political union, a genuine federal constitution presupposes as the necessary conditions of its existence. The system which our ancestors had organized, has been decomposed and annihilated by an *abuse of Form*, and by *languor of Spirit*. It is indispensable for the future constantly to

guard against that abuse, and to oppose the return of this languor with vigilance, activity and wisdom; and in the exercise of these virtues alone, we may not only rebuild what has fallen, but secure the durability of the future edifice.

The first care from its very nature belongs to the governments. The experience of the last twenty years has sufficiently demonstrated what disorder in the political system, what extensive fatal consequences, what distrust, what discontent, what coldness between princes and their subjects, what perilous uncertainty in possession, what debilitation of the federal principle, what destructive examples to usurpers, what pretexts for injustice and tyranny have sprung from projects of partition. Every just and conscientious government must first, therefore, set it down as an unchangeable maxim in its own policy, never henceforth to lend an ear to plans which are not founded in the strictest equity. In the next place, though a general code of laws cannot, in the proper sense of the word, be framed for the regu-

lation of a state confederacy, at least no means should be left untried to procure for these maxims a common sanction, and the solemn ratification of treaties. In every considerable alliance,* in every treaty of peace, particularly in every congress composed of several considerable powers, the parties must mutually engage themselves not to endeavour to extend their territory by unjust means; and not to enter into any scheme or association directed against the rights or possessions of an independent state, by whatever name it may be called, whether of dividing, of rounding, of concentrating, of uniting, or of indemnifying themselves for other losses. A sort of anathema must also be pronounced by anticipation, against all such as shall project such violations of right, or call upon others to assist in them; so that a lively conviction may be again established in the public mind, that when princes and states enter

* The two Imperial courts, with a wisdom which can never be sufficiently extolled, in their declaration of the third of September, voluntarily and uncalled upon, declared "the integrity of Germany and of the Ottoman power," to be one of the bases of their union.

into combinations with one another, their objects always are preservation and protection and defence against common danger, never the attack and invasion of the innocent.

The second care, that of rousing the public spirit, is the common duty of us all; but here also the governments must lead the way. For if they do not set the example, we have no right to expect that, in an age like ours, so distinguished for general culture, for the developement of individual talent, for the refined enjoyment of life, for constantly increasing riches, for growing corruption, for the charm of so many private occupations which tempt to a renunciation of those of a more public nature, and which intice individuals to devote their cares exclusively to their own happiness, their own improvement, their own comfort or pleasures, people shall again take a hearty and lively interest in the public welfare, depending as it does upon the existence and preservation of a great political union. But princes, and particularly those of high rank, are crea-

ted and live expressly for the purpose of managing the high trust of the general interest. For this purpose they must, before all things, be true to that which to them is dearest. Their most sacred duty is never to permit any diminution of their own rights, but to maintain intact the degree of political weight, importance, and influence, which has been consigned to them; and not to tolerate, under any pretence, the introduction of changes into the general system of the political relations and distributions of power in Europe, by which, sooner or later, they might be driven from their proper stations. But they are no less called upon and obligated to watch over, maintain and defend, the independence, security and rights, of their neighbours, their allies and of every acknowledged and legally constituted power; even those of their rivals, and those of their occasional enemies. From the moment that they no longer feel themselves strong enough to prevent the weakest and most inconsiderable state from being injured with impunity, or robbed of its independence

by the criminal and arbitrary acts of a stronger, their own thrones become unstable. We must hear of no insulary systems, no indifference to a danger apparently foreign to their own immediate interests, no absolute neutrality, no unconditional seclusion from any important transaction!* The fear of involving themselves in endless disputes and continual wars by this policy (the only true and worthy policy) is altogether imaginary, and is suggested by false philanthropy, or ignoble sloth and pusillanimity. The more industry and vigour is employed in checking the first acts of injustice and violence, the less frequent will be the cases in which it will be necessary to march forth to fight against them in the field; the more steadfastly they hold themselves in a state of preparation, the greater reluctance will be

* Such expressions as "the fate of this or that land, "of this or that part of Europe, does not concern "them;" or "that they would confine themselves "wholly to the maintenance of tranquillity in this or "that circle;" or "that they had done their duty "in admitting this or that state within their line of "demarkation," &c. should never be heard from a prince or a statesman.

felt to challenge them to combat. In a word, the more perfect, harmonious and stable the federal system of the European states, the greater the sensibility each individual discovers to every violation of common rights, the stronger the tie which binds each member to the collective body, the more rarely wars occur.

When proper care is thus taken to consolidate the walls and joisting of the building, then every individual who possesses any powers within himself may, by a judicious application of activity and continued zeal, perfect and complete the edifice; and however unfavourable the times are, education, and instruction, and information derived from conversation, or from books, will even yet effect a great deal. It is not here the question of begetting what is called cosmo-political feeling—whether the Italian be united in affection with the German, the German with the Briton, the Briton with the Russian, and so forth, is a matter about which we have little concern—all that we contend for is, that every one should be

zealous to promote the prosperity, the glory, and above all the prosperity of his native land, and that he should see and be persuaded that this first and most important of all objects cannot be attained as long as he remains indifferent whether others stand or fall. A conviction of the necessity, and a sense of the excellence of a federal system, will always accompany the existence of true patriotism. Let this sentiment only be cherished and cultivated; and projects of universal dominion will be banished from the earth.

It is impossible that the history of our time should pass without producing some beneficial fruits for us and our posterity. Whether Buonaparte, in the recesses of his haughty and gloomy mind, has really conceived the idea of a universal monarchy; under what form he has conceived it; what progress he has made in forming the project, and when, and how he thinks of realizing it, all this futurity will disclose. But so much is clear and certain, that in the course of six frightful years he has been doing, without intermission, all that he

must do on the very worst supposition, and that he has succeeded in things which seem very unequivocally to prognosticate the most pernicious and desperate issue. Were every thing here to close, were his career to be terminated, were our undertakings to be crowned with complete success, and his star to set for ever, is it possible that we could forget what sorrows, what bitterness, what disgrace, what troubles, what convulsions, what a grievous load of present evils, and what anguish for every coming day, was felt throughout the greatest and best part of Europe, from a bare attempt and beginning to effect such a project? and shall we not therefore adopt every expedient which wisdom can devise to prevent the return of these hard trials?

It is necessary above all to recollect that the measures of prevention and security, to which we here alluded, must be the work of a better (and God grant not distant) futurity; *and that this futurity must be acquired by victory.* But in order to be able to give a satisfactory ac-

count to ourselves of what we will and must be, it is necessary accurately to know what we at present are. A general review of the existing political relations between France and the other states is, therefore, one of the *desiderata* of the time.

CHAP. IV.

*Of the Relation between France and the
other States in internal Constitution.*

CONFORMABLY to the notion we have given of the genuine acceptation of a political balance in Europe, the internal constitutions of the respective states come under consideration not *judicially* but *historically*. In other words, it cannot be a matter of indifference to any state to know what is the internal situation of another at every given point of time; though no one state has the right to call another to account respecting the constitution it has chosen to adopt. For though the internal constitution has an immediate influence upon the strength or weakness of a state, the federal system is not grounded upon degrees of power, but upon the external limitations of this power. The state which is not prevent-

ed by any external consideration from oppressing a weaker, is always, however weak it may be, *too strong* for the interest of the whole; the state which can be made to respect the rights of the weakest, though perhaps in itself the most powerful of all, is *not too powerful*.

There is only a single case in which the principle of the balance of power can make it a duty, in the whole state confederacy, to exercise an immediate influence on the internal relations of a kingdom, namely, when by a mortal distemper in the vital parts of this kingdom, by a violent overthrow of its government, by a dissolution of all social ties, a cessation (though perhaps only a momentary one) of political existence ensues; for besides that in such a case of pressing urgency, the principals in the league are collectively called upon by the most imperious MORAL considerations to interfere for the preservation of the most precious common good, the eternal foundation of legal and social order, the absolute anarchy which inva-

riably accompanies total violent revolutions would produce the most destructive consequences to the general interest of the confederacy; because the state which is a prey to general disorder, as long as this disorder lasts, has lost all its political functions, and is incapacitated from acting as a substantive member of the league; likewise because it is uncertain when it may be enabled to resume a place which it is essential to the interests of the whole not to permit to remain vacant.* But even in

* When Burke said in year 1791 that France was "a chasm in the map of Europe;" this great man well knew that in this chasm might exist not only all the infernal apparatus of bloody anarchy, but that a monstrous tyrannical government which would make Europe tremble, might arise out of it; and he even foresaw, with wonderful sagacity, that things would take this turn when all the imaginary wise-heads of the time held such a result to be absurd, and even sometimes ridiculed the prediction. But *at the period* when he used this expression, France had really disappeared.

No opportunity must therefore be neglected of repeating, even should half a world-full of philosophers, and (should it please GOD) of philosophical writers die of chagrin in consequence of it,—that it was *not* fear for the preponderance of France—for this first unfold-

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this extraordinary case—and such a one we were destined to experience—the interference in the internal relations of the state takes place, not because a fear is entertained for an unnatural growth of its power from revolution (which is often indeed the consequence of political revolutions), but on the other hand because a too great debility, or an entire annihilation, is apprehended to follow.

But as soon as a regular government is established in a state, however it may

ed itself in the course of the war—that it was not a wish to profit from France's misfortunes, but that it was compassion for the helplessness of France, the dread lest its splendour, so necessary for Europe, should be eternally eclipsed, and the purest maxims of high and genuine state policy, which dictated the war against the French revolution. That this war afterwards not only failed of its object but degenerated even from its character, and produced misfortune on the back of misfortune; that we are far from disputing, that we are desirous even deeply to impress on the minds of contemporaries. But the original motives of the sovereigns were doubtless beneficent and just, and they who now maintain that the object of the war was to mutilate, to lame, to destroy and divide France, can, if they are sincere, best explain why it so miserably failed; they know the most about it.

be constituted, whether it has been founded in justice or in violence, whether it is moderate or tyrannical, destructive or beneficial, weak or strong—the state confederacy, as such, has no longer any title to interfere in its domestic concerns. And yet, however little we are disposed to restrict on any side this incontrovertible position, the nature of the thing here presses upon us one consideration which cannot be neglected without the utmost danger. The internal constitution of a state which, from its geographical situation, its natural or acquired advantages, its relation to the neighbouring states, or from the general situation of Europe, has a visible tendency to aggrandisement and overpoise, or which has already attained a degree of overpoise, will, on this very account, be a fair object of anxiety, of sedulous enquiry, and the most attentive observation. For whether the external preponderance of a state, which has arrived at such a pitch of greatness, be facilitated and favoured, or restrained and discouraged, by its internal relations, is manifestly

a question of the utmost importance for the whole. We are, therefore, in quality of representatives of the great commonwealth, fully entitled and justified in examining into a subject in some respects foreign to us, not with a view to bring what passes in the interior of another state immediately before our tribunal, but with a view to trace the connection which subsists between its constitutions and our own interests, our own cares and dangers, our own wants and the measures of precaution they may dictate.

France possesses in its present political constitution three manifest advantages over all the other European states, which must insure it an undoubted preponderance if, in its external relations, it is merely equal to the most important among them. But which, now that the balance is decidedly in its favour, must give to this preponderance a formidable importance:—these advantages are—

First. The unlimited form of its go-

vernment, in a sense and extent unparalleled in that of any other European state.

Secondly, The decisive influence of the military character upon the whole system, and all the component parts of its constitution.

Thirdly, The occasional employment of revolutionary instruments and forms.*

1st. All the monarchical governments

* Many readers will perhaps be surprized that *the personal qualities and talents of its ruler* are not here included among the advantages of France. But were this to be done in a consistent manner, we should also be obliged to take into account what in these personal qualities may prove fatal to the person possessing them; and what, instead of being available for the improvement of its situation, may (for the consolation of the world) tend to its deterioration; and the author would thus be led into a calculation of loss and gain, into which he does not feel himself disposed at all to enter. The character of a man whose career is not yet terminated, and respecting whom public opinion varies in all the infinity of shades from one extreme to another, will be best depicted by his *acts* (his *speeches* and *writings* we are also acquainted with); and of these acts, at least of those of a political nature, we shall have enough to say in the following pages.

in Europe are more or less limited internally. These limitations where they are not in one way or other *legally* and regularly fixed, as is the case in many governments, exist *in fact*, and give evidence of their existence in the opposition which the supreme power often encounters in the execution of its measures, in the variety of providential considerations which enter into its administration, and in the prudence and caution which it at all times finds it necessary to observe. In the monarchies of the middle part of Europe, the original dissimilarities of their component parts, the differences in the local constitutions, legislative rights and privileges of the provinces, contain a visible modification of the absolute principle of their common government. How considerable is the influence of this circumstance, for example, in the administration of the *Austrian* state? With what care—to adduce only a single instance of it—with what tender and anxious care, does the *Austrian* government go to work in every thing that concerns *Hungary*? With what conscientious and

estimable strictness it respects the forms prescribed by the old constitution of this kingdom, and by the attachment of its present inhabitants to the laws and ordinances of their ancestors! How far has it been at all times from disposing of the means and resources of this country, according to its own will or discretion, or of deriving an advantage from them proportionate to its extent, population and substantial riches! and yet Hungary, in a statistical point of view, composes not much less than one half of a monarchy which has been usually, though most unprecisely denominated absolute. In the Prussian monarchy also, though in a less considerable degree, there is an essential difference in the provincial constitutions, and in all the rest of Germany, whether considered as composing a single empire or as divided into different states, the government is every where surrounded either with legal or actual restraints.

Besides this, there is another fruitful source of limitations for all European

governments, in the existence of privileged orders and great family possessions. The high clergy and the high nobility, where the old constitution remains perfect, and the latter alone where the former have lost their influence, possess a part of the public power, contribute in a more immediate or more distant manner to all great measures of administration, and are posted beside the sovereign as a sort of standing counsel or natural House of Lords. Even in Russia, a monarchical empire, much more constitutionally absolute than most of the states in the middle of Europe, both in its origin and subsequent development, no one can deny the influence which a mighty opulent nobility, endowed with great rights, dignities and privileges, must inevitably exercise, and does in fact exercise without intermission, upon the character and conduct of the government. In a word, as long as there is in a monarchy great and illustrious names, powerful and independent families, extensive territorial possessions, and high social importance attached to individuals; however the constitution of the state may be cast, no go-

vernment can boast of absolute authority in the strict sense of the word.

In the back of all these limitations there starts up another still of great consequence, of a consequence paramount perhaps to all the rest, founded upon the power of public opinion. The measures which have been resorted to for the purpose of confining this continually controuling power, by counteracting regulations, may be more or less circumscribed in their operation, more liberal, or more oppressive in their nature; but the result is almost always the same. In one shape or other, public opinion will make its voice be heard; and wherever the supreme power, either upon hereditary or adopted maxims, is administered with paternal mildness, and with a due regard to the prosperity of the people, the rulers must sooner or later lend an ear to it. In the age in which we live, in spite of the wild and violent outcry against despotism, oppression, and slavery, its influence is become so mighty that it is rather difficult to determine whether greater evil has arisen

upon the earth from obstinately resisting it, or incautiously giving way to it. In one of the most renowned states, and in certain critical moments of the history of our times, the latter has been undoubtedly the most productive in bad effects.

In the old French monarchy the limitations here mentioned were all in full activity. In the present day not one of them exists. The levelling club of the revolution has annihilated all the rich variety of local constitution, as it formerly existed in France; all the rights and privileges of the provinces, their usages, their customs, their statutes, their legal and judicial forms, their assemblies, their independent institutions and public establishments, their separate proprietors, their acknowledged relations with the court, their immediate influence and credit; and has, at last, effaced their confines, and even their very names. The present ruler of that country stretches out his dreaded sceptre over an immeasurable expanse, where not the smallest height, or hollow, hill, or dike, is found to impede, interrupt, or lead him out of his

way. From the centre of his kingdom, in which an universal uniformity obtains, by means of an omnipotent cabinet, a ministry that trembles at his frown, a fiscal machine wound up to a pitch which makes its springs crack;—an omnipresent and omniscient police, an army entirely devoted to him, and a multitude of prefects and under prefects, he rules a nation of thirty millions of people as easily, securely, and absolutely, as the Grand Signior in the good times of the Ottoman empire governed in the seraglio, by means of his pacha's and aga's, his Europe and Asia. The constitutions of the empire, as they are called, do not even attempt by the slightest regulation to impose limits to this monstrous despotism; they are besides, for every practicable purpose, become a mere empty name.*

* A tribunate and a legislative body, the remains of a consular constitution, are now and then brought before the people; and a senate steps forth two or three times a year from the slumber of the tomb, as it were, to give a sort of solemnity to certain decrees of the government. But what influence these completely dependent bodies possess in reality is known to every one.

But it is not only the constitutions and rights of individual provinces and towns which have been abolished, there is not a trace to be found of the importance, influence, and co-operation on the part of the higher classes, which obtained under the ancient government, or of the personal power, weight, and authority by which private men of large property, of great family name, or of distinguished merit, created a sort of collateral dominion in the state. In the place of the mighty heads of the richly endowed Gallican church, we find a set of hireling priests and bishops, for the most part poorly paid, blindly subjected to the government, and secluded from all the affairs of the world. The French nobility, with all their titles and dignities, their splendour and riches, are gone; those of old families which remain, have either unconditionally sold themselves to the new reigning family, or concealed themselves in distant provinces, where they live in obscurity and quiet upon the miserable residue of their former fortunes and consequence. A great part,

perhaps the majority, of the present landed proprietors are new men, who turn pale at the very thought of any material change in the government; and these would adore the chief ruler, though he happened to be a Phalaris, a Nero, or a Thamas Kuli Khan. There is no individual importance, or reputation, or influence on the minds of men existing, to throw as a counterweight to his power in the balance. Before the commencement of the military period, in the course of ten years of horrors, a certain perfection in madness, a certain refinement in crime, were the only means of attaining in France to distinction and power. Since the army got the upper hand, the pretensions of all others have been gradually sunk in the reputation and fortune of one victorious general. Whatever might have had a tendency to eclipse his splendour, is annihilated, condemned, or sent into exile. France presents itself to the beholder like a vast and barren waste, where nothing appears between him and the horizon, but a single colossal arm, which rises like a leafless and denuded trunk in the midst of the desert.

Notwithstanding this unlimited degree of power, public opinion still exists there as well as in other countries of Europe; but from causes immediately arising out of the present situation of France, it is either in complete subjection to the government, or things are so ordered that its voice is never heard. It is in part devoted to the government, because the great mass of the people consider the present ruler as its deliverer from the plagues of anarchy; as having brought the detested revolution to a conclusion; and because even the wiser and better informed part regard, (whether justly or unjustly we shall not now enquire,) the bare possibility of a new revolution as the greatest of all evils, behind which lies a bottomless abyss, and all the terrific forms of past days. From this manner of considering things, and this temper, it is easily conceivable why the authority of the government over the public mind remains constantly the same, though almost all its resolutions and measures in the by-gone years, (its conquests, its wars, its nepotism, and so forth,) have been at open variance with the true interests of the

country. But though the well informed and enlightened are perfectly persuaded of what no one can for a moment doubt, it is rendered impossible for them by a thousand different regulations to communicate this conviction to their fellow citizens.*

The present French government is there-

* Police arrangements, regulations for the censure of the press, book prohibitions, &c. in those countries of Europe where they are exercised with the greatest rigour; have much about the same relation to those which obtain in France, that a high fence, thrown round a place for the purpose of preventing trespasses upon it, holds to a pit a thousand feet deep, which has been dug in the middle of the place for the punishment of those whom curiosity has tempted to enter it. That is to say, the regulations adopted in other countries have merely an obstructive operation, and those who violate them are afterwards treated with strictness and indulgence. But in France, besides these obstructions, dreadful punishments are inflicted on those who in any way attempt to break through them, and a single newspaper paragraph has often been followed up by years of imprisonment, by banishment, or death. Besides this, from the multiplied connections existing between the states in the middle of Europe and their neighbours, every thing gradually becomes known to the public, notwithstanding the strictest prohibitions; whereas in France, foreign publications have but little circulation, and the introduction of them is attended with real danger.

fore on all sides, and in all possible views and directions, the most absolute that can be conceived, and things, persons, and powers are subjected to its will and disposal in an infinitely greater extent than can happen in any other state.

2dly. In all the monarchies of the interior of Europe, the *military character* maintains its rank, but no where is its preponderance so great, no where is the government so essentially military, and no where is every thing so unconditionally sacrificed to military greatness as in France.

Amid the storms of the revolution, and even in that troubled and unnatural state of things which followed upon the explosion of the tempest, neither civil nor political talents, nor social virtue could flourish; and what in this frightful period was called state prudence, and the economy of government, was of a character so little respectable, (the whole fabric of the state resting upon injustice and faithlessness, and robbery, and the most flagitious maxims,) that honourable men declined polluting

themselves by mixing with it. At the same time, by a remarkable combination of circumstances, which it is not here our intention to elucidate; the spirit of the army was from day to day strengthened and exalted, till at last it attained to that state in which we beheld it during the last years of the war. It was now the only point in the national economy of France on which the eye of the observer could rest without reluctance; and the good fortune which accompanied their arms, seemed to throw a splendid mantle over the nakedness of the state, and, in some degree, to cover its deformities, distempers and crimes. The most celebrated of its generals soon succeeded in subverting its government, a detested and contemptible government, whose fall all parties considered as a desirable event. From this time forward the preponderance of the military character was decisive, and as, in spite of all the changes of form which the new government experienced, and in spite of all the accumulation of titles and badges of distinction, and pomp, and ceremony, no counterpoise was found for military consequence and

fame, this preponderance was naturally augmented and confirmed.

The present ruler of France is a fortunate general; but unlike other rulers, who, born to their thrones, obtained in successful wars a military reputation independent of their power, his government is founded merely on his reputation; military exploits alone have opened to him the unexampled career which he now runs; in quality of a soldier, and secure of the support of the army, he overturned the direction of government; as a soldier, and confiding in the army, he has acquired, instead of a limited temporary authority, an unlimited, absolute, and hereditary dominion.—Whether he will be always victorious futurity will disclose; but as long as he is determined to rule, the preservation of his military fame must remain his first and highest care: so closely and so inseparably connected is the existence of no other government in Europe with its military interest.—No other government sacrifices so unconditionally to its military greatness every other interest, every consideration

arising out of the state of the country, and suggested by the wishes and longings of the people. Wherever we find a government regularly constituted, mild in its administration, consecrated by right and time, and immediately allied with the prosperity and contentment of the nation, the military power, however high in estimation, is always considered as subordinate to higher objects. What we were formerly accustomed to call military states only merited this denomination, subject to the restriction now mentioned. It was in this point of view that Frederick II, though himself a successful general, considered the army which he had created in the latter half of his reign; and what in the constitution of his kingdom was founded upon military forms did not prevent his successor from acting, (perhaps to too great an extent;) upon this in itself excellent maxim, "that the prosperity of the state was the first care of government, and that its military interests were to be consulted only in the second instance." But it is not the same in an order of things, where in every essential point the advantage of the regent is separated from the advantage of the

country;* it is not the same where his authority is only superficially rooted in the opinions and usages of the people, where the government has been established immediately after a stormy revolution by extraordinary circumstances, with much opposition and many perils, and consequently where—however powerful and absolute it may be—it is every moment in danger of being shaken or overthrown in its turn by extraordinary circumstances acting in an opposite direction. The constant care of such a government must always be uniformly to appear strong, and victorious, and formidable, and, above all things, formidable in a military aspect. Here things proceed in an inverted order. If the prosperity and happiness of the state cannot be reconciled with its military interests, the exertions of the government are divided between both; when a preference must be given to one or other, the latter will always carry it. Its military greatness must be maintained, let manu-

* Where the regent has, as it were, an interest *apart* from the country, or to judge of it in the most favourable way, *more than paramount* to that of the country, without being united with it, or sunk and lost in it.

factures, and trade, and commerce, and colonies, and individual prosperity save themselves as they can, or go to wreck as it may please heaven. This is the precise state of the actual relations of France in regard to its military constitution!

3dly. When we reckon the employment of revolutionary instruments and forms among the advantages which the present government of France possesses over all the other states of Europe, we meant exclusively the use which it makes of this dangerous mean in its *external* relations.* —How far revolutionary maxims still retain their influence in the interior it is not our object to inquire, and might also be difficult to determine. For there reigns between the revolutionary system and that of an absolute despotism, such a striking and manifold analogy, that it would be frequently very embarrassing to decide

* This nevertheless belongs to the class of advantages which it derives from the character of its *internal* constitution. For other governments could not employ such instruments without the greatest danger to themselves, even were they unfortunately *wished to do it*.

whether this or that law, this or that measure of the government proceeded from one or the other. When one sees on all hands the most violent invasions of personal liberty and security, the prisons of state crowded with unhappy persons, who expect no other sentence than what the arbitrary will of an individual may pronounce; military commissions whose summary proceedings are first recorded in the papers after the victims are dispatched; decrees of imprisonment, banishment, and transportation passed under the most nugatory pretexts, and for the most part without any pretext at all; when one sees the most celebrated and execrated master in revolutionary tactics—for whom Collot D'Herbois acted with too much tardiness—whom the National Convention expelled as too blood-thirsty—invested with the office of minister of police, and reinstated after having been once displaced,—one cannot get rid of the suspicion, that the present French government, not contented with the regular and gigantic powers which circumstances have placed in its hands, now and then resorts for weapons to the

still half open armory of exploded revolutionary tyranny. Here we have only to do with those which it employs against foreign states.

The true fundamental principle of all revolutionary policy is, "that behind the legitimate sovereign of a state there is still another natural and superior authority entitled the sovereignty of the people, which, though usually slumbering, sometimes awakes to molest or overturn the other in the exercise of its undoubted rights." This doctrine which has been long ago exploded in every enlightened system of social and civil policy, but which, for common capacities, always has something more or less seductive, was the very quintessence of all the errors and enormities of the revolution; and long before the time of the revolution, of all the great and little, the fruitless or successful attempts of factious insurrectionists and fanatics of liberty. As in the interior of France it was the most effective of all the instruments of fury and crime, it always produced a great proportion of the calamity

and misery which the revolution poured forth upon other countries. After this destructive doctrine, that nations not only had an interest separate from, and often opposite to that of their governments, but also possessed the right of persecuting the latter, was by a variety of hellish artifices brought into general circulation; it happened that the confidence of the people in the persons and measures of their princes was in some places entirely destroyed, in many more than half undermined, in all considerably shaken; and that it required not only a hard, but long experience, to break the spell by which for a time every French army appeared in the shape of an ally, a saviour, and deliverer of the people. This delusion is now indeed dissipated, less perhaps by the progress of more enlightened views than by the example of France, from which the people saw what sort of liberty and what kind of equality and sovereignty that nation itself acquired, by the conduct which it so zealously and ardently recommended others to imitate. The danger of seeing these treacherous arts again triumph in another war is certainly

at présent not very considerable, but no one can take upon himself to answer that they are wholly and for ever exploded. The great mass of the people is cured; but half enlightened wittings and giddy speculators, such as we almost daily see thrusting themselves forward in the publications most generally read in Germany (to our shame be it confessed,) will not lose their public all at once; and in great conjunctures real traitors will always be found. In every case even a momentary attempt to sow discord between rulers and their subjects must create much trouble, much confusion, much temporary embarrassment, and will give the party which resolves on employing this wicked mean an undoubted advantage over all its opponents.

But the present French government has not only never disavowed the intention of repeating such conduct,* but it has both

* To this it may and must be compelled in a comprehensive, equitable and lasting treaty of peace, as a thing which other states have a right to require, and as being indispensably requisite for the common security.

no one who is in possession of the data necessary to direct his judgment, and who has the faculty of combining them, can remain long in doubt respecting the result. * All that interests us now is, to know that the present French government possess real and essential advantages over the other governments of Europe. All we mean to maintain is, that a power which has these advantages at command has already obtained a decisive preponderance * over such as either do not possess them at all, or in an inferior degree, supposing an equipoise to be established between them in other respects.

Were France in point of situation and magnitude an inconsiderable state in Europe, such as Norway and Portugal, or the island of Sardinia, and had it obtained by extraordinary conjunctures these three characteristic advantages, the rest of Europe would consider this, at best,

* That is to say, keeping the true acceptation of a balance of power always in view, "such a preponderance as enables it with more facility and with a better prospect of impunity to attack the independence of others."

as a political problem, and as a curious subject of disquisition for ingenious politicians, but as of very little practical interest.

Had France, at the conclusion of the former war, returned within its own limits, these characteristic features in its constitution would not have been in that case a matter of indifference; for before the revolution, and before the conquests to which it led, France was already too powerful and mighty not to give a considerable degree of uneasiness to its neighbours by a sudden developement of a new system of government. But as no one would have a right to call it to account respecting its internal constitution after it was once acknowledged, we should have had no other resource left than to remain constantly on the watch against every danger that might threaten us from that quarter, and to set about invigorating and new modelling, according to the necessity of the time, our own systems of government, in as far as that could be done without overturning principles and rights.

Had France even remained within those limits which were prescribed to her by the last treaty of peace, still a great change would have been necessary in our views, calculations, measures and arrangements,—such a change as is prescribed by extraordinary conjunctures—for at the time when that peace was concluded, the balance of power in Europe was so much deranged in its operation that much must have become dangerous which would have been formerly considered as harmless, and yet in this perilous situation we could not have found a just motive for immediate attack, if we remained true to the principles already laid down in their utmost strictness, either in the internal constitution of France, or in the necessities of the rest of Europe arising out of that treaty of peace.

But after the French government, from the moment that the peace was concluded to the hour when the preparations began, shewed that the only object it had in view in becoming a party to this

treaty was arbitrarily and wantonly, on all sides, to overleap those boundaries which were already too far extended for the common interest of Europe; the rest of Europe acquired an indubitable right to call it to account not only for the steps it had taken since the peace, but also for what it had become by means of the peace, and even to enter on a general revisal of its internal relations in-as-far as they were more or less incompatible with the general security. For as on the breaking out of the war the treaty of peace was completely cancelled, and the state of things created or sanctioned by the treaty no longer exists under its guarantee, it is now of course permitted to examine whether Europe can ever accede to the re-establishment of the same state of things, and to its confirmation by new treaties.

CHAP. V.

Representation of the Relation subsisting between France and Austria in the Interval between the Peace of Luneville and the Breaking out of the present War.

THE peace of Luneville, properly considered, was not the work of an individual power; it was the act of the collective governments of Europe, it was the final result and lasting expression of a general disorganization—

Had this peace been the concluding act of an ordinary war, in which though one party must upon the whole be victorious over another, still a sort of balance is maintained by acquisitions upon both sides, by mutual prosperity and adversity, by reciprocal losses and advantages; or had it been the result of an ordinary congress, where the pretensions of the two parties are discussed with calmness

and deliberation, where not only the present moment but the past and the future are consulted, and where by the influence and interest of several powers, who appear as friends, as allies, as arbitrators or guarantees, the progress and issue of the negotiation are often more affected than by the immediate relations subsisting between the principal combatants, it would be lost labour in posterity to endeavour to comprehend how such a treaty could ever have been recorded in the annals of history.

But the treaty of Luneville was the necessary, the cruel result of an unexampled combination of misfortunes, and whether a parallel will ever henceforth be found to it or not, the circumstances which concluded it (for circumstances, not men have done it) were certainly without a precedent. At the end of a ten years war whose original and praiseworthy object, often indeed mistaken and betrayed though never entirely abandoned or lost, was the salvation of Europe from the destruction of anarchy!—At the end

of this most important, eventful and now hopeless and desperate war, Austria stood alone, *insulated* and *forsaken*, opposed to the Colossal power of a revolutionary mass disciplined by time, experience and victory. This power, penetrating by the two principal flanks of the monarchy with an equally impressive force, had encompassed the centre and was every day more and more narrowing its circle; without some event approaching in character to a miracle, or such an effort of despair as could not then be hoped for, a favourable issue was impossible; the monarchy, formerly replete with splendid energy, was crippled for the moment; and at this very moment the negotiations of Luneville were opened. If any friendly star in any one point of the horizon had appeared even then to Austria, if it had obtained the support even then of a single power, if the slightest political diversion, a declaration or even one vigorous word had been thrown into its mounting scale, however threatening the aspect of its fortune was, it might have made some port of safety. Political wisdom would then have done

its utmost, sideways of escape might have been opened; artificial delays might have prevented the necessity of immediate decision, time might have been gained, courage and hope might have returned. But it was not enough that the French policy with iron resolution repelled every attempt at participation,* Europe facilitated its purpose, and voluntarily renounced all co-operation. The only articulate voice which was heard, either in friendly or hostile accents, from near and from a far, and from all corners of the earth, was peace! peace! and peace on any conditions! None of the courts could be ignorant that in consequence of their thoughtless and blind resignation, the in-

* The British ministry, in fact, did its utmost in order to be admitted to the negotiations at Luneville, and as England had made many foreign conquests, and, besides, having a good deal to give up, had long before recognized the principle of compensation, considerable advantage might have accrued from this to Austria and to Europe. By what crooked ways and miserable quibbles the French cabinet found means of eluding this co-operation, cannot be forgotten by those who have followed with attention the progress of events; it was one of the most remarkable chapters in the diplomatic history of that period.

solence and the demands of France must be carried to the most extravagant pitch; that provided with such *instructions* and subjected to such *mandates* the Austrian government would be compelled to subscribe to a sentence of death upon the whole confederacy if France chose to pronounce it. But all that stedfastness and wisdom could have attempted in other conjunctures, was in vain in that moment of desertion; there was no more room for political calculation, for consideration of futurity, for the fair discussion of important objects. The only terror even of those who were at a distance from the scene was the continuance of the war: to see it ended eight days sooner they would have offered in sacrifice to their insatiable enemy hecatombs of lands and treasures, of rights and dignities!

With this spiritless disposition of the courts, the complaints of the people, the dejection of the great, the decay of the sentiment of public interest, and the influence of the never-ceasing outcries of the treacherous or scrupulous apostles of peace

were all in unison. A considerable part of Germany, Italy, and Switzerland was in fact depressed in a degree scarcely supportable by the evils of the war; the most flourishing provinces of Austria grievously felt the scourge; the condition of the more opulent classes was straitened, painful, and perilous, the condition of the lower classes was equally comfortless. To long for the conclusion of the war in so distressing a situation, was what no friend to humanity could condemn, and no statesman could disapprove. But the characteristic of the time, as well in the cabinets of princes as in the opinion of the people, in every circle of society from the highest to the lowest, in every conversation and written production of the day, was, that no limits were set to this desire of peace; that peace *on any condition* was the universal watchword, the wish of all wishes, the ultimate object of all human efforts. In no other epoch of history has the feeling of present necessity so completely subdued the public mind, as to benumb and paralyze all power of reflection, as to confuse and falsify the judgments of every one. To investigate

what might afterwards happen, to look at the most immediate consequences merely to inquire what was the amount of the ransom, seemed then a sort of martyrdom to the minds of the nations; they would not even know—how and where they were about to fall; and after the negotiation was concluded, and the violent irresistible wish of so many millions was accomplished, had, in place of all other information and formalities, a board with the inscription *peace is signed!* been carried through the towns and countries, the public would willingly have consented to be left in total and perpetual ignorance of the conditions.

At so extraordinary a crisis, if all the courage and political wisdom in the world had been united in a few individuals, they could have effected nothing against the omnipotence of the evil, against the omnipotence of opinion; the die was irrevocably cast, and Austria was more than justifiable in ceasing to struggle against destiny. There are cases in which a sacred duty calls upon rulers and their ministers to contend with the wishes of the people,

with whatever force, with whatever violence they may be expressed; for governments are appointed on the supposition that those who compose them are wiser than the multitude. But there are other cases, though they seldom occur—in which the most enlightened government must give ear to the public voice, even when its demands are pernicious. Such was the case before us; and what gave it its full weight was that the motives for giving up the contest were of a two-fold kind. For even the best informed and the most dispassionate saw that Austria was abandoned to its fate, and that the rest of Europe was dead, breathless, and cold. It was in vain to expect a favourable turn from without; any effective aid; or even an energetic remonstrance, since those from whom alone they could be expected saw nothing so desirable as peace: they and the public were completely at one. This facilitated and hastened the determination to listen to the prayers of the people, and a monarch whose former conduct had shewn him to be most laudably familiar with such

resolutions, but who, during a ten years reign, had learnt with exemplary devotion to reap in care what was sown in care, and by sacrifices to purchase new sacrifices, could, without violating any duty as a sovereign, adopt this resolution, which certainly was not one of the lightest to form.

Hence arose the treaty of Luneville; the merits of which it is unfair to estimate by the common standard of political and diplomatic perfection. It was less a negotiation than an unequal and hard capitulation, between a superior force, which took every advantage of its superiority, and an inferior, which, though compelled to surrender, would not give up all its fortifications at once. In a desperate situation to make the best retreat possible was the only tactic of an Austrian negotiator. Every position which could be maintained in the struggle, every point which could be saved, covered, concealed, or thrown out of sight, was a victory. But the principal articles of the capitulation were necessarily dictated by France; and as the resolution to

surrender could no longer be departed from, no exemption from this compliance could on any ground be hoped for.

When the necessary effects of a treaty of peace concluded under such circumstances are considered, a doubt naturally arises whether it was really binding. At the time of this treaty there was something monstrous and unnatural, and something which prognosticated death and dissolution, not only in the condition of Austria, but in the whole political body, in the exhausted and consumptive form, and in the haggard traits* of Europe itself. An instrument like that wrested by unfeeling violence from the weak and trembling hand of an expiring man, would, at least in private life, be unfavourably looked upon, and would not be received by a civil judge without hesitation and scruple as a ground of obligation. But far be from us the introduction of such maxims in the political relations between states! What was

* *Facies hippocratica.* It was really to be compared to the state of a person dying.

resolved on with an appearance of freedom, and what without any visible application of violence was confirmed and ratified, must be held sacred and inviolable. We can only go so far without danger and with the most perfect right, as to maintain that a convention where all the advantage was on one side, all the burthen and loss upon the other, should, in its execution, its operations, and consequences, be interpreted indulgently for the *suffering* and rigorously for the *winning* party. This is the dictate of reason and of justice; and such has been the doctrine held by the publicists of every time. If Austria, therefore, had not conformed to the stipulations of the treaty of Luneville in their full extent; if it had attempted to discover forced interpretations and subterfuges, or if it had seized upon the first opportunity to break in upon the grievously oppressive order of things which that peace created; impartial judges would have excused, and the world would have pardoned what could not have been wholly justified. Not so if FRANCE did it. The slightest violation of a treaty which was so exclusively, in such a dispropor-

tionate and unexampled degree favourable to France, was, on her part, a revolting act of injustice, an unpardonable crime.

Let the history of the last four years be consulted, and there we will find what has happened on one side and what has happened on the other.

The Imperial court has observed every article of the peace of Luneville with the most punctilious exactness. It has neither availed itself of the unfavourable situation in which it found itself at the time of its being concluded, nor of the privilege of liberal construction, which, in all unequal and hard contracts, belongs to the injured party, to elude the execution of any engagement. It has given the French government so little ground of complaint, that one can conscientiously maintain, that, if a conduct such as that which Austria has invariably held for these four years, without a moment's wavering and with a patience almost incredible, had been followed in a healthy order of things, and where the total overthrow of the constitu-

tion of nations rendered a long continuation of peace impossible, war must have vanished from the earth.*

The ruler of France has, on the other hand, considered the treaty of Luneville merely as an instrument, by the help of which he could—without fear of resistance from any quarter in which resistance could be made—prosecute his plans of insatiable ambition and unlimited aggrandizement: and, as in the memorable interval between the signing of this treaty and the coronation at Milan, the history of his *interior*

* If what we here assert required any proof, if it was not clear as day to the whole of Europe, it could not be better confirmed than by the utter incapacity of the French government to find out even the shadow of a complaint against Austria. Neither in their official declarations, nor even in their own journals, little accustomed as they are to spare any one, or to confine themselves within the strict limits of truth, has any thing ever been brought forward of such a nature which was not manifestly false, or contemptibly ridiculous. They have even freed us from the task of entering into this subject in great detail, for to such grievances as “that the emperor had purchased *Lindau*,” or that “*he ruled despotically over the south of Germany*,” or “that he had not resisted the *British maritime code*,” no one can expect us to make any reply.

administration is that of an unceasing progression from a power confined and modified by laws and certain prescribed forms, to an authority without either bounds or moderation; so the history of his external policy presents an uninterrupted series of unauthorized extensions of territory, of arbitrary transformations of the civil and political existence of states, a constant transgression, violation, and derision of all rights and all conventions. And it is an incontrovertible fact that, (without attempting to accomplish every thing at once, and thus frustrating his own schemes,) he could not, in the interval in which all this took place, have proceeded with less constraint, with more rapidity and greater violence, had there been no treaty in existence to fetter his operations.

It is less for the purpose of proving this position—for it is demonstrated as soon as it is laid down—than for the purpose of an historical illustration of these remarkable events, that we now proceed to a short review of them. After all that has been already said, it is almost unnecessary to

repeat, that the enterprizes of the French government were not injurious only to the private interests of Austria, but that they in effect wounded the interest of Europe in the most sensible and vital points. When we represent therefore what happened after the peace of Luneville as the particular concern of Austria, and as a breach of peace with Austria, it is done on the following grounds: first, because the Imperial court, in concluding that unfortunate treaty of peace, acted as the real, though involuntary representative of the whole European state confederacy; in the next place, because the most considerable acts of violence on the part of France, and its progress in injustice and usurpation were immediately injurious to *Austria*, and affected the rest of Europe only *through the medium* of Austria and *her* dangers; and lastly, because the greater part of these arbitrary measures were accompanied with circumstances which rendered them offensive in an eminent degree to the honour and dignity of Austria, when considered for a moment apart from the common cause of all other states.

In order to establish a certain arrangement in this disorderly chaos of contemporary, accumulated, and variously blended and interwoven malversations, it will be best to class them together in principal groupes, classifying them in the order of the different theatres on which they were transacted.*—This will be done under the following heads.

I. Infractions of the peace of Luneville in the arrangement of the internal affairs of *Germany*.

II. Enterprizes against *Switzerland*.

* A representation of them, following the *order of time*, would also have its advantages; but we have thought a preference due to the other as the most perspicuous mode of arranging them.

It will be remarked that in the above catalogue only those infractions of the peace are noticed by which *Austria* was immediately affected. Of the ill treatment which *Holland* experienced, of the violence practised in the *north of Germany*, of the seizure of *Hanover*, of the ransom of the *Hanse towns*, &c. as well as of the attempts against *Baden*, *Wirtemberg*, and *Bavaria*, we shall treat in other chapters. However in one way or another they were all violations of the peace of Luneville.

III. Enterprizes against *Italy*.

This last head, on account of its great extent, admits of several subdivisions, as
 1st. *Piedmont*. 2d. *Parma* and *Placentia*.
 3d. *Lombardy*. 4th. *Genoa* and *Lucca*.

Of *Tuscany*, *Naples*, &c. occasional notice will also be taken.

I. VIOLATIONS OF THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE IN THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF GERMANY.

In the seventh article of the treaty of Luneville it was stipulated, that as in consequence of the cession of a part of Germany to France several princes of the empire had lost their possessions, the loss should fall equally upon the whole, and that the *empire* should adjudge to the hereditary princes who found themselves in this situation indemnities to be taken out of its interior.

The fifth article stipulated that the Grand Duke of *Tuscany* should receive a

complete indemnity in Germany for the loss of his Italian states.

These two plain and unambiguous articles were executed in the following manner:

Instead of leaving the conduct and direction of this great German family process to the empire, as the treaty required, France, under the most frivolous pretences and with unexampled presumption, arrogated to itself the right of projecting a plan for completely revolutionizing Germany, and of giving a new constitution to the empire, without consulting the emperor, but merely with the consent of **RUSSIA** ;* transmitted it to a deputation of the states of the empire for their compliance; and, to fill up the measure of insult, fixed the term of two months for its completion. To this violent and af-

* How far this consent of Russia extended, and in what light it must be viewed consistently with truth and fairness and for the justification of the court of Petersburg, we shall afterwards explain.

fronting conduct the term *mediation* was applied.

Thus was the seventh article of the treaty fulfilled. The following was the fate of the fifth. In this plan of the French government, projected with the blindest and most arbitrary decision from private considerations alone, and directed solely to the accomplishment of its own private ends of stirring up present cabals, and founding upon them its future hopes; a lot was adjudged to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, containing about *one half* of the territorial surface, a *fifth part* of the population, and *four tenths* of the revenue of his former possessions. This was the *complete* indemnity that he was promised by the most precise of all the stipulations of the peace of Luneville.

And not to leave room for the smallest doubt respecting the meaning and object of so outrageous a perversion of the treaty, and effectually to prevent any soothing interpretations of it, such as that the mass of

indemnities was insufficient, after the fairest proportional distribution of them, to cover the amount of the losses sustained, some received more than double, and one received even ten times the value of his loss, the indemnity amounting to the full value of all his former possessions!*

* What rendered these dictatorial and uncovenanted acts still more revolting and insupportable, was the language held by France respecting them. In the memorable report of the 21st of August, 1802, which was introductory to the plan of indemnities, *Talleyrand* did not blush to assert in the face of Europe: "In the formation of this project, the most conscientious care has been taken to unite the demands of justice with the views of policy.—" It was impossible to form any plan which, in its principles and in the means provided for carrying it into execution, was more conformable to the spirit and the letter of the peace of Lunéville."—And "Austria in particular will derive immense advantages from it." In much the same stile of bitter and cruel sarcasm it was said in another part of this report: "It affords to France the most lively satisfaction that the principles of secularization has permitted it to retain one spiritual elector."

The same spirit in which these and similar writings were composed, actuates the French cabinet at this day; and when, for example, in the *Exposé de la conduite réciproque*, &c. which was laid before the senate on the 23d of September, we read, "In the distribution of the indemnities in Germany, Austria was treated with a degree of favour which must have contented all its

The situation in which Europe, and Germany in particular, then found itself; that dissolution of all federal ties, that decay of all public spirit, that insulated policy, that selfishness, that indifference, that exclusive thirst of gain, that oblivion of all great and common motives of action, in short, all that we have already described as illustrative of the unfortunate issue of the war, gave likewise to this infamous and detested transaction the power of uncontrolled operation. The *principle* was never once questioned, the competence of the mediatory powers was without difficulty acknowledged; the French partition plan was adopted as a basis of future regulation; only a few of its provisions met with accidental obstacles, and some immaterial alterations were introduced in consequence of unexpected cabals and private negotiations; but, upon the whole, France had the triumph of having by means of an

“wishes, and surpassed even its most sanguine expectations,”—one is in doubt whether this be really a French *sneer*, or a new experiment of that unexampled hardihood with which they act in every thing.

organic senatus-consultum,* broken in pieces, overthrown, and annihilated the old constitution of Germany, and of having established a new one in its place, suited to its temporary interests, its known or secret policy, its wishes or caprice.

The Imperial court,—wounded at once in all its great relations,—as supreme head of the empire, as the first and most important state of the empire, as president of the deputation of states, as subscribing party in the treaty of Luneville, as one of the principal powers of Europe, as sovereign of the Austrian monarchy, as intercessor for the grand duke of Tuscany—wounded in so many and so sensible points, would have been more than justified if, supported as it was by the articles of the peace, it had resisted in the most energetic manner that violent infraction of both its

* It is remarkable that the French declaration which decided on the fate of Germany was dated on the same day, (the 6th of August, 1802,) on which the famous *organic senatus-consultum* was made known at Paris, which abolished the constitution of 1799, and raised Buonaparte to absolute power.

letter and spirit, that uncalled for interference of strangers, and, in short, the whole French system. It was deterred by two principal considerations. On the one hand, it was apparent that 'the same unfriendly influence, the same decomposition of all the elements of the system, the same political indifference which prepared the unfortunate issue of the war, and the consequently disadvantageous peace, still reigned with undiminished ascendant, and that the evil had even increased in extent and violence; so that an ill-timed effort at salvation might not only fail of its object, but hasten the approaching ruin. On the other hand, the Imperial court, in an affair where its own personal and family interests were immediately concerned, (as well as the security and prosperity of others,) could not proceed to the last extremities, without exciting a suspicion that it was influenced by selfish motives and the desire of private gain, without laying itself open to the malice of some and the credulity of others.* In these

* It was also too apparent, that besides the principal

circumstances, tranquil resignation was the only policy suited to the occasion. The indemnity of the grand duke was in a later period of the negotiation somewhat, though inconsiderably, augmented. The addition, which was scarcely perceptible in point of population and territory, reduced the sum total of his loss in *revenue* to somewhere about *a half*; in all other points the will of the stranger gave the law, and from this moment the peace of Luneville, as an article in the great national code, might be considered as annihilated.

II. ENTERPRIZES AGAINST SWITZERLAND.

“ The contracting powers reciprocally

motive which instigated the French government to demand the cession of Tuscany, (it will afterwards be further illustrated,) it was influenced by the crafty design of sowing discord between the Imperial court and the empire. It was its object to place before Austria the bitter alternative of either submitting to a serious loss without an adequate compensation, or of rendering itself obnoxious to the empire by insisting upon a complete indemnity, such as had been stipulated by treaty. By Austria's moderation the latter expectation at least was disconcerted.

“ guaranteed the independence of the
“ Helvetic, Batavian, Cisalpine, and Li-
“ gurian republics, and the full power of
“ the inhabitants to adopt that form of
“ government which they may judge most
“ eligible.”—So ran the eleventh article of
the treaty of Luneville.

It is indeed to be regretted that the influence of those adverse circumstances, and of that imperiously urgent necessity which gave rise to this treaty, is felt in this as well as in its other stipulations, and that it was not possible for Austria to establish more *precise* principles, more precise preliminary conditions, and more precise limitations in regard to the future constitution of countries whose fate was so immediately and so variously connected with its own. But even as matters now stood, so much was indubitably certain from the clear meaning of the article and from every possible interpretation of it, that France gave up all pretensions to prescribe laws to the Swiss, to fix their internal constitution by direct interference, or forcibly to impede their march, and to

substitute its own will and laws to their *independent* election. It was just as little doubtful or ambiguous that to the *independence* of a state the *integrity* and *sacredness* of its territory were quite indispensable.

How far this article was observed will appear from the following account, the historical accuracy of which rests upon public, notorious, and well-attested facts.

Switzerland found itself, in consequence of the destructive revolution which France in the year 1798 effected in its interior, divided into two principal parties, the one of which had for its object the re-establishment of the old constitution (in so far as it was possible and desirable after all that had happened), and the other of which aimed at what was called an *one and indivisible system*, in which the management of all the important concerns, as well of the whole state as of each individual canton, was to be vested in a central government.* Of those who since the

* An *unconditional* return to the old government was

beginning of the troubles had taken a part; in one shape or other, in the administration of the state, the majority were, upon grounds not difficult to be understood, for the latter system: but could the votes of the Swiss have been collected at any one moment of tranquillity, and had the national voice been pronounced through a free and legitimate organ, the former would undoubtedly have prevailed,

wished for only by a few; for even those who contended for the right of demanding this return were persuaded that, in the situation of things which then existed, justice and prudence required considerable alterations. It must likewise be acknowledged that among the partizans of the new system there were only a small number of fanatics (perhaps none but the Pays de Vaud) who had sworn the unqualified destruction of the old order of things. The characteristic difference between the two principal parties was, that the one wished in the new constitution to give a *preponderance* to ancient forms, the other to the system of unity.—The numerous subdivisions and shades of opinion that arose out of these two principal heads of difference it is impossible to distinguish in a general sketch; and it is perhaps necessary to observe that it is not at all our object to pronounce any judgment upon the Swiss transactions, in so far as they concerned its internal interests, but merely to say as much about them as is requisite to enable us to represent the conduct of France in its proper light.

The members who composed the government in the first months of the year 1801 were more or less attached to the principles of *unity*, and it was easy to foresee that the principal features of any constitution which might be expected from their hands, would tend to the establishment of such a system. Nevertheless some hope remained to their opponents (supported as they were by the good opinion of the nation) of gradually gaining the upper hand, of disconcerting, if not wholly at least in part, the projects of the ruling party, and of thus attaining to a constitution which would have again restored in the greatest possible perfection the ancient character of Switzerland, its old political organization, the laws, the usages, the forms, the mutual relations of the different cantons, and every thing to which for centuries it had been indebted for its prosperity and renown. The complete independence of the nation was the preliminary and necessary condition of the fulfilment of such a hope. This had been assured to it by the peace of Luneville, and the first declarations

of France announced a determined resolution not to oppose the performance of the promise. The personal assurances of the chief of the French republic were calculated even to excite higher expectations and still more gladdening prospects; for, when he declared to the Swiss deputies of his own free motion:—"That, that
 " constitution which should be most *ex-*
 " *clusively* conformable to the *particular*
 " *character* of their country, its *situation*,
 " its *manners*, its *local relations*, appeared
 " to him to be the best and the wisest"
 —the true Swiss were justified in hoping that the plan of modelling the constitution of their country after a speculative system, or theoretical pattern, was given up once for all at least by the French Government.*

*It is highly necessary in the following narration constantly to bear in mind what Buonaparte, in the end of the month of May 1801, said to the Swiss deputies *Glair* and *Stapfer*. We shall quote his words as they are officially recorded in an article of the *Moniteur* of the 9th June.

Le premier Consul s'est contenté de faire aux citoyens *Glair* *Stapfer*, députés de l'Helvétie, cette

The provisional authorities however, after various discussions and vacillations, adhered to a *project of a constitution* which one of these deputies had brought from Paris to Bern. By a resolution of the 29th May, they convened a general diet which should adopt this project as a basis for the establishment of a constitution. The most unequivocal discontent was manifested at these preliminary measures in the elections of the deputies to the diet, in the primary assemblies of the people, and in the course of all the necessary formalities throughout the whole extent of the country, and particularly in the little cantons situated in the mountainous part of it. The diet assembled on the 7th Dec. 1801, amid the most violent protestations and the general murmurs of the people, and it had scarcely opened

seule observation: " que le meilleur projet de constitution de l'Helvétie seroit celui qui auroit ce caractère principal de n'être applicable qu'à elle, et dans lequel on reconnoitroit les circonstances particulières du territoire, du climat, et des mœurs de l'Helvétie, qui ne ressemble à aucun autre état Européen: que du reste le gouvernement François ne vouloit aucunement influencer leurs délibérations ou diriger leurs pensées."

its sittings when the fragility of its composition was visible, and the necessity of a new order of things became every hour more and more evident. A part of the deputies had hardly met when they abandoned the deliberations and protested against all the resolutions; and when the rest wished to proceed conformably to the principle of unity to decide upon the fate of all the districts of the country, including even those which now refused to acknowledge their competence and their representative character, the members of the secession supplanted the provisional government in its functions, and put an end to the diet. This happened on the 28th Oct. 1801.

The most remarkable circumstance in this revolution was the ascendant which the friends of the old constitution obtained, in spite of the most unfortunate auspices, by the influence of public opinion alone; for though the primary agents in it were far from being attached to old principles and forms, though they even commenced their career with a resolu-

tion declaring the constitution of the 29th May (this constitution which was the work of French skill, and which was favourable to the system of indivisibility) to be provisionally introduced, they were in a short time obliged to commit the whole powers of government into the hands of those who had first shaken the authority of the diet by a vigorous resistance, and who were the real organs of the people's will. A senate of twenty-five persons (which since the 25th of October was the central point of all public authority,) and a select committee of this senate, invested with the most important offices, was organized in such a manner as to give the opposers of the system of unity the most decisive influence: and *Reding* whom both friends and foes considered as the principal supporter of the old system, and whom the little cantons in particular considered as the guardian angel of their independence, was amid shouts of joy appointed first *Landamman* with almost unlimited power.

That this order of things gave little satisfaction to the French was soon ob-

servable, could the contrary ever have been expected, from their suspicious silence. The Swiss territory however was in the mean time covered with their troops, and it was easy to perceive that without their formal concurrence a fortunate issue could not be expected. *Reding* therefore resolved, for the purpose of putting an end to all anxiety and doubt upon the subject, on the night of the 30th of November to undertake a journey to Paris.

His first reception was extremely flattering, promises of the most encouraging kind, the acknowledgment of the new authority, the integrity of the Swiss territory, uncontroled freedom on the part of the cantons to settle their internal constitutions, a softening modification of the treaty of alliance, in short every thing which the best intentioned could wish or the most sanguine hope for, was assured to him in the first interviews. But this fair dawn of better fortunes was soon clouded. The negotiations became difficult and intricate, the language of the French ministers became colder, more ambiguous and un-

friendly, till at last their real object was disclosed in a peremptory demand: "That "*Reding* should divide the chief authority " with the heads of the opposite party;" and a letter of the first Consul of France betrayed this secret to Switzerland and to Europe, that, notwithstanding all his hypocritical professions of friendship, the real independence of the Helvetic nation was an abomination to his heart.*

* Of the true meaning of this remarkable letter of the 6th January 1802 no doubt can be now entertained. It was a plain unequivocal and pressing requisition to the Swiss to solicit *the union of their country with France*. The beginning and the conclusion of the letter which we are about to quote, evince this in the clearest manner. " In the course of the last two years " (so the letter begins) your countrymen have occasionally consulted me upon their affairs. I have " spoken to them as the first magistrate of the Gauls" —A dignity of which till now we have never heard in history, and which must have remained concealed from the rest of the world in some *Paris edition of Cæsar's Commentaries!*—" would have done, at the time when "*Helvetia formed a part of Gaul.*" And after reminding him that Switzerland was not only *without a government* but *without a national will*, and encouraging them to *resolve on making a great sacrifice*, he concludes in the following words: " France will continue " to manifest towards the Swiss those affectionate and " paternal feelings which have subsisted under the pro-

From this moment those who observe

“tection of an alliance consecrated by several centuries *between these two independent branches of one and the same people.*”

In this important document, which in many respects is a better monument to the character of the man whose name it bears than all the inscriptions on the Egyptian Pyramids, it is likewise declared for the first time: “That the French nation would recognize no constitution in Switzerland, which was not founded upon the principles *by which it had been hitherto regulated,*” or in other words, upon the system of indivisibility. This was the *independence* promised by the peace of Lunéville! Thus was pronounced the sovereign will of the same omnipotent Ruler, who not only six months earlier made the declaration quoted in a former note, but who only six weeks before, *in an official exposé of the situation of the French republic*, had, through the medium of one of his servants, expressed the following sentiments: *Souvenez-vous*” (a dit le premier consul à l’Helvétie) “*du courage et des vertus de vos peres; ayez une organization simple comme leurs mœurs; Songez à ces religions, à ces langues différentes, qui ont leurs limites marquées; à ces vallées, à ces montagnes, qui vous séparent; à tant de souvenirs attachés à ces bornes naturelles, et qu’ il reste de tout cela une empreinte dans votre organisation.*” (Moniteur of the 2d November 1801.) Who would have expected that this wholesome and consolatory counsel was an introduction to the letter of the 6th January, a preface to the Dictatorial Recommendation of the principle of indivisibility, to the requisition to unite with France, and to all the faithless and violent measures which we are about to recount!

and understand the signs of the times, could with certainty foretell the fate of Switzerland. *Reding* returned to Bern, and in order to avoid all responsibility, perhaps also from a deep conviction of the impossibility of resisting with success, he punctually performed what the French government had required. Six new members of the party which favoured the system of unity were immediately introduced into the senate; the select committee was so organized, that this party had even a majority in it; the place of second Landamman, created for the occasion, and several of the most important ministerial offices, were filled with its partizans. And still after so many endeavours to deprive him of authority, the personal importance of *Reding*, and his influence in the business of state, were so predominant and beneficial that he would probably have succeeded in establishing a constitution, if not perfectly, at least in a great degree conformable to the real wants of the state and to the real wishes of its inhabitants, had not his enemy, and the enemy of his

country been powerful and treacherous enough to remove him entirely from the theatre of action.

On the 13th April 1802, the senate had adjourned its sittings for eight days to celebrate the Easter festival, and *Reading* for this purpose had set off for the canton of Schwitz to join his family. The chief authority was in the interim entrusted to the select committee, and found itself for the moment exclusively in the hands of those members who were indebted to France for their places in it. They took advantage of the favourable conjuncture, and with the activity of well trained conspirators, passed a series of resolutions on the 17th April, which in craft and audacity are almost without a parallel in the history of political factions, which reversed every thing which had been done towards forming a constitution, and appointed forty-seven persons of their own nomination, to meet at Bern, and to deliberate upon the old project of the 29th May 1801, and in the mean time

they adjourned the senate *sine die* "till it should please the secret committee again to assemble it."

And that no doubt might be entertained respecting the quarter in which these acts of violence originated, or under whose protection and authority they were executed, *Verninae*, the French envoy, who till then had observed a constant silence and confined himself to secret cabals, sent a congratulatory letter to the immediate authors of the resolutions, in which he testified to them his joy, "that they had made so wise a use of their legitimate temporary power."

Reding and his friends in vain resorted to the most energetic means of maintaining their just and honestly acquired authority against this hostile attack; in vain they called heaven and earth* to witness

* It might have also been said "heaven and hell," for among other expedients *Reding* tried that of writing a letter to *Buonaparte* on the 22d of April, in which he represented to him in the most moderate ex-

of the righteousness of their cause and the treachery of their adversaries; in vain they attempted by the most dignified protests to destroy the effect of their measures: these protests were considered as *voluntary resignations*, their places were declared to be vacated, and successors were appointed to them. On the 30th April the assembly of notables, as it was called, met without either authority or title, but merely by the appointment of an incompetent and self-constituted government, and in less than three weeks a constitution was formed under the protection of the French envoy, and under his daily direction conformably to the

expressions what had been the fruit of the *promises made* to him at Paris, what had been the reward of the confidence with which he had complied with all the conditions prescribed to him, and what had been the conduct of those with whom France had compelled him to share the administration of the state;—He accused in particular the French envoy: “I cannot believe,” said he, “that this is the result of the generous sentiments which the *First Consul* expressed to me.”—This letter naturally remained without an answer, and *Ferriac* knew very well the grounds on which he acted.

project of the 29th May and the principle of indivisibility.

Before considering the operation of this constitution and the events which arose out of it, it is necessary to direct our attention to a contemporary transaction, which, though only an interlude in the drama of Switzerland's subjection, is of the highest importance, particularly when considered in a political point of view and as a flagrant breach of the peace.

France had already—in order to extract from the calamities which its avarice had brought on every possible facility for its plans of conquest and domination—in the general confusion robbed Switzerland of some of its most important possessions, and particularly of its strongest bulwarks and passes: on the north-west side, the territory of the bishoprick of Basle, so interesting for France in a military view, with the entrances into the mountains of the Jura, the passes of Bruntrutt, the valley of Munster, Arguel, Biel, &c.: on the south-west, the flourishing city

of Geneva become of still more importance to France than before since the union of Savoy: On the south-east, the Valteline, Chiavenna and Bormio. To compleat the circle of its conquests one other acquisition only was wanting. The high country of the Valais had for those who have the command of Italy, and who from thence wished to trouble the peace of Germany and Europe, an irresistible charm. The ancient, free, and once powerful and proud people, which inhabited the valleys of this land, opened or shut at pleasure two principal roads out of the Alps, the one leading over mount St. Bernard, the other by the pass of the Simplon. In the then existing situation of things, when the plains of Lombardy were in possession of a French army, and were ruled by French functionaries, under continually varying titles and pretences, the command of the route over the Simplon was extremely desirable, because it secured them the earliest and shortest passage, the most direct channel of communication with the Milanese, and an immediate entry into the heart of Italy,

On the overthrow of the Swiss constitution, and during the last years of the war, French generals and proconsuls, by grievances and oppressions of every sort, converted this once happy land into a howling wilderness; and it is a fact of public notoriety, that in several countries of Europe charitable subscriptions were set on foot to save the miserable inhabitants from famine and death. After (to use the words of a great historian) "every thing was profaned, and rifled, and plundered, and trodden under foot," nothing farther remained, except to adopt military precautions for futurity; a military road across the Simplon was begun in the Autumn of 1800, and at the time when the peace of Luneville was signed part of it was already completed. The project was interrupted by the peace; the French troops retired from the Valais; and if in the eyes of the French government the stipulations of the treaty were any thing but a dead letter, they never could again return within this territory.

Their usual policy soon unfolded itself.

For the purpose of introducing and covering more violent measures, the then provisional government was required to *give up* the country of the Valais; at first only the territory on the left bank of the Rhone, and afterwards the whole, under the well-chosen pretext that part was not sufficient for the completion of the military road. The provisional government neither felt itself disposed nor authorized to terminate its career in this way; during the sittings of the diet in the month of September, the proposition was renewed, but no decision was passed upon it. When Reding at last, by taking the helm of the state, had invigorated the hopes of the well intentioned, and had disconcerted every unpatriotic scheme, no prospect seemed to remain that any negotiation would be entertained which had for its object the public ruin, and the French government was convinced, that without employing violence it could not obtain the so much desired result. On the 25th of December, 1801, it caused the country of the Valais to be again occupied by its troops; deaf to the most urgent representations of the ma-

gistrates, to the lamentations of the inhabitants, to the protestations of the government of Bern,* General Thurreau pressed forward with his army, seized upon the public chests, threw those who resisted into prison, and contented himself with assuring the ill treated people in an ironical proclamation: "that the French republic had resolved on doing all this from regard to their welfare and prosperity."

The people of the Valais left no means untried to escape the fate which threatened them. In the strongest and most affecting

* It wrote to the French commander on the 28th of December, (*Reding* was then at Paris) in the following terms, "The country of the Valais is a part of Switzerland. You trample under foot the rights of the Swiss government, *the rights of nations and the stipulations of treaties.* France is at peace with us, calls itself our ally and friend; you involve us in war without declaring war against us. You drive a people to despair which desires nothing more than to repose itself in the lap of a constitution which it loves, after all the miseries it has suffered from revolution. — By this conduct, *the independence of our republic is violated*; if we receive no support from Paris, we must recommend our just rights to eternal justice, &c." The answer was: "*He must execute the orders which he had received.*"

addresses they conjured the government of Bern "to avert from them this last deadly
" blow, the bitter calamity of separation.
" They would suffer and forget every
" thing, their misery might rise to a still
" higher pitch, they would submit to be
" ruined and undone, provided this con-
" solation was left them, of sharing their
" good and evil fortune with their old
" allies, provided they only retained the
" name of Swiss." When *Reding* re-
turned they besought him for help and
hope; he revived their sinking courage
only with vague and ambiguous expres-
sions; he had now learned to know the
character of their enemies. All those
flippant promises of respect for the inde-
pendence of Switzerland and the inviolable
integrity of its territory, of protection,
friendship, and fidelity, he had learned to
estimate according to their true value. At
the moment when the consul and his mi-
nisters were imposing upon his honest in-
genuity, at the same moment the orders
were given to *Thurreau!* And so far were
the actors in this scene from making any
retrograde movement in their criminal pro-

gress, that they even treated the addresses of the *Valaisans* as punishable acts of sedition, and they declared the conduct of the Helvetic government in not rejecting these addresses to be an injury against France.*

* In the answer which *Talleyrand* communicated to the Helvetic minister at Paris upon his last representations, he went so far, after having thrown out other allegations and reproaches, as to say to him, "The first Consul does not know of any such body as a Helvetic confederacy." Upon which Mr. *Stäpfer* summoned courage enough to address a note to *Talleyrand*, which must here be mentioned as an important historical document, because it demonstrates in the most incontestable manner what opinion even the well intentioned men who did not belong to *Reding's* party, and who were not friendly to the old constitution, entertained of the conduct of the French government. In this note it was asked, "Was it not then your government, citizen minister, which by force of the bayonet confounded the country of the Valais with the other parts of the Swiss territory in a common mass? Was it not then your soldiers which repeatedly visited with fire and sword the inhabitants of that land, for the purpose of compelling them to submit to those laws by which Switzerland was collectively to be governed? Was it not you yourself, citizen minister, who subscribed the treaty of alliance between the French nation and the one and indivisible Helvetic republic? Was the Valais not then an integral part of that republic? And did not the treaty of *Luneville* guarantee the whole extent of our territory as it stood at the time of the conclusion of this treaty?"

After *Reding* was removed from the government all serious resistance was at an end, and the work was brought in silence to a conclusion. In the project of a constitution, which came to light before the 17th of April, under the auspices of *Reding*, the Valais with its old boundaries appeared in the list of the Swiss cantons. In that which was decreed by his successors it was without any reason being assigned *left out*. The French government had now obtained its object: to incorpd-

This remarkable note was delivered on the 27th of March, 1802. On the 17th of April an end was put to *Reding's* government and to all further protests!

It is scarce worth while to observe that France thought fit to set down the district of the *Frickthal*, ceded by Austria to the Helvetic government, as an indemnification for the Valais. Even according to the loosest notions of indemnity, and laying aside entirely the consideration, that here quite different interests and views were brought into play, it was altogether ludicrous to consider the *Frickthal*, which is only five square miles in extent, and contains only about eighteen thousand inhabitants, as an indemnity for the Valais, containing ninety square miles and a population of a hundred thousand souls. The only remarkable circumstance was, that the inhabitants of the *Frickthal* protested just as vehemently against their union with Switzerland, as the people of the Valais did against being separated from it.

rate the country of the Valais would have been an act of foolish presumption, and to have proceeded to avowed conquest without any disguise, so soon after the treaty of peace, would have startled the most daring innovator as highly indiscreet. It was contented with erecting the Valais into an independent republic under the protection of the French, Cisalpine, and Helvetic republics! The road over the Simplon—for this was the great object—was to be kept up at the expence of the three republics; and, (the better to confirm no doubt the *soverignty* and *independence* of the Valais,) all the *passes* were to be occupied by *French* troops!

A more violent and daring infraction of a treaty of peace, either in spirit or in form, could not well have been attempted; and had circumstances been more propitious than they were, who would have blamed Austria had it followed up this decisive step with a declaration of war? In defiance of the interests, the wishes, the remonstrances of the Swiss; indifferent to the despair of the *Valaisans*, and

without asking the consent of any neighbouring court, France, at its own instance, violated the article of the peace of Luneville which assured to Switzerland its independence, and by force of arms lopped off an useful member of the league from the political body. And this act of violence was committed for the purpose of making itself master of a territory which certainly, to the no small danger and to the mighty detriment of Austria, opened to France, in peace and war, and at all times, a short and convenient road into that part of Italy which lay contiguous to the Austrian states!

In the meanwhile the Helvetic assembly of notables laid a project of a constitution formed in haste before the people for their acceptance, but notwithstanding all the efforts they made to suppress the voice of the nation, it was loudly raised against their work. *Only four days* were given to the people to mark their acceptance or disapprobation of it in the registers of the municipal magistracies, and those who refused or omitted to give their opinion were

declared to be considered as approving it. But even this stale and worthless artifice, which had been so often employed in revolution politics, could scarcely procure a majority of names,* and much less a ma-

* It is true that, according to the registers, there were 228,000 votes of approbation, and 70,000 votes of disapprobation, so that there were about five-sevenths of the people in favour of the constitution. But it must not pass unobserved, that according to *the report of the minister himself*, "those who did not give any vote at all," and who were included in the 228,000, were in proportion to those who absolutely approved of it *of somewhat more than two to one.*" This confession was decisive: for supposing those who were silent had been *only* in the proportion of two to one to those who absolutely approved, the number of votes for the constitution would not have amounted to more than 76,000. Now taking for granted, what neither appears improbable nor unfair, that of the two-thirds who were silent only one half was unfriendly, these 76,000 added to the number of those who expressly rejected it, makes the number of negative voices to amount to 146,000; so that there would only remain a majority of 8,000 in favour of it. But as this proportion *was somewhat more than two to one*, it is clear that, if the truth were known, there was a *real majority against* the constitution.


It is evident that no reasonable man can attach the smallest value to such disgusting calculations. It can do no harm, however, occasionally to call to mind, that in such miserable arts consists the sum of all *revolution wisdom*. For it must not be forgotten, that in this and no

majority of sentiments, though it was the only way without further discussion or delay of putting the constitution in activity. This took place on the 2nd of July, 1802; three of the leaders of the ruling party at that time were appointed, one to the post of Landamman; the other two to the offices of his stadtholders; and the people were told without disguise that “if this new constitution was not agreeable to their wishes, still they had no alternative but to obey it.”

The answer to this proclamation was an immediate general insurrection throughout the whole of the east part of Switzerland. The three original cantons set the example; they desired, should every thing else be denied them, only to be left to themselves, their ancient laws and forms of government, and to remain disjoined from their former allies, free, independent and

other way, all the new constitutions in France, Italy, and Holland, all the numberless constitutions and counter constitutions of our time, from the purely democratic to the imperial and royal, all the unions and incorporations of territory, have been established and ratified.

the just, and shared s and ps of lent, age, bom- con- led as at for. here ould d at mber, basis the per- tution n only t ap- evolve and of the he in- In



sons vested with authority by the constitution, which had been rejected by the public voice, were driven from Bern to Lausanne, and in all human probability Switzerland would now have obtained a constitution truly independent, such as its interests prescribed, such as the friends of the country desired, and such as had been assured to it by the treaty of Luneville, if Buonaparte had been disposed to comply with this treaty.

On the first breaking out of the troubles, at a moment when the new government with no support but that of an usurped authority, disowned and detested on all hands, and scarcely respected even by its dependents, could only be maintained by foreign power and military aid, he had on a sudden ordered his troops to give up Switzerland to its fate.* This resolution

this project also no mention was made either of a patrician order, or of privileges attached to particular towns.

* Orders for this purpose were received on the 13th of July. The new rulers could not loudly protest against it; but their apprehensions were visible enough from the

requires no comment. The resistance to the new constitution was decided, and had been already unequivocally and loudly pro-

circumstance of their intreating the minister, *Verninac*, two days before, "to postpone the execution of the order till further communications could be received from Paris." They received this remarkable answer: "The first Consul is persuaded that in the virtues of the Helvetic nation sufficient means will be found for the maintenance of public order." He did not think it once worth while to mention the only proper ground of the measure, namely, that the continuance of French troops in Switzerland was in contradiction to the *peace of Luneville*. To be sure, if this circumstance were at all worthy of attention, they should have been withdrawn a year and a half sooner. *Reding* had done his utmost at Paris to bring that about, but in his time they paid no attention to such representations.

The best of it was that not long after, notwithstanding the public correspondence between *Verninac* and the Helvetic government, *Talleyrand*, in a letter of the 9th of September to the Helvetic *envoy* at Paris, expressed the most lively regret that his government should have believed that it was possible for it to exist without French troops, because it entered into the *beneficent intentions* of the first Consul to have let these troops remain in Switzerland at least a year longer, had representations been made to them to this effect!

Was ever truth and public honesty, all humane and political considerations, sported with in so revolting and disgusting a manner as in these unparalleled transactions?

nounced; to favour this resistance to the constitution, and the new authorities it had itself created, accorded neither with the principles, views, nor intentions of the French government. The only possible motive for withdrawing its troops precisely at this moment, was the prospect of a civil war, the prospect of again introducing these troops into the country under circumstances of urgency, and the hope of convincing the Swiss that, without the support and protection of France, there was no longer any salvation for them. That this and no other was the calculation soon became a melancholy certainty,

The newly constituted authorities called upon France to interfere. Their government was overthrown and dissolved; victory had declared in favour of their adversaries; the present was the crisis leading to a new organization which ought to have been permitted to develop itself uninfluenced by foreign interposition. At this very conjuncture *Buonaparte* interposed. In an address of the thirtieth of September—in much the same tone in which *Talley-*

rand, *Mengaud*, and *Brune* hailed the approach of the days of terror in 1798—he thus spoke to the Swiss nation. “I had, it is true, resolved to take no part in your internal affairs, but I retract this resolution;* I will be the mediator of your differences; but my mediation shall be effectual, and such as becomes the great nation in whose name I speak.” And at the same time to give satisfactory proofs of the *efficacy* of this *mediation*, he declared every thing to be *null* that had been resolved upon and executed since the flight of the constitutional authorities, reinstated them provisionally, and summoned a *consulta* to Paris.

The scene which followed upon this letter was one of the most revolting which Europe has experienced, from the time that it became impossible to keep within bounds a despotic and tyrannical power by a judicious and vigorous application of a restraining force. Switzerland was on all

* And he might have added, *repeal the article of the peace of Luneville* by my own unquestionable authority which forbids such a retractation.

sides at once inundated by French troops; between forty and fifty thousand men were destined to lay the whole nation in chains; the speedy subjection of the chiefs, and the unexpected facility of the work required only one half of this army to be employed. They took possession of all the strong posts of the country; they penetrated, as in the year 1798, into the most remote recesses of the mountains; and the most sequestered and sacred asylums of an innocent and harmless people, were once more profaned and destroyed. The violent overthrow of the magistracies, the annihilation of all the influence of the patriots, and the consequent triumph of the French party, was the first military exploit of this terrible army of execution; a general disarmament was carried into effect with the utmost rigour both in the large and small cantons;—a measure of so flagitious a character that it is not easy to conceive how even tyranny itself ventured to order it, or had power to carry it into execution; at last the most distinguished friends of the people were taken into custody and thrown into distant fortresses

After so many acts of cruelty and violence, the Helvetic government—now re-established in its functions—derided the dumb despair into which the nation had sunk, and announced to the wretched people that it was not enough to bear all this, that they must also maintain their oppressors, and pay military tribute to those who had robbed them of their liberty. In fact, not to mention many other grievances, a contribution of more than 600,000 livres was imposed upon the cantons, and levied without mercy or indulgence.

The contrast between this conduct, this violent and wanton barbarity, and the calm tranquil resignation with which the leaders of the Swiss confederacy bowed their necks to the yoke of necessity, completed the gloomy picture. They had begun the struggle on the supposition that France was to remain neutral; to enter the lists with France never had been their intention. The leaders of the convocation which met at *Schweitz* resigned their inefficient authority on the 15th of October, a fortnight before the entrance of the troops with

noiseless simplicity and dignity, not however without a solemn declaration, “ that
“ while they saw themselves necessitated
“ to yield to the *force of foreign arms*,
“ their ancient unalienable right to be
“ their own lawgivers, this sacred right
“ which they had inherited from their
“ fathers, and which was *lately confirmed*
“ by the *peace of Luneville*, remained in
“ full force and activity; and that accord-
“ ing to their most conscientious persua-
“ sion, without the free and uncontrouled
“ exercise of this right, Switzerland could
“ enjoy no permanent happiness or lasting
“ peace.”

On the very day that the promoters of the last Swiss league quitted the scene of action with this remarkable reservation, the French government took a step, which, if it could not be explained upon other motives and a different association of sentiments, might have given rise to a supposition, that even in its career of violence it had not entirely lost all consciousness of injustice, and all recollection of its obligations. It apologized for its conduct to-

wards Switzerland, but the spirit, as well as the form of its apology, tended much more to criminate it than the most obstinate silence could have done. If any European sovereign was entitled according to the law of nations to call France to account for its measures, it was certainly the emperor of Germany; he had concluded the peace of Luneville, he was an acknowledged and responsible guarantee of the independence of Switzerland; it could not be matter of indifference to him, the immediate neighbour of this country, to him whose hereditary states came in contact with Switzerland in so many important points, whether France treated it as a conquered province, and its free inhabitants as rebellious subjects. But *Talleyrand* did not make choice of him to whom to address a declaration upon the subject—he chose *the Elector of Bavaria!* It was to the accredited minister of this prince, who took about as much interest in the fate of Switzerland as the king of Etruria or the regent of Portugal; who cared for the maintenance of the peace of Luneville only so far as his *indemnities* were con-

cerned, who confined himself to narrow views of private advantage and keeping aloof from all great negotiations, shewed a most complete indifference to every thing that happened in Europe—to this person was the letter addressed in which the French government entered into an explanation of its past and future policy in regard to the affairs of Switzerland. For the purpose of humbling Austria, for the purpose of undermining the peace of Luneville, for the purpose of ridiculing all the rules of decency and the forms of diplomatic intercourse, as well as of sporting with the articles of the peace itself, and for the purpose of informing the world once for all, that France no longer acknowledged any other law than that of its own will, this miserable juggle was resorted to. The execution corresponded wonderfully with the project. At the moment when twenty thousand French troops roamed through every district and corner of Helvetia, disarmed the Swiss, dispersed their convocation with the bayonet, and threw their leaders into prison; in this moment of devastation and horror, this lying ma-

nifesto carried an assurance through the medium of a Bavarian envoy to Europe, amazed and panic struck, as it were, by the events which were passing before it, “ that the first Consul never had any other “ object in view than the perfect independence of Switzerland; and that political “ organization *which it might see good to “ adopt.*”*

* When we apply the epithet of *lying* to this justificatory letter of *Talleyrand*, we mean that it *eminently* merited this appellation; and not merely in the common sense in which it proverbially and of right belongs to all the French official writings, whether under the name of manifesto's, exposé's, or comptes rendus, &c. &c. In that particular instance the web of falsehood was so thick and coarsely wove, as wholly to prevent even a diaphanous glimmering of truth. “ The influence of *external cabals* and of *foreign gold* had hindered the Helvetic “ government from acquiring stability!”—“ The *enemies of the people* were the exciters of the insurrection, they had *traduced and calumniated France*, they “ had maliciously circulated the notion that the *Helvetic republic* from a spirit of imitation might enter into the “ same relation with the first Consul in which the *Italian republic* stood.”—“ *A handful of seditious emigrants and renegados from foreign armies* had desolated “ Switzerland with fire and sword!”—“ *These enemies of the people* are now punished by the *disgust, detestation and contempt* of their better informed fellow citizens, *who have turned their arms against their leaders!*” —With such shameless audacity were events misrepre-

At last the concluding act of the piece commenced. The consulta met at Paris. In the then existing state of things in Switzerland, in the state of helpless depression to which the patriots were reduced after the recent and complete victory which had been obtained by the partizans of the system of unity, and the allies of France,

sent and falsified, the true character and progress of which were known not only to all the cabinets, but to the public, and to the world.

What immediately gave occasion to this fable of *Talleyrand*, was to all appearance a step adopted by the British government, which in a note of the 10th October, had taken part with the Swiss, and had protested against the violation of their independence as it had been assured by the peace of Luneville. As precisely at that time France had announced the senseless pretension of entirely excluding England from the affairs of the continent; the object of the letter to the Bavarian minister was probably clearly to show how little the French cabinet cared for *England's* representations. That this was an insult, and an intentional and studied insult to England, is certain; but whoever takes into consideration the grounds already mentioned, and the whole existing relations, cannot entertain a doubt, that though the court of Vienna observed a compulsory silence, in the course of all these unfortunate proceedings, the conduct of the French government was incomparably more injurious, insulting, and humiliating to Austria.

The latter party were sure in the election of deputies to have a majority of voices; accordingly in a deputation of *sixty*, their opponents had hardly *sixteen* in their favour. The friends of the *one and indivisible system* must therefore have undertaken the journey to Paris with confidence; the issue must have appeared to them not in the least degree doubtful; their long possession of the French support and protection; the triumph which they had just obtained, their present preponderance, every thing was in alliance with their hopes: but every thing had taken a sudden turn. In a letter of the 10th December, their mediator and protector represented to them, "that a FEDERAL CONSTITUTION was the only one at all suitable to the exigencies of their country and to the character of their nation; that a CENTRAL GOVERNMENT absolutely could not make them happy, that a wise statesman would never attempt to contend with nature, and that such had uniformly been his principles and views." After this unexpected introduction of the business, ten deputies (five of each party) were invited to private conferences in which this new

system was in various ways unfolded, recommended at one time in a high commanding tone, at another with professions of kindness and good will, and was at last declared to predominate. At the same time a new constitution for Switzerland, in twenty chapters, was brought out from the workshop of a secret commission, composed of four French counsellors of state, fixing not only the general relations of the state, but prescribing the whole details of a form of government for each particular canton; and though the authors of this constitution,*—their political principles were well known—could certainly not be accused of any attachment to the old constitution of Switzerland, and though if left to themselves they would have been contented to give every possible extension to the revolutionary principle, their work came as near to the old constitution as it could be brought

* The counsellors of state *Barthelemy, Fouché, Desmeuniers*, and *Ræderer*. The last mentioned of the three seems to have been the principal author. The constitutions of the former aristocratic cantons were exclusively the productions of his genius.

under such a conjuncture, with such instruments, associations and promises ; a clear and convincing proof that he who directed the whole had expressly ordered that it should be thus, and no otherwise modelled.—The new federal constitution was immediately delivered over to the deputies, to be by them carried into effect under the title of an *act of mediation*. One of their number, and (that nothing might be omitted which could give an extraordinary character to the whole transaction) this person a supporter of the *federal system*, was appointed first Landamman, the consulta was dismissed and the new constitution put in activity.

To trace with historical accuracy this extraordinary change of things, this unexpected rapid transition from a decided support of a system of unity, to a declared renunciation of it to its true causes, is perhaps permitted only to those who are initiated in the mysteries of the time. Whether Buonaparte at once (in an interval of four or five weeks)—it might be from a new view of things, from the

the unknown influence of private representations and consultations, or from that violent spring which is sometimes made by an irregular and capricious mind, that cannot bear restraint from love to hatred, and from persecution to favour—*had changed his opinion* respecting the affairs of Switzerland, so as to make him reject the principles to which till then he had accorded his protection; or whether he really *all along* had considered the system of unity as a bad one, given a decided preference in his own mind to the federal system, acted from political motives contrary to his own conviction, condemned what he favoured, and persecuted what he approved, leaves room for a difference of opinion. The latter of the two hypotheses, however, appears to be infinitely the more probable one of the two, and whoever considers all the circumstances with attention, will soon be convinced that it is only in this way we can obtain a compleat solution of the enigma.*

* As often as Buonaparte had occasion merely to de-

If the interest and prosperity of Switzerland, if a happy and free development of its fortunes, if the re-establishment of the only constitution which perfectly corresponded with its real wants had been the single, or even the chief object of the French government, it would have found in the course of the two years which had elapsed amid troubles, civil war and multiplied calamity more than one occasion of satisfying its wishes. It needed only to have confirmed the authority which *Reding* had acquired in December 1801; instead of meeting his noble and ingenuous confidence with cold ambiguous declarations, with hollow and fallacious promises; instead of entirely paralyzing his powers, it needed only to have avoided every thing tending to diminish his influence, or damp his zeal for the pub-

clare himself against the affairs of Switzerland without proceeding to action, he uniformly spoke (as we have already said) in favour of the federal system; but as often as it came to action—till the time of the conferences at Paris—he exclusively favoured the opposite system. Of this contradiction only one account can be given, and we think we have hit upon it.

lick good; the storms in the int erior would soon have passed, the triumph of patriotic principles and old Swiss sentiments over the low party spirit of the day would have been complete, and a truly national constitution would soon have been established. More lately still, when the  evacuation of the Swiss territory by the French troops, (no matter from what motives,) had given rise to events of the greatest importance, such as a general expression of hatred against the authors of a detested constitution, a popular insurrection against them, their banishment from B ern amid the triumphant shouts of the inhabitants, and a clear manifestation of the prevailing sentiments of the Swiss; France had only then to remain inactive and observe a wise and strict neutrality, to leave the issue of the whole to the conduct of the acknowledged friends of the people. But the interest and prosperity of Switzerland were by no means the chief, much less the only object of the French government; its happiness and tranquillity were a very subordinate consideration; the first and

dominant object was, *that France should continue to prescribe laws to it.* When those very constitutions and laws which Buonaparte had more than once extolled and pronounced to be the only ones applicable to the state of the country, were opposed, rejected and reprobated, it was because those who brought them forward were too little open to foreign influence, were too little affected to France, were, in a word, too independent. When on the other hand constitutions were taken under protection, and defended with words and arms, the principle and character of which had been loudly condemned by the chief of the French government, it happened because their authors thought they could reckon upon the support of France, and because even the confusion and troubles which necessarily followed upon their introduction, were more agreeable to the French cabinet than harmony and peace established by instruments and means which it did not acknowledge as its own. This is the key to the whole conduct of France towards Switzerland. It was on this account,

and this account alone, that the latter country was fatigued, distracted, and tormented, for two long years, France always entertaining a hope that its complete subjection would be the final result. And on this account Buonaparte would not permit the principles of the federal system to triumph, and a constitution founded on that basis which he had long ago acknowledged as the best to be established, till he had brought Switzerland to that state in which he could unconditionally *prescribe* them to it.

Considered in this point of view, his conduct appears divested of that mysterious form in which it at first presents itself. It was not an accidental wavering between the principles and measures of one party and the principles and measures of another, it was an uniform obstinate struggle with the independence of the Swiss nation. Accordingly after all was finished, a naked confession of the truth came at last from the mouth of the mediator. In the conference of the 12th December, he instructed the deputies who were present, respecting the proper relations of their country, as he had projected their establishment from the be-

ginning. "Switzerland," said Buonaparte, "shall be *independent* in regard to the management of its own internal affairs, *but by no means in regard to what concerns its relation to France.*"* This was

* To make this still more intelligible, he added in the course of the same conversation; "If any foreign power attempts in the slightest degree to interpose in your behalf, Switzerland from that moment shall be united to France." These words would have been sufficient to have justified a declaration of war on the part of all Europe against him who pronounced them! They appear to us the more remarkable, because it is now known that *England* did actually, at that time, interpose for Switzerland. Whether he wished to conceal this, or whether he had already struck out England from the list of powers whose reclamations were to be regarded, we know not. In the latter case, Austria might congratulate herself on having this comfortable declaration exclusively addressed to her!

The protocols of the conferences of the 12th and 19th December, the genuineness of which cannot be doubted, as they were printed under the immediate inspection of the French Counsellors of State, and even with their corrections, together with the letters of the 6th January, the 30th September, and the 10th December, 1802, are among the most important official documents of our time, and as illustrative of the character of the present ruler of France, are perhaps the most interesting of any. In this view they cannot be studied by contemporaries with too much care, nor recommended with too much earnestness to the consideration of future historians.

the last unambiguous result of the long reverses of Switzerland! This was the just and literal interpretation of the article of the peace of Luneville!

It does not at all come within the scope of the present work to analyze or decide upon the merits of the constitution which

A prominent feature in the conference of the 12th December was the haughty and contemptuous manner in which he treated the members of the last Helvetic central government, which only two months before he had declared to be the only legitimate one, and which he had employed twenty thousand men in re-establishing. He rallied them with their *weakness*; he reproached them with their *obsequiousness*; "do you know," said he, among other things, "what would be the fate of the first French town which refused to obey? It would be *razed to the ground!*"

In the same memorable conference, he pronounced these significant words: "Il est reconnu par l'Europe, que l'*Italie*, et la *Hollande* sont à la disposition de la France aussi bien que la *Suisse*."

All these unparalleled outrages must then be submitted to by the other powers, and the few among them who had not lost all feeling for public wrong, were doomed to deplore them in silence. The great mass of the people in Europe, such was the decay of public spirit, seemed scarcely to observe them. Many who read them here, will hear of them perhaps for the first time,

Switzerland received in the year 1803. If in spite of the unhallowed source from which it sprung, it should upon the whole appear to be the best of which it was susceptible; if tranquillity, and harmony, and prosperity, and content, flourish under its auspices, if it be established upon a permanent basis, and if the Swiss feel themselves happy under it, it would be an act of culpable presumption to attempt disturbing them in the possession of it. But however great may be the interest that every wise European cabinet, which every benevolent and noble mind takes in their peace and welfare, yet we must not forget that we have another and a higher interest, because on it every thing depends. The great *political* question in which is immediately involved the balance of power in Europe, the sacredness of treaties, and the security and dignity of the different states, is not whether the Swiss constitution, as it now presents itself, merits approbation or censure, not what it is, nor what it could, nor what it ought to be, nor what it may possibly be in future, but singly and alone—*how it has arisen.* If the Swiss can forget

this, is therefore no one justified in bringing it into discussion? Shall *Austria* on that account, shall *Europe* on that account forget what we all suffered from the wounds immediately inflicted on the Swiss? Was it for the protectors of national right, for the guardians of the public security and prosperity, for so many who thought in the peace of Luneville to have seen a term to the peril and oppression of Europe, to have found a boundary to their reverses, to have reaped the scanty and dearly earned reward of their sacrifices, was it matter of indifference for them to behold Switzerland, which had been declared independent, still, at the end of two terrible years, governed by the agents of France, desolated by the troops of France, and delivered over to the combined plagues of ignominious external tyranny and wantonly fomented internal disorder? To behold it spoiled with impunity of its most important bulwarks of defence and tossed about in restless convulsions from one constitution to another, from unity to federalism, from federalism to unity, that at last it might lose every remains of independence and liberty, which, under all

its afflictions, it had contrived in some degree to maintain, in total and unconditional subjection? To behold it at length, only left at rest after the French government, despairing of obtaining a more complete result, had at least brought it so far as to accept its laws and constitutions from its hands, and to submit to every thing which Buonaparte chose to prescribe; and to crown all, to hear its haughty lawgiver declare in the face of Europe, “that the *independence* of Switzerland was *only so far admissible* as it was compatible with *dependence on France?*”

Shall all this be set aside, forgotten and extinguished? No! A compulsory and unwilling silence is not to be construed into a renunciation of an incontestable right. And even if state policy counselled us, and our duty to Switzerland admonished us to treat that production of so much violence and oppression, the present federal constitution which the nation has accepted, as legitimate, it by no means follows from thence that the account between France and Austria, between France and Europe is

closed. We have satisfaction to demand, as well for the long oppression of Switzerland as for every other infraction of the peace of Luneville. But in these great concerns there is only one sort of satisfaction to be obtained, the introduction or re-establishment of a system which will effectually prevent a return of similar evils in future.

III. ENTERPRISES AGAINST ITALY.

Before entering upon the facts which are comprehended under this head, it is necessary to cast a rapid glance at the general relations in which *Italy* was placed in respect of *rights** by the peace of Luneville.

This treaty had only decided with precision respecting two objects; the boundaries of the *Austrian* territory and the future fate of Tuscany. Many other relations which were in great confusion, and which required elucidation, were either super-

* Its relations in point of fact were treated of in a foregoing chapter.—(N, B, This chapter was left unfinished.)

ficially touched upon or passed over in silence.

That this was a great political defect in the treaty of Luneville, and one which never can enough be regretted or lamented, we are not at all disposed to deny. The pressure of that imperious necessity out of which this defect arose, has been oftener than once alluded to in the course of this work, and is well known to all the world. But here the important question starts up, how far *public rights* were affected by this want of precision, or by this absence of provision in the treaty, and whether they could support or bear out the arbitrary pretensions which France has attempted to rest upon them?

If treaties of peace were to be considered as binding only in regard to those objects which are immediately mentioned and established in them, then every individual treaty must contain a complete review of the collective relations of the contracting powers, whether old or new, as well of those which have been changed as of those

which remain unaltered. But it is long ago become a constant maxim in political negotiations to assume the existing relations between states as a basis of treaty, and to consider them as continued and established in all points where they are not either altered or suspended by the treaty.*

The application of this principle is simple and easy as far as objects are concerned which, previous to the conclusion of the treaty of peace, were on all sides fixed, regulated and indubitably settled. It becomes more embarrassing and difficult where the treaty of peace found the former con-

* In the treaties of peace concluded previous to the French revolution, we find invariably a clause by virtue of which the earlier treaties, in as far as they are not abrogated by the latest are *expressly confirmed*. Such an article, though not absolutely necessary for what is once grounded in national right can only be repealed by a sentence conformable to national right, was considered as one of those forms which the common political interests of states had introduced into diplomatic practice. That no such article found a place in the treaties of peace of this unfortunate time (of *Campo Formio, Luneville and Amiens*) is of itself a proof of the deep decay of the whole political system. It was, to call things by their proper names, a step from a regular federal constitution to a state of absolute and lawless barbarity.

stitution of rights shaken or dissolved, and where its re-establishment or regeneration were obstructed by insurmountable obstacles. Yet even in this extreme case so much is indisputably certain, that no one of the contracting parties from the silence of the treaty can acquire *more rights* than he possessed when he concluded it. From this principle no exception can take place. For could one, for example, in those extraordinary conjunctures, where all decision upon a doubtful point is purposely waved, or from certain circumstances is rendered impossible, avail himself of a momentary confusion to erect his will into a title, to convert arbitrary demands into legal claims, to construe imperfect possession into perfect property, or to acquire in *fact* what he was not entitled to by *right*, no person could say where, in the end, he would stop: new rights might thus be created by the silence of a treaty, and at last every thing might be declared legal which the articles of peace did not expressly prohibit.*

* Upon this maxim, Buonaparte might without hesitation have declared himself King of *Spain*, and if *Austria*

If, therefore, the peace of Luneville either did not absolutely decide upon the fortunes of a part of Italy or left them wholly undetermined, this can in no way be wrested into a proof that it left Italy entirely at the discretion of the French government, or conferred a right on it to dispose of it as it pleased. The peace of Luneville left Italy in all respects not expressly provided for, exactly in the state in which it found it. But as the state in which it found it could not in its very nature be permanent, as the transition from a military anarchy to a regular and legitimate constitution, must be fixed in one way or other, and as it never could be supposed that

had protested, he had nothing to do but to reply "the peace of Luneville has left this object wholly undetermined." And let it be remarked that the possibility of such a pretension does not rest upon mere hypothesis. An attempt has been already made to advance it. The often repeated and infamous declaration "that *France* is "under no other obligations to *England* than those "specified in the treaty of Amiens," was founded upon this very maxim, and in the latest state papers which France has published, we find the most anxious endeavours to impose similar limits to its relations with Austria. The facts are all in the same sense and have the same tendency.

it could be the design of any treaty to leave the destinies of Italy to be fixed according to the will of one of the parties interested; it follows with conclusive certainty, that this silence of the Luneville peace was to be interpreted conformably to the principles of national law, not as an everlasting, but merely as a momentary blank, not as an absolute renunciation of all right of interference, but merely as a postponement of the settlement.

The circumstances also which gave to the treaty of Luneville that particular and extraordinary character of intentional vagueness and imperfection, lead to the same conclusion. The Imperial court, at the time the treaty was concluded, was on the one hand not powerful enough by fixed stipulations to establish Italy in that constitution which was best calculated to insure its independence and prosperity, the security and preservation of Austria, and the general welfare of Europe; on the other hand, it was not weak enough implicitly to cede whatever *France* might have required, had Italy at that time been

to receive a permanent constitution. The actual maintenance of the provisional government which then existed, of the military administrations, and of the whole interregnum of arbitrary violence, was properly a tacit convention between the contracting powers, that all decision upon the future fate of the Italian states should be deferred for the time; but this suspending resolution was inseparably connected with a reservation, though not expressed, that a negotiation should afterwards take place upon this subject, and that it should be conducted in a legal way and according to legal forms. For it was impossible that Italy should for ever remain in that intermediate state in which the peace of Luneville had found and had left it; this France itself could neither wish nor expect; and even if France had entertained such a wish, the neighbouring and other states of Europe could not long have permitted the existence of such a political monster. But how, (even taking for granted what never can be admitted, that all ancient pretensions had been lost, and all ancient rights extinguished,) was a transition from this

intermediate state to a lasting and durable constitution to be effected, if it was not done by the co-operation of the powers interested, by new diplomatic negotiations, and by new conventions?

There is either no code of national right in existence, or this conclusion must follow.* and in this conclusion we are furnished with data which enable us to pronounce, that all the enterprizes of France in Italy in as far as they transgressed the undefined conditions of the treaty, directly violated its positive stipulations. Every arbitrary step not arranged by previous negotiation and sanctioned by actual convention, to substitute a fixed and lasting

* What we have here said may with justice be called the *spirit* of the peace of Luneville. Whether this person or the other *has* actually so understood it, is to us matter of little concern; it is enough to have proved that it *cannot* be otherwise understood. It is according to this interpretation alone that it deserves the name of a treaty, in any other sense it is a diplomatic phantom. If France chooses to acknowledge it as such, (which it has long since rendered it,) let it immediately begin with restoring the ceded territory, and then we shall set about negotiating a new treaty, which, it is hoped, will turn out to be more intelligible.

constitution in the room of that unstable and provisional government under which the most important states of Italy were left by the peace of Luneville, was as much an infraction of the peace as any violation of its most express articles, or of its most manifest provisions. All that France has attempted and executed in Italy since the year 1801 is contrary to treaty, and cannot be justified by any other plea than that of force; the only difference in its measures is, that some of them have violated the *letter*, others, the *spirit* of the treaty; and the most of them have been contrary to both.

We proceed to the proofs.

I. PIEDMONT.

At the conclusion of the peace of Luneville, the king of Sardinia, though forcibly plundered and sent into exile, was the true and legitimate sovereign of all the Piedmontese territory and population. The hapless fortunes of this house, from that unlucky moment in which a weak and

betrayed prince delivered up in April, 1796, to the invading French army all his invaluable fortresses, and with them the keys of Italy, to the period when French outrage—and scarcely can the history of the revolution furnish a more revolting instance of injustice—drove his successor from his throne, and from that time down to the present day are well known. The rights of the princes of Savoy have never been extinguished, they have never even renounced them;* none of the other

* The only written document which France has to produce against them, is an edict of the 13th of November, 1798, in which the then reigning king (Charles Emanuel) waved *the exercise of his power*. If this document, extorted from a sovereign by the most cruel violence, by threats and ill treatment of every kind, by enormities, for which they who committed them ought even now to blush, could ever have been considered as valid; it could have been only as a *temporary* and by no means as a *definitive*, much less a *peremptory* step. For the principal article was couched in these express words: “ Sa majesté declare renoncer à *l'exercice de tout pouvoir*, “ et avant tout elle ordonne à tous ses sujets d'obéir au “ *gouvernement provisoire* qui va être établi par le *Général François*.” The then Duke of Aosta, who is now king, (Victor Emanuel,) was likewise compelled to sign it, but he did it only in the following form: “ Je garantis, que je ne porterai aucun empêchement à l'exé-

powers has either through the medium of any rightful organ, or in any diplomatic form consented to the forfeiture of their states; the only point which France upon the pinnacle of its vaunted greatness was able to carry against *Austria* and *England*, was that no mention should be made of *Piedmont* in the treaty of *Luneville* and *Amiens*; and *Russia* has never ceased to take the most energetic steps towards establishing a construction of this compulsory silence observed in the treaty, to the advantage of the house of Savoy, and in support of its pretensions.

Besides those comprehensive reasons, why nothing was fixed respecting *Piedmont* in the peace of *Luneville*, founded in the disproportion of the relative powers of the parties, in the preponderance of France, and in the deserted state of *Austria*; there

“ cution du présent acte.” That all this was no abdication, no renunciation of the sovereignty, no permanent obligation even for the subscribers, much less for their legitimate successors, is too apparent to stand in need of proof.

was still another, founded upon a hope that the mighty influence of Russia would be able to conduct the affairs of Sardinia to a satisfactory issue. But however that silence may be explained, so much is incontestably certain, that France by the treaty of Luneville neither came into legal possession of Piedmont, nor obtained any further right to dispose of it than had been admitted before the treaty; and that the fate of Piedmont was neither fixed in the negotiations at Luneville, nor left to be fixed at a future period by *one* of the parties alone. A final settlement, if it was meant to be valid and effectual, could only take place in one or two ways. Either the legal sovereign must be unconditionally restored, or a convention on certain conditions, whatever may have been their character, must have been agreed to between him and the French government, with the consent of all the powers interested in this great transaction. Till one or the other of these happened, the antecedent right of France was confined to a military occupation of the country; every step beyond this was a violent usurpation

and direct violation of the peace of Luneville.*

Two months had scarcely elapsed after the signing of the treaty, when General *Jourdan*, who was appointed chief administrator of Piedmont, announced to the country its *next*, if not its definitive destination. In an address of the 19th of April, 1801, he declared to the Piedmontese, " You have been found worthy to be governed by *republican laws*; the immediate consequence of this is, that *Piedmont* shall in future constitute a *French military division*; a general adminis-

* In the official notes, with which the Austrian declaration of the 3d of September appeared accompanied in the *Moniteur* of the 27th of September, it was boldly contended, that because Austria at the time of the peace of Luneville in vain demanded the evacuation of Italy and of other countries possessed by French troops, the fate of all these countries was henceforth dependent upon the will of France. We think we have sufficiently refuted this argument in what has been said in the former pages, and we abide by the result already stated: that the transition from a provisional to a fixed and permanent constitution can only be effected by conventions; if this principle falls to the ground, the whole code of national rights falls with it.

“ trator invested with the same powers
“ which the French commissary-general
“ at *Mayence* exercised previous to the
“ union of the four Rhenish departments,
“ will conduct the civil administration;
“ the domains, public receipts, sale of
“ national estates, the police, and the
“ department of justice, will all be ar-
“ ranged on the French footing, and
“ agreeably to French laws: *Piedmont* has
“ *deserved* to share the fortunes of the
“ republic, to increase the glory of the
“ French nation, and the fame of the
“ Hero, all whose efforts are directed to
“ form the people, which he tranquillizes
“ and blesses with his protection, *into one*
“ *single family.*”*—On the same day there

* This same General *Jourdan* had six months before (on the 26th of October, 1800,) when several violent proceedings, among others the separation of the country of *Novarese* from *Piedmont*, and its arbitrary union with the Cisalpine territory, had excited great anxiety about the future, by the express order of the minister for foreign affairs, assured the commission at Turin in the most precise terms “ the French government has constantly at heart to secure to the country the existence of an independent state.” In what way then had *Piedmont* *deserved* in so short a time to become a French military division?

appeared a new division of the country into six departments; the government commission was declared to be dissolved; and with the three coloured standard and the tree of liberty waving over their heads, it took leave of the *subalpine people* with the following compliment: "The long hoped for day has, at last arrived; by that name, which was the fairest in Europe even before the discovery of the rights of man, you will henceforth be called; your political destiny is irrevocably decided; the French laws will be yours."

Their triumph was afterwards found to have been premature; the rejoicings at their patriotic festivals were unexpectedly interrupted by that very voice, which, a short time before, had greeted them as brothers, and which had welcomed them to the bosom of the great family; and which was now lifted up for the purpose of moderating their ardour and setting bounds to their hopes. "The new administration,"—thus spake General Jourdan in an instruction of the 1st of May—"is to

“ be considered only as temporary; Pied-
“ mont is not united with the French
“ republic, and it is not permitted for us
“ to anticipate the views of the French
“ government in premature expositions of
“ them. The decrees of the Piedmontese
“ administration will *not* therefore be
“ passed in the name of the French re-
“ public; the public functionaries will
“ *not* dress according to the French cos-
“ tume, &c. &c.”

In order to understand the meaning of this precipitate change—between the two declarations there was scarcely an interval of ten days!—it is necessary to know what afterwards came to light, namely, that the Russian minister at Paris immediately after the first declaration, addressed a serious and energetic remonstrance upon the fate of the Italian princes to Talleyrand, asserting in the strongest manner the cause of the King of Sardinia, requiring the restitution of his states, and insisting on the conclusion of a definitive peace.* In the teeth of such a

* This note was delivered on the 26th of April;

remonstrance to unite *Piedmont* with *France*, would have required more boldness than *Talleyrand* and his master then possessed. Keeping their object constantly in view, they judged it advisable under all the circumstances to take in some sail, and to proceed more gently before the wind; Jourdan was therefore commissioned to retract his premature congratulations, and to wait for more favourable times.*

This season soon arrived. In the last

1801, shortly after the accession of the present Emperor of Russia.

* In an official article respecting the external relations of the republic, which was published on the 9th June 1801 in the *Moniteur*, it is said of *Piedmont*: “the fate of this land has not yet been fixed in a positive manner; it has received a sort of preliminary organization similar to that of the four Rhenish departments before they were united with France; the brave inhabitants must already feel some alleviation, and may safely entertain *better hopes*.” This vague and dubious language clearly betrayed, (what the whole of the conduct of Jourdan as above described confirms,) that the French cabinet did not then think itself justified in adopting any decisive measure. It would be curious to hear what has taken place since that time for its justification.

months of the year 1801, various changes took place pointing to the concluding act of the scene. The minister of the King of Sardinia was ordered by the police to quit France; the Piedmontese troops were incorporated with the French; the spiritual institutions were abolished; the laws of France were substituted in the place of those of the country. When at length, in the year 1802, every external obstacle was overcome and surmounted, when England alienated to a certain degree from the affairs of the continent, by the peace of Amiens, had, by a temporary understanding with Russia, put an end to all resistance on that side, and Austria appeared crippled, and incapable of resistance, the decisive blow took place, and a *senatus consultum*, as it was called, declared the Piedmontese country to be a constituent part of the French territory.*

* The *senatus consultum* was dated the 17th September 1802. It referred to a proposition which the government had made through the medium of its state counsellors, and to a report of a special commission of the senate. Neither one nor the other has been

When it is considered that so important an undertaking was determined upon, and executed without any introduction, dictated by the law of nations or any diplomatic formality, as if Austria had been blotted from the earth, and Europe had been eternally separated from Italy by an impassable abyss, as if every trace of popular conventions had been effaced, and the lawless will of France set up by the solemn consent of nations in the place of the rights of states; when it is farther considered what the object was to which this undertaking led, the extension of the French domination over a country of inestimable value, and that by this measure alone, even had France at the moment confined itself entirely to it, it had ruined the independence of *Italy*, completed the subjection of *Helvetia*, opened a vast theatre for new conquests, and overthrown the old political system from

communicated to the public: perhaps they were suppressed from some remains of shame. In the *senatus consultum* the name of Piedmont is not once introduced. The departments of the *Po*, the *Tanaro*, &c. are spoken of.

its very foundations; when it is, in *fine*, recollected how often the French rulers, even when they had arrived at the point of no longer dreading resistance, and of fixing those limits to their empire which arbitrary caprice dictated, consoled the world with the assurance that these would never be extended beyond “the Rhine, “the Pyrenees and the Alps—more they “did not desire; there *nature* had erected “eternal walls of partition between them and “other countries; to break through this “line, even if France had a right to do so, “would be the excess of folly;”—And that so soon afterwards these eternal walls of partition were broken down, and levelled by a French *senatus consultum* like a rotten paling; that nature (even *their nature*) was solemnly convicted of falsity, and that that was executed in the course of a few months under the silence of dejected Europe, which at so late a period they had not ventured so much as to think of:—It must surely be confessed that it would be more than folly to believe that a power which freed from every restraint, and delivered up entirely to its

own impulses, thus rushed forward in all directions and with constantly increasing velocity, will any where stop short, till the scattered elements of opposition are collected, either by wisdom or good fortune, and barriers again erected to break the violence of its progress.*

* In an address to the French people of the 14th July 1801, signed *Buonaparte*, we find the following passage, “ our confines are extended to the boundaries which nature has marked out for them; *and what is an undoubted pledge of peace—Austria is henceforth separated from France by vast regions; so that the jealousy and cares which for centuries past have brought so much misery upon Europe, are at an end.*”

Such was his language even after the peace of Luneville! and with what rapture were these deceitful words repeated in all tongues and languages! what songs of praise were heard upon the deliverer, benefactor and generous pacificator of the world! But when before the year was yet expired he declared himself *ruler of Lombardy*, when soon after he extended his dominion to *Piedmont, Parma and Placentia*, when he took possession of *Naples* with his troops, then created an *Italian kingdom*, and at last united *Genoa* to France; “ when all these vast regions which separate Austria from France “ were swallowed up, when “ the pledge of peace” with which he amused the credulity of mankind was redeemed—how came it that not one of those who had made every land resound with their

Our only remaining hope now is, that as every thing which has taken place in Piedmont since the peace of Luneville has been executed without any just title, without the consent of a single court, and with a perfect contempt of all rights and of all forms, at a future and more fortunate era, when justice and order shall once more predominate, the work of violence, and arbitrary power will be annihilated. However necessary this change, we will show in a subsequent chapter that every peace must be nugatory as long as Piedmont remains a part of France, and that no perfect system of security can be expected till the sovereignty of the house of Savoy is restored. But what enlightened statesman is there in Europe

shouts of joy was now heard to utter the smallest complaint? That not one of his enthusiastic adorers expressed the slightest disappointment, or made the most humble representation of degraded, dastardly generation! That is the liberty you have paid so dear! these are the idols which you have chosen from which you have hoped every thing, and to which you have sacrificed every thing!

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who is not long since convinced of these truths!

II. PARMA AND PLACENTIA.

Respecting Parma and Placentia there was nothing concluded in the peace of Luneville. The fate of these countries also does not appear to be in the smallest degree doubtful. Their sovereign was, it is true, several times in the course of the war obliged to suffer them to be occupied by foreign troops, but a final loss of them was never so much as spoken of, and when the war ended he returned into quiet possession of them.

But during the negotiations at Luneville, *Lucien Buonaparte* had opened a private negotiation at Madrid with the Spanish court. Its immediate object seemed to be a distinguished exaltation of the hereditary prince of Parma, (who was son-in-law to the King of Spain); and the world suffered itself for a time to be persuaded that this step had no other

motive than friendship for the court of Spain, gratitude for its fidelity to France, and a wish to confirm the bonds of their alliance; the truth however soon came to light, and it appeared that new plans of aggrandizement were, if not the only, at least the principal inducement to adopt it.

In the beginning of the year 1802, there appeared in the public papers, without either preface or commentary, a treaty between *France* and *Spain*, said to have been signed at *Madrid* by the *Prince of Peace* and *Lucien Buonaparte* on the 21st March 1801. By the first article of this treaty, the reigning duke of *Parma* renounced for himself and his heirs all his estates in favour of the French republic, and *Tuscany* was assured to his son as an indemnity for this renunciation. The other articles related to the royal dignity of the *Infant*, to a reversion of his new possessions to the princes of the *Spanish* house, in case of the failure of male heirs, to the cession of the island of

Elba to France, and of Louisiana, which afterwards became so important.

It is difficult to ascertain whether the French government, in the plenitude of its over-weening confidence in itself, was really persuaded that such a transaction as this could become a law to Europe without the consent of the other powers. In every view of national right the contract was vain and invalid, for—

1st, The King of Spain had no title whatever to dispose of the possessions of the Duke of Parma. The father of this prince received his possessions not through the favour of Spain, but by valid and sufficient treaties concluded between the principal powers of Europe; these possessions therefore could only be separated from his house by similar conventions. The future constitution of Italy, which was pretended to be arranged in this partial and nugatory contract, concerned the court of Spain much less than the other principal powers; it was only interesting to Spain in the sub-

ordinate respect of family connection, while it interested the other powers in the much more essential relations of security and preservation. To settle the fate of Italy in a private convention between Spain and France, was as unjust and unbecoming as it would have been for France and Austria to conclude a treaty respecting Portugal without consulting Spain.

2dly, Besides the considerable interest which the imperial court possessed in the general rights of its neighbours, it had a particular title to interfere, and to give a decisive voice in settling the estates of Parma. These states, originally a fief of the empire,* in the first half of the eighteenth century, in virtue of treaties

* As such, after the treaty of 1713, (commonly called the quadruple alliance) they were given, upon the extinction of the family Farnese, to the Infant Don Carlos; and the emperor, by a particular decree of commission (of the 9th Sept. 1720) had required the empire to give its consent. This relation has never been annulled in a legitimate manner, and the emperor therefore, in the double capacity of head of the empire and chief of the house of Austria, was entitled to take the most active part in all that befel Parma.

(such as used to be concluded when a code of national right was still in existence) had come into the possession of the princes of the Spanish line of the house of Bourbon, to whom they were assured in the year 1748, at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. But it was settled in the same treaty that failing male heirs, *Parma* and *Guastalla* should fall into the house of Austria; and in the treaty concluded between France and Austria in the year 1758, the same destination was repeated. The Austrian court therefore might be considered as a reversionary heir to the estates of Parma, and no power was competent to alienate this possession, burthened with that eventual right of inheritance, without Austria's consent. The injury was considerably aggravated by the circumstance that France, as an indemnity for Parma, fixed upon a province of the house of Austria, and robbed it of *Tuscany*, the more certainly to trample under foot its indisputable claims upon Parma.*

* What makes all this the more remarkable was the following circumstance: the first article of the treaty with Spain, of the 21st May 1801, refers to a former treaty in

3d, When the peace of Luneville was concluded, the cession of Parma and the new destination of the hereditary prince, was already completely concerted and settled between Spain and France. Why were not these conventions made known at Luneville? this can only be explained in one of two ways. The French government either clearly foresaw that Austria, notwithstanding its embarrassed state would refuse to sanction them, or it thought itself sufficiently powerful to set at defiance,

the following words: "Le Grand Duché de Toscane, sera donné au fils du Duc de Parme, en indemnité des pays, cédés par l'Infant son père, et par suite d'un autre traité qui a été conclu précédemment entre sa Majesté Catholique et la République Française." This antecedent treaty has never come to light, but it must at any rate have been concluded (seeing that the negotiations respecting the *second* were not begun till the end of the year 1800) at a time when France was not in military possession of Tuscany. And this explains, why in the month of October 1800, in spite of the cessation of hostilities which had previously taken place, Tuscany was invaded under the most frivolous and ridiculous pretexts, and wrested from its lawful sovereign. It was here they sought for an equivalent with which to console the Spanish court, and the princes of the house of Parma for the loss of their estates! and thus did one crime lead on to another!

all principles and forms : but whatever was the motive, the treaty between France and Spain, and the whole transaction respecting Parma remained destitute of the confirmation quite indispensable to their validity.

Parma, in respect to the French pretensions upon it, stood pretty nearly in the same situation with Piedmont. They had both been passed over in silence during the negotiations, and France acquired as little right to the one as it had done to the other by the peace of Luneville. The only difference was that the presence of the legitimate sovereign, and the uninterrupted continuance of his government, opposed certain obstacles to the measures of France in the case of Parma, which the banishment of the King of Sardinia had removed out of the way in that of Piedmont. But the treaty by which Parma was given up, and the *senatus consultum* by which Piedmont was united, were both plants of the same soil, both exotic productions to the province of national rights, and according to the *spirit* of the treaty of Luneville (for the *letter* of it took no cognizance of them)

both must be regarded equally as infractions of the peace.

The fancied pretensions of the French government to Parma were not however carried into effect during the life of the reigning duke. He died suddenly on the 9th October 1802, after appointing a regency composed of his princess, the archduchess of Austria, and two of his most confidential counsellors.* Scarcely had the news reached Paris when the former French resident (Moreau St. Mery) was appointed

* This circumstance is worthy of most particular observation.—Let it be explained as it may, it shews it to be at least extremely problematical whether the duke ever consented to an alienation of his states. It renders certain what those who are acquainted with the real state of things, and France's usual manner of proceeding, must have believed, independently of this additional ground of faith, that in the negociation of the treaty of Madrid, as it is called, either the duke was not at all consulted, or what is more likely to be true, that his incapacity seriously to resist its execution, was construed into assent. There never has been either in France or in Spain, at the time of the negociation or afterwards, the smallest document brought to light to prove the concurrence of the duke. There was only this circumstance wanting to strip that treaty of all semblance of importance, and to place it in the list of the most invalid clandestine agreements.

in the name of the French republic, general administrator of the states of Parma. By a decree of the 23d of October, this person dissolved the counsel of regency, asserted the full sovereignty of the French government, with all the rights and appendages belonging to it, and admonished the public functionaries to instruct the people respecting its real situation, "that it might know how to appreciate, in its full extent, the happiness of being governed by France." He neglected nothing on his own part which could be done to render this happiness sensible to their perception. Not contented with the sovereignty and the revenues of the state, he laid hold on every thing which he saw; and allodial property, valuables of every kind, whether in cash, jewels, or furniture, all that the widow might justly lay claim to, or the King of Etruria pretend to inherit, every thing, without respect or discrimination, was confiscated by his rapacious hand for the benefit of the great nation. The duchess was forced to quit the country.*

* How this princess was robbed not only of all her political, but likewise of all her personal rights in the vilest

The final destiny of this land was kept secret for an unusual length of time. The most probable ground of this delay is to be found in the relation then subsisting between the French cabinet and the court of St. Petersburg. The repeated and solemn promises made to the Russian emperor of an indemnity to the King of Sardinia, prevented the French government from coming to a final resolution to dispose

and most shameful manner, how she was driven from her palace, stripped of her proportion of the private property of the duke, of her dowry, revenues; and of what she herself possessed even to her jewels, how she was treated as the commonest emigrant, abandoned by the Spanish court, and ineffectually protected by Austria against this monstrous tyranny of France, how she dragged out her days in continual care, often struggling with real want, till death at last put an end to her life of sorrow, is well known in Austria; and when it is recollected *who she was*, we may certainly be permitted to wish that in the long catalogue of injuries for which Austria has to demand satisfaction, this may one day not be forgotten. That it may be still more sensibly felt, we cannot omit calling to mind that the French government was brutal enough, at the very moment when it was subjecting the duchess to all these mortifications and persecutions, to cause it to be announced in its official journal, "the duke has left
" 225,000 ounces of silver plate, 112 pounds of worked
" gold, and two millions in jewels; the amount of the
" sums of money found in his bureaux cannot yet be pre-
" cisely ascertained."

definitively of the only remaining objects, which, in case of necessity, could be offered for this purpose; and in this way from positively declaring what by the bye no longer admitted of doubt, that it was fully determined never on any condition to discharge its obligations. This consideration ceased to have any influence when a rupture with Russia drew near. But even then it is worth while to remark the moment which was chosen, fully to carry its plans into execution. When the ruler of France, in the month of June 1805, visited "his possessions beyond the Alps," to use the expression of his journalists, (he was at Parma on the 26th of June,) the old provisional administration still existed as it had been established three years before, and though a good deal had happened in the interval tending to throw light upon futurity, there still remained a certain degree of uncertainty respecting it. It was first after his return to France, after he had learned that the Russian negociator had gone back, after receiving the first intelligence of the warlike preparations of Austria, after discovering that his ambition

had kindled a flame which must soon spread over the whole of Europe. It was first on the 21st. of July—for the purpose, as it were, of setting the displeasure of the courts and public opinion at defiance—That the states of Parma were incorporated by a *decree*, (they did not seem worthy of being dignified by a *senatus consultum*.) with the 28th military division, subjected to French laws, and organized as French provinces.

When the *grand duchy of Tuscany*, the indemnity of the hereditary prince of Parma for the loss of his paternal estates, received the name of an independent state, and was raised even (whether out of compliment to Spain, from arrogance, or in irony, we know not) to the rank of a kingdom, it was the only dowry which its titular sovereign received with it. In every other respect Tuscany continued to be a French province. Involved in the wars of France, and in all its plans of violence and oppression, the infirm government of Florence was obliged to support French armies; to the ruin of its productive com-

merce to shut its ports and markets against the enemies of France; and in violation of all the laws of hospitality to arrest traveling English who had held its territory as sacred. Leghorn was constantly in possession of French troops, even during the peace with England; when the war again broke out, in the year 1803, it was even declared by the French generals to be in a state of siege; a French *cordon* was drawn along the sea coast; the island of Elba belonged to France, and—in consequence of usurpation on usurpation—the opposite principality of Piombino was now in the possession of France.* The con-

* The following are the circumstances relative to this principality. The king of Naples had by the peace of Florence, on the 28th of March, 1801, ceded to France his interest in the island of Elba, and his possessions on the continent of Tuscany, consisting in what were called the *stati delli presidi*, and the principality of Piombino. By the fourth article of the so often mentioned treaty between Spain and France, (in itself a violent usurpation,) it was stipulated, that the hereditary prince of Parma, in quality of *future* possessor of Tuscany, should give up that part of the island of Elba which belonged to the grand duchy, and which was the most important, because it contained Porto-Ferrajo, to France; and that in return he should receive the principality of Piombino, which had been ceded by Naples. When the prince of

tinual presence of domineering French agents, the uninterrupted marchings of troops, the irreparable disorder of the finances—every thing announced the weight of external pressure; and, to complete the union with France, there was nothing wanting but a short decree, constituting Etruria a department of the Arno, or such, or such, a military division.

III. LOMBARDY.*

In the article of the peace of Luneville,

Parma was installed at Florence, and the French had taken possession of the whole island of Elba, it was expected that Piombino should be delivered up to him, conformably to the engagement. But the French government, (still usurping in the midst of usurpation,) thought otherwise. It evacuated, in favour of the new king of Etruria, the district *delli presidi*, and kept Piombino for itself. This principality was afterwards, in March, 1801, conferred under the most frivolous pretences on a brother-in-law of Buonaparte! It is remarkable, that all these transactions, in great and small, in essential and collateral circumstances, were dictated by one and the same spirit.

* This is the only title by which we can now distinguish that part of Upper Italy. The name of the *Cisalpine republic* is, it would appear, for ever extinguished,

which, as we have before shewn, assured the independence of Switzerland, the independence of the *Cisalpine republic* as it was then called, and the right of its inhabitants to choose any constitution, which might appear to them most eligible, were likewise stipulated. All that we have said, and the regrets which we have expressed respecting the vagueness of this article, are again applicable to the present case. But it is equally certain, that however the words of the article may be understood or interpreted, no grounds of justification for the conduct of France in this instance, more than in the others, will be found in it. For to declare a state independent, and at the same time to grant permission to a foreign power to prescribe laws to it, or to confer on a foreign prince the right of taking possession of it, is an evident contradiction. But both these events befel this state after the conclusion of the peace of Luneville, the one in the year 1801, the other in the year 1805; the

with many other fantastical denominations of a similar kind; and there is no *kingdom of Italy* as yet acknowledged in the code of national rights.

one when Buonaparte declared himself president, the other when he declared himself king.

Had the French government, when it became a question of giving a regular organization to the Milanese constitution, only exercised that degree of influence which necessarily arose out of its former connection with these provinces, its acknowledged preponderance in Italy, and the presence of its troops, no one under the existing circumstances would have found fault with such an interference. But this was not even then sufficient to content the ambition of its chief. In order to render the complete dependence of the Cisalpine republic conspicuous to the world, he summoned the constituent assembly which was to confirm its destiny to Lyons, in December 1801, under the name of an *extraordinary consulta*. Here *four hundred and fifty representatives* were ordered to select *thirty* from their number, to whom was committed the task of framing a constitution in a few private conferences, under the presidency of French

directors. Of the proceedings of this secret commission, the consulta were kept entirely ignorant; there was no public deliberation, no proposition, no collection of voices, not even the outward form of a sitting, till suddenly, on an appointed day,* a report of the whole transaction was read to the assembled deputies, every article confirmed with acclamations, and after the business was thus finished—the consulta was dismissed. With regard to the office of first magistrate, the authors of the report declared that in the existing situation of their country, it would be neither advisable nor safe to commit the chief post in the administration of their affairs to a fellow citizen; and that besides, “as the French troops could not leave their territory at an early period,” the welfare of the country required of them “to beseech General Buonaparte to be pleased to take the government into his hands.” The general complied with their desire, assuring them, that it appeared to him also impossible to find any

* On the 25th of January, 1802. The whole farce took up only about eight days.

one in the country who was qualified to undertake the government.*

Of the further arrangements and details of their constitution, as it was called, as usual no person took any notice; the age of constitutions is past; the only thing which foreign states, and particularly the neighbours of the republic, learned, not without just astonishment, was, that without any explanation of the matter, the empty *Cisalpine* title had been exchanged for the most significant one of an *Italian republic*.†

* He did not condescend to tell the deputies, "since you are of this opinion it shall be done as you desire," no! he took the responsibility upon himself, and found it beneath his dignity to leave room, even for a suspicion, that he was not the sole author of the measure; and that the select committee of deputies had not been his tool. He therefore said to the assembly: "Celle de president je n'ai trouvé personne parmi vous, qui eut assez de droit a la confiance, &c.—pour la lui confier;—Je conserverai encore, pendant que les circonstances le voudront, *la grande pensèe de vos affaires.*"

† There was never the smallest explanation given of this change of name. The world might think of it what it chose. The only hint of its importance came from the government commission at Milan, when it made known

But what gave serious consequence to the farce at Lyons, ludicrous as it was in itself, was the absolute extinction of Lombardy in the formidable dominion of France. The military command of this country was now become a permanent part of its constitution; every shadow of independence had vanished; Buonaparte ruled more despotically and with less controul at Milan than he did at Paris: for as yet the *senatus consultum* of the 4th of August, declaring him consul for life, was not past. This was the first bold act of authority that he had exercised since the peace of Luneville, and notwithstanding the general torpor, this was remarked and felt.

The means to which he had recourse to dispel the anxiety and still the murmurs of the world, seemed to have been selected expressly for the purpose of increasing the uneasiness to the highest possible degree. Instead of employing soothing representations, calculated to divert the public at-

the result of what had passed at Lyons, “*La republique*”—so it expressed itself,—“*a pris l’auguste nom de republique Italienne.*”

tention from the idea of a complete conjunction of the French and Italian dominion, he found it better to circulate it, and by a dry undisguised confession, to remove every tranquillising doubt. In an official article of the *Moniteur*, (of the 16th of February 1802,) the accession of influence and power which the Italian republic threw into the scale of France, instead of being denied or under-rated, was defended on political grounds, and declared to be just and necessary. And here, for the first time, the terrible doctrine was held forth, that all the foreign conquests of France had only re-established a balance of power, which had been destroyed to France's prejudice by the events of the preceding century; that the Netherlands and the provinces on the Rhine had at most restored the balance in *Germany*, and had scarcely done that satisfactorily; that still much remained to be done in Italy before arriving at a similar result; and that in setting out, the Italian republic was only to be considered as an equivalent for the loss France had sustained in *Venice*

and Naples.* This justification had, at least, the merit of clearly pointing out their object. The future relations of Lombardy were no longer involved in any uncertainty, and we were not only permitted, but required, to consider it as a territory dependent upon France, or at

* The principle of these extravagant apologies has been already illustrated in one of the foregoing fragments, and, (if we are not misled by a feeling of too great confidence in ourselves,) combated with success. The article to which we here allude, was the first formal development of this principle, the original mould and prototype of all those which have been written down to the present day, in defence of the French usurpations, by way of insulting both truth and the human understanding, and of adding to all our real sorrows and shames, the bitterness of satire and the taunts of sophists. In that article, for example, they were pleased to assure us, that "if the Italian republic was not inseparably bound to France, the political system of Italy would be entirely dependent on the caprice of Austria."—"France is not become more powerful than ever, it has only recovered its ancient influence,"—"no nation has shewn so much moderation as the French; victorious in war it has constantly given up every thing for peace,"—"a balance of power in Germany, a balance of power in Italy is all at which France aspires, &c. &c." *Væ victis!* for it is only there where people write politics with the sword, that such assertions can be ventured and endured.

all events, as a personal dominion of the ruler of France; Buonaparte assented to this interpretation, and the only care was to give a colour to the avowed subjection of this land, which might in some measure disguise its repulsive aspect to the eyes of contemporaries.

In this quarter every thing now appeared to be accomplished. There was no immediate French department bound to the consular government by more slavish ties than this Italian republic. Its internal administration was conducted by a servile commission of agency, which knew no other law than the will of their master; a considerable French army covered the land and devoured its produce; *two thirds* of the public burthens were exclusively devoted to the maintenance of this army and to the execution of military projects, in which no other than France, or (as this might be even saying too much,) no other than the dictator of France had the smallest interest. No voice could be raised against him; the most secret expressions of friendship were inquired into and de-

nounced; private letters were treated as crimes against the state, thoughts were construed into high treason. No resistance, no interference, not the mildest remonstrance on the part of any foreign power:—to submit and be silent was then the order of the day!—there was nothing on either side to trouble or diminish the enjoyment of absolute dominion. The most insatiable avarice would have been satisfied, the most rapacious ambition would have been contented; but *Buonaparte* desired something more.

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Scarcely was he crowned emperor when he caused it to be announced, “the Italian republic requires a definitive organization, and will soon receive that which is most conformable to its own prosperity, to the advantage of the French state, and to the well-understood interests of the neighbouring powers.”*

* Such was the language held by the minister *Champagny*, in an official exposé of the situation of the French empire to the legislative body on the 31st December 1804. In this document the assurance which we have quoted above, (“ que dans la nouvelle organi-

Three months were passed in anxious expectation before the curtain rose. Then there appeared at once, as if it had issued from the bosom of the earth, the resolution of a *new consulta*, appointing the founder of the Italian republic to be *King of Italy*, decreeing the throne *hereditary in his family*, and declaring the future separation of the Italian from the French crown to be agreeable to law, but fixing the period for its separation to be when the French arms have evacuated Naples, the British Malta, and the Russian Corfu. The resolution was on the 17th March in a solemn audience, delivered for acceptance and confirmation, and with the same readiness with which the ruler of France, three years before had

zation on concilieront les interets des deux peuples amis avec les interets bien entendus des puissances limitrophes") is followed by these remarkable words, which though unobserved by the frivolity of contemporaries, the future historian will know how to combine with the facts which took place immediately after: " Par ces changemens tomberont enfin d'absurdes calomnies, et la France ayant elle-même élevé des barrières là où elle avoit posé des limites, ne sera plus accusée de vouloir les franchir." (Exposé, &c. Moniteur 1st January 1801.)

condescended to occupy himself with the *great conception* of the Cisalpines, he now determined to be their first king.

The following day he repaired to the senate, and here Talleyrand was called, in a laboured report of the proceedings, to praise the profound wisdom of his master, his exemplary *moderation*, his unparalleled *resignation*, his generous *self-denial*. So far were a cunning perversion of the subject, unbounded flattery, and a contempt of truth, carried in this report, that any one unacquainted with the circumstances, who had read it as a literary curiosity in a distant corner of the world, would not have hesitated a moment about believing that it related to the *resignation* of a crown, not to the voluntary *acceptance* of one, and to the arbitrary *foundation* of a kingdom.

The first thing in the bold undertaking which attracted the attention of the neighbouring states, and which called forth and justified the astonishment, consternation and indignation of the world, in a

degree unexperienced before, was the arbitrary nature of the measure, and the miserable nullity of the pretexts which were employed to cover it. If it was once determined, and irrevocably determined, that the *deceived* people of Lombardy (for liberty had been promised them in a hundred seducing manifestos, from the year 1796 down to the battle of Marengo!) should be vassals of the French empire, and slaves of its despot, then its constitution absolutely needed no new organization. At the time of the consulta at Lyons, this constitution was called *definitive*; as such the rest of Europe, though by no means friendly to its principles, and well aware of what was comprehended under them, had either recognized it, or let it pass in silence. The authors and agents of this new resolution might still, it is true, continue to assure their fellow citizens and contemporaries, that "the constitution which was declared *definitive* is, however, only *provisional*, a work of circumstances too weak to be capable of lasting; to preserve it is impossible, it must there-

“fore be voluntarily condemned and
 “superseded in the course of that rapid
 “progress of events, by which the pre-
 “sent epoch is characterized”—but these
 must be accounted words without mean-
 ing, not susceptible of any serious in-
 terpretation, or at best as adapted to the
 multitude. The only real want of the
 Italian republic *was the removal of the
 French troops, and the accomplishment of
 its independence of France.* That neither
 of these objects was effected by the ele-
 vation of its president to the rank of
 king, is manifest to the dullest compre-
 hension,* this change was as foreign to

* In that master-piece of Talleyrand's art, it is true things were so represented and connected, that one unacquainted with this school, might imagine from it that the independence of the Italian provinces was the only object in the new foundation of a kingdom; but all the craft and daring of the servant were not able to prevent the military despotism of the master from bursting out from among this tissue of lies. For amid the most unblushing panegyrics upon the magnanimity and self-denial of the master, a clear, though tortuous confession was made, “that even the separation of
 “the crowns left the period for withdrawing the French
 “troops quite indefinite.” As if thirty thousand French troops quartered in the Milanese, would not be infinitely more prejudicial to the liberty and prosperity

the wishes as it was to the welfare of the land, it was not even dictated by the interest of the chief governor, that is by the interest arising out of his duties and obligations as a ruler. For every thing which was necessary to his ruling, and ruling without impediment or limitation, had been already secured to him in

of the inhabitants of upper Italy, than the presence of fifteen thousand French in Naples, of a few British regiments in Malta, or some Russian regiments in Corfu!

Of the same cast was the pretence of founding the independence of a state, by thrusting upon it the hereditary sovereignty of an unknown and *un-named* family, instead of that of a president for life. For though Buonaparte had the right of appointing a successor, provided he was either a Frenchman or Italian, it was never certain whether he would avail himself of this right. And this was called, "fixing and confirming the tottering fate of Italy for ever!"

No! Justice and truth have not always presided in the great affairs of the world: but of such a compleat disavowal, such a systematic abjuration of both, there is no example to be found in history. We are familiarized with these things, and because they daily and hourly pass before us, we no longer pay attention to them, the threatening danger is disregarded till it overtakes and lays us low. How will future generations be astonished at our fatal blindness!

quality of president. What could tempt him to go further? The desire of adding to the title of Emperor that of king, or a wish to elevate his relations, and to found new dynasties. Both motives were equally dangerous to the security of the neighbouring states, and to the independence and tranquillity of Europe; and as Buonaparte visibly under their influence, had already without scruple sacrificed to them a considerable portion of his fame, the favour and confidence of many of his earlier admirers, the whole republican scaffolding by which he had mounted to power, and the dignity and consistency of his life, who could now banish the apprehension that no longer any consideration on earth could stop him in his career!

But what rendered the whole transaction still more repulsive and disgusting was the pretension of carrying it through by force of power alone, without the sanction of the law of nations, without any prefatory negotiation, and without the consent of a single power having been either

requested or waited for. The peace of Luneville acknowledged the *Cisalpine republic*, and stipulated its *independence*. This *independence* was now, it is true, annihilated, the *Cisalpine* name no longer existed, and the *republic* was become a French province. But however, grievously the treaty had been infringed, and the peace broken by this series of revolutions, there was still a great and wide difference between that constitution which was produced at Lyons, and the absolute possession of the country transformed as it now was into a hereditary family estate. And in bringing all this about to appeal to no other authority, or seek for no other justification, than the diplomatic rhapsodies of his own sophists, supposes a hardness in iniquity, an intoxication of insolence which Europe could not bear without forging its last fetters. In that memorable report of Talleyrand, there was nothing said either of the peace of Luneville, of the neighbouring powers, of any obligation towards others, or even of a wish, much less of a want of having

this title of king acknowledged.* And then when we were justified in expecting a statement of satisfactory grounds of conduct, or at least a sparing exercise of power, or an attempt to evade our reclamations, or a word of kindness to disarm our indignation, or some intimation of future negotiations, or if every thing else was refused, at least some form of diplomatic politeness there—will posterity believe it?—We receive the comfortable assurance, “ that *France, like the ocean, without regard-* “ *ing inefficient barriers, gives laws to*

* This intentional and supercilious reserve must have produced a deep impression especially on the imperial court, because in Champagny's official paper, to which we have before alluded, it had been expressly promised that the interests of the neighbouring powers should be consulted in the settlement of the affairs of Italy, farther because the French cabinet in the first two months of the year 1805, had given this most tranquillizing assurance to the Austrian ministers, who had then manifested their alarms, and because in the last place the suspicious or rather perfidious title of a kingdom of Italy was a public insult to the emperor, an attack upon his dignity, and his rights, and was besides a very intelligible omen of farther usurpations which were likely to ensue from the same comprehensive system of violence.

“ *itself*, and prescribe *its own* boundaries.”
(We quote the words of Talleyrand’s report.)

If such a conduct could in any way be atoned for, it was not certainly in the way which was adopted, of pouring into our fresh bleeding wounds the ineffectual balsam of deluded hope. Some prospect of a *separation of the crowns* under certain conditions was, it is true, held out, but almost immediately and intentionally withdrawn, lest any distrust in the validity of self-constituted rights, or any consideration for the claims of others, or any respect for principles might incautiously be imputed to the ruler of France. “ You, “ yourself”—said Talleyrand to his master,—“ You, yourself, will fix the period “ of separation, that you may not have “ one day the *degrading* alternative pro- “ posed to you, either to consent to this “ separation, or take up arms; for then *the* “ *respect you owe to your dignity* would pre- “ scribe to you, to listen to *the calls of honour* “ rather than to the *calls of humanity*.”

* In reference to this preliminary declaration of war,

Besides, this promise was merely a diplomatic artifice, invented for the purpose of exciting astonishment in a gazing populace, and of occupying the attention of the more discerning spectators for a moment, till the throne was securely established. This temporary object was attained; the panygerists opened their mouths to extol the magnanimity of their hero, and fancied publicists bowed with reverence to the wisdom and elevation of a mind which, in founding and establishing a kingdom, never lost sight of the great political relations of states, and contrived to interweave a *proposition of peace* in the very *statute of its constitution*. The more skilful soon discovered the geographical bearings of

a hardy parasite (formerly a sturdy republican, full of zeal and ardor for liberty, but now the most slavish tool of power, and in garrulity surpassed by none,) talked of "a voice of the human heart, which in the midst of war is an echo of peace." The same loquacious gentleman asserted, "that all the sovereigns of Europe were much *indebted* to his master for having, by the foundation of the Italian kingdom, added a new support to their thrones." See the speech of his excellency *Monsieur Francois de neuf Chateau*, president of the Conservative Senate, in the *Moniteur* of the 25th March 1805.

their new situation, and the imposture, which was endeavoured to be practised upon them, was too clumsy to escape detection.

It was soon discovered that the ruler of France had no right to take Italy or give it. The kingdom which he promised to relinquish, when Malta was evacuated by the Britons, and Corfu by the Russians, was not his. Before taking credit for the self-denial of resigning a crown, (we take it for granted that the resignation of it was seriously intended,) it must first be shown by what authority he came to the crown. The following is the language which he held to Europe. “ I
“ will take possession in virtue of a power
“ which no one dare controul, of a neigh-
“ bouring country, of which there is not
“ a square mile belonging to me, which
“ is already occupied by my troops,
“ though it has been declared by the last
“ treaty of peace to be *independent*, and
“ of which I have been for an indefinite
“ time appointed ruler and dictator; I
“ will, without waiting for your consent,

“ erect for myself a regal throne in this
 “ country. But if those powers with
 “ which I am at present at war, choose
 “ to accept the conditions of peace which
 “ I prescribe to them, then I will display
 “ my magnanimity; the country shall be
 “ given up, the crown shall be resigned
 “ —in favour of a particular person whom
 “ I shall then name.”* This was the jus-
 tice, this the wisdom, this the diplomatic
 penetration which statesmen admired, to
 which authors offered the incense of praise,
 and of which, particularly in Germany,
 (since we must bear the ignominy, we
 may also confess having merited it,) there
 arose more than one encomiast.

Considered in a general view, the con-
 tingent separation of the crowns, instead

* With equally the same right he might pursue the
 same conduct in other quarters, and justified by the
 same arguments. He might, upon the same system,
 (to recur to an example we have formerly made use
 of,) take possession of Spain, and assure the courts
 that when England evacuates Malta, and Russia gives
 up Corfu, he will let one of his brothers reign at
 Madrid.

of affording any ground of satisfaction, rendered the injustice and violence of the whole proceeding still more manifest and perceptible. For in what light must this perfidious clause appear to those powers, which though immediately and deeply interested in the fate of Italy, saw that the performance of the arbitrary condition which France had fixed for its prospective operation was wholly out of their power? For how could Austria and Naples—the two European states which suffered the most from the union between Italy and France—how could they effect the evacuation of Malta, and evacuation of Corfu? We shall wave altogether the consideration which was however in itself a very important one, that in the present state of things, the continuance of the English in Malta, and the Russians in Corfu, was a most desirable circumstance for Austria and Naples. We shall even suppose for a moment the contrary, and that both these powers anxiously wished to see the English and Russians driven from the places which they occupied, and in general from the Mediterranean seas. Had they any means in their power with

which to accomplish this wish? and if the issue of the maritime war, and the result of the negotiations with Russia turned out so unfortunately for France that Malta must be left to the English, and Russia must be permitted to keep troops in Corfu, was Austria, was Naples in a condition to compel either of these powers to forego their advantages? What sense then was there in the conduct of the French government? In defiance of right, and of treaties, a dominion arose in Italy from which the greatest dangers were likely to spring. This dominion was in the first instance proclaimed to be an appendage to France, and the only hope of seeing them in future separated (and *how* separated, we shall consider by and by!) depended upon an event entirely without the circle of their operations!

Thus did the matter stand, supposing the promise of the future separation of the crowns to be sincere, and supposing its execution to be really beneficial to the powers immediately interested. But neither the one nor the other was the case.

On what was the hope founded that that separation should ever be realized? upon the word of the French government. Was this an adequate security? Was it reasonable, was it possible to expect that, after so long a dreary experience, after so many broken treaties, after so many violated oaths, after so frequent a subversion of principles and forms, after a retraction of so many engagements, the world should be tranquillized by the words of Talleyrand and his master? Had any one of their splendid promises been fulfilled; was not France, and Germany, and Switzerland, and Holland, covered with documents of their perjured faith? * Was the whole his-

* Let only what has been said in the present work, under the heads of Germany, Switzerland, Piedmont, Parma, Tuscany, and what will by and by be said of Genoa, be collected into a whole, and let it be considered that all this is only one corner of a vast and uniformly gloomy picture which we could present. If any one would take the trouble to publish in a chronological order all the promises of this government, which have appeared in the course of the last five years, in its different addresses and manifestoes, official reports and official notes, in one column, and opposite to them the events corresponding with each, without a single note or commentary, he would give to the world such a work as no age ever saw.

tory of their government any thing else than a constant series of constitutions established one day and torn down the next? And if their own constitutions and conventions could not bind them, who could flatter himself that a partial and arbitrary declaration would tie them down faster or more effectually, and that it would not share the same fate with a vast number of others which lie dispersed over every page of their annals?

And even if at last, contrary to all expectation, this much vaunted separation actually had taken place, what would Italy, or what would Austria and Europe have gained thereby? The statute of the 17th March had declared the crown of Italy to be hereditary in the male offspring, *whether natural or adopted*, of the French emperor. To him alone it was left, unconditionally left, to appoint his successor. His choice would therefore at all times have fallen upon the person on whose devotion, docility, and obsequiousness, he could most surely depend: far more than a son or brother could be, the new ruler would have

been, in the most proper sense of the word, a creature of his hands. Add to this, the French troops which he had never promised to withdraw, but whose continuance in the country he had on the other hand taken every occasion to declare to be necessary to its welfare, would never have evacuated Lombardy, or even if they had retired for a short time from the states of Milan, the possession of Piedmont, of Parma, of the Vallois, of the roads across the Alps, and of all the entrances into that part of Italy, put it in their power to return as soon as they thought fit. The stamp of a French province, whether it was considered geographically, politically, militarily, or morally, was so deeply engraven upon this country, that nothing but an entire dissolution of its parts could efface it. When all these promises were weighed, it was impossible not clearly to see the result. Could a king of Italy, appointed under such circumstances, be any thing else than a French Stadtholder? and was it not an insult to the human understanding to talk of the future independence of the Italian kingdom?

But the courts who were injured and alarmed by this precipitate proceeding were not even permitted to have the satisfaction of lodging their well-founded protests. Their consent was never solicited, no justificatory declarations were made, no soothing explanations given, no sooner was the resolution formed than it was carried into effect, as if a treaty of Luneville had never existed, as if there never had been acknowledged any mutual obligations in states to give an account to their neighbours of steps which tended to destroy their political relations, and to effect total revolutions in the orders of things established by treaties; as if France had an interest apart from all the other states of Europe; or to speak more correctly, as if enthroned high above all other states, and equally indifferent to their approbation or censure, it had only to seek in its own will for its justification, and for the sanction of its acts in the acts themselves.

While the half of Europe protested partly aloud, partly in silence,* the corona-

* Notwithstanding all the accounts given in the French

tion at Milan was celebrated with affected pomp, and with many mortifying and some menacing circumstances. One of the most significant undoubtedly was, that in the whole course of the solemnities, in no speech nor reply, nor congratulatory address, nor personal nor ministerial declaration, was there the smallest mention made of the renunciation of the Italian kingdom! the promise of the separation of the crowns appeared now to have passed into oblivion, and he who was bold enough to choose the inviolability of so young a usurpation as the ground of his motto

papers of the recognition of the Italian kingdom by this and the other principal power in Europe, it is indubitably certain that neither *Austria* nor *Prussia* ever did recognize it. It is needless to make the same assertion respecting *England, Russia and Sweden*. Excepting those states which must be considered unconditionally as French vassals, such as *Spain, Holland, &c.*; the new-made crown was only acknowledged by *Naples*, which endeavoured by this desperate measure to avoid its approaching overthrow; and by the *four electors of the south of Germany*, who in this, as well as in all other similar cases, disregarding their own dignity, the duty which they owed to their country, and the most sacred obligations, vied with each other in willingness to serve an insolent foreign tyrant, as soon as the hoarse and dreadful accents of his voice were heard.

(Dieu me l'a donnée, gare à qui y touche!)
had done his part to banish every hope of a voluntary renunciation of it, or a voluntary limitation of his power to the land of chimeras.

IV. GENOA.

The state of Genoa, or the Ligurian Republic as it has been called, was one of the countries which was declared independent by the eleventh article of the peace of Luneville. That this stipulation, at least for a long time to come, could be nothing more than an empty form it was easy to foresee from the geographical and political situation of this state, from its want of internal strength, from the total extinction of its ancient aspiring spirit, and from the established influence of France. But though it seemed for a time precluded from the enjoyment of real independence, it was an object of no inconsiderable value to retain even its shadow and name, for as long as a nation is able to retain even this, the hope still remains to it, of availing itself of some fortunate turn of circumstances for the resto-

ration of its affairs; and of rising from the deepest and most forlorn state of decay into its former independence.

In the course of the first four years after the peace, Genoa experienced a fate similar to the other republics which had been created, revolutionized, or transformed by France. Constitutions followed upon constitutions; the order of things which was one day proclaimed as a state of repose after the storms and troubles by which it had been introduced, was set aside the next, to make room for some other new definitive plan, the chief officers of state were appointed by the French government, French troops occupied the strong posts of the country, and the French marine was recruited by Genoese sailors.

Such was the course of things till the year 1805, and such was then their general aspect, as to render it presumable that the brittle fabric would at least survive the times of trouble. Before the coronation took place at Milan, a Genoese deputation, with the doge at their head, appeared with

an offer of thanks for the generous protection which had been accorded to the Ligurian republic by its great friend and neighbour. In the answer to the address of this deputation there was no intimation given of any new project or approaching revolution. In a short time after, however, the French minister, *Salicetti*, accompanied the most tractable members of the deputation back from Milan to Genoa, assembled the senate in the greatest haste, communicated to it the wish of the chief ruler of France and Italy, and in the course of four-and-twenty hours carried through a resolution, declaring it to be necessary *to unite the republic with France*. By the means which are usually employed in such cases, a quantity of votes were soon collected confirming this resolution; * on the

* "A large chest full, which two porters were scarcely able to carry," it was said in the protocol, "the votes of the archbishops, bishops, grand vicars, canons, curates, military and naval officers, judges and magistrates, members of the national institution and universities, the citizens of Genoa, of the forty-seven cantons, and seven hundred and five parishes, which the Genoese territory contains." And all this had been effected in the course of two days.

4th of June it was delivered at Milan, and the sovereign of Italy was pleased most graciously to receive the proposal. "I conform to your desire, I will unite you with my great people;"—such was the sentence by which Genoa was for ever blotted from the list of independent powers.*

The pretext under which this was done, for no attempt was made to justify it, left every thing which had ever been devised before in the mode of announcing similar acts of violence in frivolousness far behind. It was said the extension which *England* had lately given to the right of blockading sea-ports, has changed the whole political relations of Europe; no weak maritime state can henceforth maintain its importance; by the effects of this system, as well as by the devastation of the African pirates, Genoa has fallen into a situation of decrepitude; its union with a mighty power, whose flag will afford protection to its commerce, is necessary to the welfare, security, and the existence of Genoa; in

* These are the very words he used in his remarkable address to the doge on the 4th of June.

this necessity; and in the wish of the inhabitants of the country, consists the title of France to adopt this measure; "they constitute the only right which Buona-
" parte acknowledges as valid."

In this extraordinary piece of reasoning had the premises been as true as they are false and unfounded, still the conclusion would not follow from them. For by the union of Genoa with France, Great Britain would not be prevented from blockading Genoa, and if the French navy could not secure the Genoese against a blockade, as allies, how was it possible that it could protect them against it as subjects? Besides all that this republic had suffered, either from blockade or maritime wars, and what it still continued to suffer from these and other causes of its decay, was absolutely and exclusively the effect of French injustice and oppression. If France had suffered Genoa to remain neutral in its maritime wars, as it had been for centuries past, England would have had no occasion, and never would have thought of blockading the Genoese coast; they alone were

responsible for the consequence who had forced this state, contrary to its wishes, and contrary to its clear and urgent interests, to take part in a war from which resulted this grievance, uncompensated by a single advantage or the smallest indemnification. But to crown all, it was a most unheard of pretension, to act as if there had been nothing on earth that required consideration excepting *France* and *England*, and their mutual relations and pretensions; as if a (true or imaginary) right which the French government maintained against the British, could justify enterprizes immediately injurious to the rights and relations of other powers which took no part in these contentions. For had it been an established point that *England* had occasioned and rendered necessary, in the French sense of the word, the annihilation of the Genoese state by the violence and injustice of its measures; still it remained to be shewn on what ground *Austria*, *Russia*, *Naples*, and all the other *European states*, were not to be consulted upon such a proceeding before it was carried into execution.

The appeal to the will of the people, as it was called, more offensive and insupportable than it would otherwise be as coming from the mouth of a despot who set every thing at defiance, was least of all calculated to support this absurd argument.

It is a most difficult question whether even the legitimate sovereign of a state can, of his own free will, resolve on its total dissolution and its subjection to a foreign power; whether such a political suicide can be excused by any formalities, or justified by any circumstances of embarrassment. But so much is indisputably certain, that if a step of this nature can be made completely legitimate, it can only be done by the consent of the powers who have a more immediate or more remote interest in the state, the fate of which is to be decided upon. In this way, and in this alone it is supposable, that the defect in the validity of the act, when resting merely on the authority and competence of the government of the individual state, may be supplied by the common sanction of all the governments interested in its fortunes.

The possession of the Genoese territory was an acquisition of considerable value to France, in extending, rounding and fortifying its dominion in Italy. The importance of the matter in dispute, and the increase of power resulting from the new accession, would have justified the strongest remonstrances on the part of its neighbours, and every kind of resistance. But so much were people accustomed to consider the encroachments of the ruler of France with patience or indifference, so great was the preponderance he had already obtained in Italy previous to the last conquest; in a word, so unlimited was his influence in the Ligurian republic, while it still retained the name of independent, that this enterprise would probably have passed like many of a similar character, without making much stir, had not two extraordinary circumstances concurred to render it quite insupportable, and to kindle a flame which soon extended over all Europe.

The one of these eventful circumstances was the choice of the time for its execution. Fatigued with violence and oppres-

sion, and impelled almost against their will by the hopeless and forlorn prospect of a series of never ending vexations, to make an attempt for the deliverance of Europe, two powers of the first consequence, had, precisely at that period, concerted measures for stemming the progress of the overwhelming flood, and setting bounds to the torrent of usurpation. Various arrangements had been taken in the Austrian monarchy since the beginning of the year 1805, but particularly in the course of the Summer, which clearly enough announced a determination to exchange habits of unqualified resignation for a disposition to active interference. The emperor had disapproved the arbitrary proceeding of founding an Italian kingdom, as strongly as was compatible with the existing policy and situation of his cabinet; he had declined recognizing it; he had during the residence of the French emperor at Milan, in the course of all his declarations and acts, and of the whole memorable scene of the coronation, observed a complete silence, which must have been more intelligible than words, accompanied as it

was with warlike preparations, which were every day less and less disguised. The emperor of Russia had already declared himself much more decidedly; for two years the most serious misunderstanding had existed between him and the French cabinet, which had originated expressly in the affairs of Italy. That he had formed the resolution to take up arms in defence of the balance of power in Europe, in case the object could not be obtained by means of negotiation; and that this resolution was fully matured and ripe for execution, no one was ignorant, who had the smallest means of discovering the secrets of cabinets and the disposition of princes, and least of all, therefore, Buonaparte.* He learned, even on his arrival at Milan, that it was the intention of the emperor to send to him immediately an envoy extra-

* It is true there was an assurance published in the *Moniteur* of the 1st of June, that "all Europe might be convinced that the emperor of Russia had determined to maintain the strictest neutrality"—but this was only one of the ten thousand cases, in which an attempt was made in this impudent and shameless journal to deny the most incontrovertible facts, when it could serve a momentary object.

ordinary, to explain the most important points of dispute between them; he declared himself ready to receive him; he knew that the fate of Italy was the principal object of this mission. And in so critical a moment he proceeded to a new act of revolutionary violence in one of the most important states of the Italian territory; and to a fresh conquest in time of peace, by way of once more reminding the powers who called him to account for his preceding conduct, that no consideration was sufficiently strong, and that no calculation of consequences was longer effectual to conquer in his ungovernable mind the restless and insatiable propensity to progressive dominion, or of proving beyond the possibility of doubt, that he was finally and systematically determined to pay no regard to any remonstrance, to act at every given moment according as circumstances might dictate, and to treat the world as his disposable property.

The second, no less important, and infinitely more revolting circumstance which distinguished this event, was the bold, un-

disguised and unqualified violation of a sacred and voluntary promise: that “*no state shall henceforth be incorporated with the French empire!*” This solemn unequivocal declaration was twice repeated in the course of three months, in moments of the highest interest, in the presence of France and of Europe, with all the calmness and dignity of a mature, deliberate, and determined purpose. After Buonaparte had ascended the Imperial throne, and again, on the decisive day when he assumed the title of king of Italy, these tranquillising words resounded in numberless addresses, in the enthusiastic panegyrists of his servants, and in the acclamations of his admirers in every country of Europe, who seemed intoxicated with joy.* But two

* It is worth while to present the whole series of these promises to the reader in a collected view.

FIRST EPOCH.

On the 28th of December, 1804, the minister Champagny, in his report upon the state of the empire, when speaking of the approaching changes in the Cisalpine republic.—“*Par ces changemens tomberant enfin d’absurdes calomnies; et la France ayant elle-même élevé des*

months had scarcely elapsed when the sound had expired for ever. Of such a

*barrieres là où elle avoit posé des limites, ne sera plus ac-
vouloir les franchir."*

Napoleon himself in his speech at the opening of the legislative body:—" Je ne veux pas accroître le territoire de la France mais en maintenir l'intégrité. Je n'ai point l'ambition d'exercer en Europe une plus grande influence, mais je ne veux pas déchoir de celle que j'ai acquise. *Aucun état ne sera incorporé dans l'empire, mais je ne sacrifierai point mes droits, &c."*

The tribunate in answer to this declaration:—" Cette déclaration solennelle sera pour l'Europe le gage assuré des sentiments de modération et de paix qui vous ont constamment animé."

The legislative body:—" Votre Majesté déclare elle-même qu'elle ne veut point aggrandir le territoire de la France. Ces paroles doivent ôter tout prétexte à nos ennemis."

Napoleon's reply to this address:—" Les sentiments que j'ai fait connoître lorsque je suis venu ouvrir la session seront le règle de mon gouvernement."

SECOND EPOCH.

Napoleon in his address to the senate on founding the Italian kingdom, (19th of March, 1805:)—" Le génie du mal cherchera en vain des prétextes, pour remettre le continent en guerre; ce qui a été réuni à notre empire par

wanton, audacious, unprovoked, and unqualified breach of faith, there was no example in the whole history of the revolution, including even its worst times; whether a parallel instance, all circumstances considered—the uncalled for formality of the promise—the giddiness with which it was violated—the shortness of the intervening time—the magnitude of the object—the publicity of the whole transaction—is to be found in universal history, I am inclined to think that those who are most conversant with it will be disposed to doubt.

The conversion of the republic of *Lucca* into a principality under the protection of France, was a miserable appendage to that

les lois constitutionnelles de l'état y restera réuni; mais aucune nouvelle province n'y sera incorporée."

François de Neufchâteau, president of the senate, on the 26th of March:—"Sir, nous n'en saurions douter, votre dernier discours dans la séance du sénat doit retentir de cette enceinte dans toutes les cours de l'Europe.—Quelle réponse *aux calomnies* des adversaires de la France! Et quand les faits parlent si haut, quelle prévention pourroit les obscurcir encore!"

desperate measure. People were now prepared for every thing. Whatever had been once considered as affording security against insolence and power was long since irrevocably lost, now the last props of individual confidence had fallen in, and all that presented itself to the astonished eye was a dark and troubled futurity, in which nothing could be distinctly perceived, but the inevitability of more dreadful evils, and a bitter alternative offered to the best portion of humanity, of forlorn subjection, or a bloody resistance.

CHAP. VI.

Origin of the War.

WE have seen in the foregoing pages how the peace of Luneville, in all points where it set bounds to France, was infringed, violated, and set at nought; how *Austria* was injured and insulted; the *German empire* modelled according to French caprice, and in subserviency to French interests; *Switzerland*, after being harassed and tormented, subjected to a constitution framed by foreign legislators and imposed by a foreign might; the *country of the Valais* separated and subjugated; *Piedmont, Parma, Milan, Genoa, and Lucca*, under many various titles, but all of them by arbitrary violence and a bold defiance of all national rights and forms, swept into the vortex of French domination. It now remains for us to show, how it happened that these events at last roused the unwarlike, long-

suffering, patient disposition of the age, to resistance, disinclined as it was to every vigorous undertaking, and prepared as it was to carry the yoke; how it came to pass, that in minds where scarcely any other feeling reigned than the desire of peace, a resolution was engendered of immediate and active war.

The situation in which Buonaparte found himself after the conclusion of the peace of Amiens, was unparalleled in the history of civilized nations, (for barbarous conquerors are sometimes carried more rapidly from earth to heaven, and fall with proportionate rapidity :) it was the proudest situation to which the caprice of fortune, favoured by an enterprising spirit and no common talents, had ever raised a mortal. He governed in the interior of France, of France, extended on all sides in the highest and boldest sense of the word, ALONE: for all the limitations, such as laws, the pride of ancestry, local constitutions, rights of particular orders, or orms consecrated by antiquity, which, before his time, had surrounded and circum-

scribed the power of the most absolute sovereigns, had been submerged in the waves of an overwhelming revolution, and had left no trace of their existence behind; and to attempt finding out new limitations was in vain, after the stuff from which they must be formed had vanished under the hand of the destroyer.* In the desert of universal equality, there are only two constitutions possible, a pure and perfect democracy, or a pure and perfect despotism. The gulph between the two is filled with various shades of anarchy. In this gulph the French nation had wandered for ten horrible years, passing from one degree

* Constitutions cannot absolutely be *made*, they must, like the works of nature, be formed by gradual development; to create them out of nothing, or to construct them out of the wreck of a general destruction, is the highest criminal presumption. This is the most valuable, and perhaps the only new truth, (for it was at most only suspected, but never completely acknowledged before,) with which the French Revolution has enriched the science of politics. But it was a dreadful price which the discovery cost. As the dissolution with which this revolution began was the most wasteful and un-sparing that ever the constitution of human society had experienced, so the tyranny in which it ended is the completest and most grievously oppressive that ever appeared in Europe.

of misery to another, drenched in blood and tears, an abomination to itself and the world. A republic of thirty millions of men was long ago acknowledged to be a chimera, the dominion of a single individual was the only alternative left; and those who would have been startled in more favourable times by the very idea of absolute power, regarded it now as a haven of safety, to which, fatigued with the storm, they resorted with joyful confidence. That Buonaparte was all-powerful, and that his dominion was subjected to no limitation, was a circumstance most decidedly favourable to the popularity of his government. A great majority of the nation anxiously longed for internal peace; whatever advanced or secured this object was considered as a benefit, under whatever condition it was obtained, and at whatever price it might be purchased. An overstrained effort at liberty had produced such monstrous evils, that a circumstance now happened, for the first time perhaps, unprecedented even under the happiest governments; absolute subjection was solicited from the sovereign as a favour! the

two great parties, in which were concentrated all spirit and talent, all power of action and enterprize, all principle of movement, and all the elements of resistance were worn out, weakened, and dispersed; the royalists by hopeless defeats, by the loss of their foreign allies, by the relaxation or apostacy of their friends, and by the want of a rallying point; the republicans by the failure of their plans, by their inability to found a constitution, by the recollection of the horrible devastation caused by their maxims or their leaders, and by the dislike and detestation of the people. Even the remains of both these parties were, indirectly at least, in league with Buonaparte. The preservation and establishment of his power appeared to both the most desirable object, while neither expected to triumph. The friends of the old constitution beheld in it a salutary dictatorship, which, though fixed for a series of years, or even for the period of a single life, would, by destroying the last revolutionary principles and forms, prepare the way for the return of monarchy, and for its re-establishment upon an im-

moveable basis. The republicans were contented with it, because in the titles of their new rulers, and in the cant of the sovereignty of the people, which was retained in the first proclamations of the government like an antiquated law stile, they saw some faint resemblance of their dreams, and perhaps thought they discerned the omens of a happy futurity.

In this memorable interval, the *external* relations of the state were not only on all sides secured from danger, but to such a degree advantageous, respectable and imposing, that to judge from probabilities, they must have been supposed adequate to supply every want, either of that moderate disposition which is contented with dignity and repose, or of that impetuous and aspiring spirit to which it is but one thing to live and to reign. On all points of its extensive confines, France was surrounded by states which either carried its yoke under the name of allies, or which, being deprived of all means of resistance, and lying open to its invasion as soon as war was declared, might be considered as the

bulwarks of its colossal power, or as its advanced posts. There were only four powers existing in Europe, which, by a union of their strength, (for none of them now was individually formidable,) might undertake the execution of plans alarming to France, and among all the four, there was not one at that time who did not ardently wish either for a good understanding or an everlasting peace with France, or at least a peace for several years. In *England* the desire of repose was become so predominant, that the nation was pleased with a peace such as that of Amiens, and the more disadvantageous this treaty was, the more deeply interested were the ministers who had concluded it in its maintenance, for the possibility of being able to repose for some years under its auspices, was, in fact, the only merit it possessed. Accordingly it could not escape any observer that the British ministry at that time, far from entertaining warlike ideas, were entirely occupied in retrenching their expenditure and ameliorating their finances, till the end of the year 1802, and even till the commencement of the following February,

only three months previous to the renewal of the war ; and that they had as the foundation of their system of government, and as the rule of their conduct, formed a resolution rather to suffer a great deal than to attempt saving themselves by having recourse to arms.—A similar, but much more determined resolution, was the principle of the *Austrian* policy. No thought of resistance, no wish of avenging the past, not the slightest symptom of dissatisfaction under all the blows which it received in its most sensible part was observable in this court, formerly so vigilant about its interest, and so tenacious of its dignity. It had even—there is no longer any reason for concealing it—unfortunately conceived Buonaparte's power to be the only remedy for the great distemper of the time, and the instrument by which the re-establishment and maintenance of the internal security and stability of all states were to be effected. On no side to circumscribe the progress of this power, in favour of its anti-revolutionary character,—for to this cause they were good natured enough to ascribe it—to pardon its poli-

tical preponderance, to spare, to nourish, to support, and to consolidate it—that was for several years the uniform and invariable system of the Austrian cabinet.*—The principles of the court of *Prussia* had never varied from the time of the treaty of Basle; even in the stormy period which preceded the exaltation of Buonaparte, they were uniformly favourable to France; and they were much more so now, when the establishment of a regular government gave some security and a fixed direction to the system of policy which they had dictated.—*Russia*, from the extraordinary turn which the political affairs of the empire had taken at the conclusion of the reign of Paul the First; from the personal character of his successor, from the maxims and views of his ministers, from his wish to take an immediate part in the affairs of *Germany* which produced the

* This is fact, and it is mentioned here not as a ground of censure or accusation, but merely as illustrative of the then existing relations. The important question of the recognition of the Imperial title was decided upon this very principle, and such was the fatality at that time, that the assurance of a few French sycophants, “that the establishment of this throne would confirm, “all the rest,” was here considered as gospel.

treaty of Luneville—perhaps even from an incorrect idea of the spirit and intention of the new French government—was not only at peace, but in friendly relations with France. Where the capacity still existed—and this was confined to a few cases—all disposition to war was extinguished; and it is a certain and momentous fact, that at that time, in the whole circumference of Europe, there was no hostile sentiment except in the mind of an individual.

It is not our present object to shew how the person in whose favour all this was arranged by the most wonderful combinations sported with his good fortune in the *interior*, and exchanged for equivocal enjoyment a glorious immortality; how he rejected every thing which could have mitigated sovereignty, conciliated respect with love, and rendered obedience sweet to sit enthroned on ruins; how he in place of a symmetrical structure of well regulated liberty and order, reared for the place of his dwelling a gloomy gigantic tower of iron despotism; how, after every thing had been changed, ridiculed or abolished, and after awakening

around him the discontent of mortified hope, the bitter feelings of oppression, and a trembling dread of futurity, he renewed the system of terror under other titles and forms, strode from violence to violence, and left his stunned and trembling nation no organ of complaint; how he arrived, feared and detested, at an unnatural dominion, which while it lasts threatens every expression of public opinion, every developement of national energy with galling fetters, and which when once it falls leaves nothing behind but an abyss of new revolutions, the fearful problem of a new political creation, and the insecurity of all things. But it coincides with our plan, cursorily to point out how, in his *external* relations, he not only forgot all national rights, but also all national and personal interests, acting as he did under the impulse of impetuous passion, which prompted him in less than three years after peace had been concluded once more to convert Europe, still fatigued and exhausted by its former struggles, into a field of battle.

He first drove England to war, not indeed by immediate attacks, not even perhaps by preparations announcing immediate attack—what has been said upon this subject must be accounted for only by momentary anxiety, and must not be judged according to the rigour of the letter—but by something which operated more strongly than any military arrangements, or naval equipments, by the loud and daily manifestations of a restless, empoisoned, deadly hatred, carried even to madness against the British government and nation. Those peerless invectives in which England was represented as the scourge of the world, its most distinguished statesmen as criminals, its policy as an infernal tissue, its political and commercial constitution as incompatible with the prosperity or existence of the other European nations, those calumnies, those curses first illustrated and commented upon by menacing reports of dangerous projects that were in contemplation, and at last confirmed in official conferences by personal threats and unheard of confessions—these

were the hostilities which ought to have been enumerated in a warlike manifesto, and which must have called England to arms, if it was not prepared to sink without a struggle.

The author of these aggressions would no doubt have preferred making them with impunity, by way of giving vent to his spleen, to engaging in a war* which at that time could not by any means be welcome to him. It would no doubt have been more advantageous to wait till Malta was evacuated, (which would have proved ruinous to England,) till the great undertakings of reducing St. Domingo was accomplished, till the French trade and the French navy were re-established, and till he had profited from three or four

* The official articles in the *Moniteur* from August 1802 to February 1803, the reports of colonel *Sebastiani*, the conversation of the Consul with lord *Whitworth*! If the British ministers had suffered any one of these manifestoes to pass without receiving complete satisfaction, they would have deserved to die upon the scaffold, or their nation ceased to be a nation. The only fault they committed at the breaking out of the war, was that they sought for other grounds of hostility than those which here presented themselves.

years of peace, for preparing the instruments proper for the execution of the boldest and most wicked of his plans. But to mingle peace and war in the most unnatural union, to manifest at one and the same moment his hatred to the British name in calumnies and threats, and indirect declarations of hostilities, and to enjoy all the advantages resulting from a cessation of arms, from the pacific disposition of this deeply injured nation, and from the conscientious observance of treaties on the part of its government, was a contradiction which all his art was unable to reconcile. After, from the violence of his conduct, war was become unavoidable, he was enraged that he had broken a profitable peace at an improper time; this is the only inference which can be drawn from the mad outcry which was on all sides set up against England, when it took the only part which was left for it to adopt. It was easy indeed to prove the injury resulting from the war to France upon grounds of policy, and the French writers of manifestoes, always sure of their public, did not fail to avail themselves of this cir-

circumstance to throw the blame upon England; but this war was altogether foreign to state prudence, it originated solely in the blindness of passion.

Not long after it had broken out with England, the relations between France and Russia experienced a similar rupture without any political motive, in defiance of the interests of France, and in all human probability, contrary to the secret wishes of its ruler, but all other considerations lost their importance, when resentment at the failure of a mistaken calculation, or indignation at the slightest attempt to restrain his impatient lust of dominion, required a sacrifice. The Emperor of Russia made proposals to become mediator in a peace, opposing in the true spirit of mediation Buonaparte's partial expectations and gigantic pretensions. From that hour this monarch appeared to him in the detested light of an abettor and accomplice of England. He immediately resolved on rejecting the proposals of mediation, and to treat the Russian minister at Paris with undisguised hostility.

The arrest of his secretary of legation at Geneva, the arrest of a Russian charge d'affaires at Rome, and the imprisonment of both in the Temple, were the introduction to a scene in which the representatives of the different courts in Europe were to learn what the new government of France meant by what it called its respect for the rights of nations, and its return to those beneficial forms which the revolution had banished, and was a foretaste of similar mortifications which they might all one day experience. Lord *Whitworth* was the first object of them, Count *Marcoff* was the second.

The Emperor of Russia however, wished the preservation of pacific relations so warmly and sincerely, that notwithstanding the unfavourable impression which these hostile and violent proceedings had made, a bare return to a milder conduct and common prudence would have been sufficient to prevent a breach. In March 1804 took place that memorable catastrophe, by which an innocent and excellent prince of the royal blood of France was seized

by French troops in the territory of a German prince, where he had long lived in the most inoffensive manner, dragged to Paris before a revolutionary tribunal with barbarous cruelty, and immediately condemned to die. It was impossible that the court of Russia could be a partner in that silence, that cowardly and criminal silence which, with the exception of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Sweden, all the European powers, stunned and petrified with terror, observed on this proceeding: Yet so firmly was the Emperor determined, even in this truly critical moment, when a just and venerable feeling would have excused the most energetic language and the strongest measures, to give a preference to a tone of mildness, that in the note which he caused to be delivered to the diet of the empire, no notice was taken of the black character and innate turpitude of this nocturnal murder, but it exclusively adverted to it as a breach of the law of nations, an invasion of a foreign territory, and a violation of the rights of a free state. This note was followed by that remarkable correspondence in which Eu-

rope was instructed in the enlightened system and exalted policy of the Russian monarch, and from which it learned with grateful admiration, that he who was threatened far less than any other with immediate danger, was animated with the most generous and lively interest in the common security and welfare. As nothing could be more diametrically opposite to dispositions of this nature than the manner of thinking of the French cabinet, a formal rupture was the natural consequence.

The transition from this rupture to actual war was, nevertheless, from the great distance of the two powers, and the state of numbness into which all the rest had fallen, slow and difficult, and perhaps never would have taken place, had not new acts of violence, exercised in countries in whose fate Russia had taken a particular interest, widened the breach, and had not the most wanton insults finally precluded all means of reconciliation. The Emperor had pledged himself to demand the re-establishment of the kings of Sardinia and Naples, in their former rights, indemnity

for the loss they had suffered, and as much security for the future, as under all the circumstances could be expected. That negotiation had proved fruitless, though the satisfaction of these Italian princes had been expressly stipulated in a secret treaty, which was signed at the conclusion of peace between France and Russia in 1801. What could have been appropriated to their indemnification had sunk piece-meal into the all-devouring gulph, and on the foundation of an Italian kingdom their last hopes were extinguished. Even now the Emperor of Russia, though already prepared for war, lent an ear to pacific counsels. He empowered a confidential minister to make one other trial, whether there was any feeling of justice, any humane consideration still existing, any possible limit which impetuous and stubborn force would still acknowledge, by no means to deliver an imperious ultimatum as has been given out in a hundred lying reports; but to make a calm and dignified appeal not only to the *ruler*, but to the *man*, for the restoration of order and the preservation of peace in Europe. This last

attempt, the author of which has only incurred the reproach, and a glorious reproach it may be called, of conceiving it to be possible to attain his object in such a way, this last attempt failed like all the foregoing ones. The accounts of the intended proposition were received with unequivocal aversion and offensive coldness,* and immediately after the negotiation was broken off, before it had even commenced, the Russian plenipotentiary received, as a preliminary answer to all his well-meant instructions, the decree which incorporated Genoa with France.

* The way in which the French government papers expressed themselves respecting the mission of Monsieur de *Novosilzoff*, not only after it was given up, but immediately on the first mention being made of it, announced to every one who could read or understand the unfortunate issue of this attempt. We live in an age in which every thing is forgotten and forgiven, and of which a gross insensibility to the deepest injuries of national honour is one of the most distinguishing characteristics, but it will be the most remarkable instance of this nature we have yet witnessed, if the Russian government could, after any lapse of time, forget that flood of calumny and abuse which was then poured forth upon it by France, without having obtained full and complete satisfaction!

In the mean time the Austrian court had likewise felt the urgent necessity of setting bounds to its patience. We have already shewn the manifold occasions of discontent, and the weighty grounds of hostility with which this court had been furnished. But to provoke Austria to war was no easy task. The keenest shafts of injury had fallen blunted when pointed against the pacific spirit of the Emperor; his modest zeal for every thing that is good, and his honest and tender anxiety for the welfare and happiness of his people. Besides, the imperial court had been abandoned for several years, not merely without any prospect of assistance, but as if it had wanted enemies, exposed to the oppression of those who alone could yield it succours, till at last, as in all similar situations, the circumstance of having suffered much became a reason for suffering more. In the last months of the year 1804, it is true the Russian cabinet had entered into a more intimate connection with this court, and into confidential consultations with it upon the common interest, but one must be very ill informed indeed respecting the pro-

gress and character of the intercourse then subsisting, to believe that had the affairs of Europe remained in the situation even in which they at that time were, and in which they continued down to March 1805, any warlike resolution would have been adopted. It required a new provocation to overcome the mass of difficulties, of cares, of indisposition, of open and secret opposition, which on all sides obstructed the path to such a resolution in will, much more in execution. The constitution of Italy must once more be violently shaken; the French dominion extended by proclamation of a new kingdom, by arbitrary caprice; a despite of forms and realities, a contempt of all the relations and duties of neighbouring powers arising out of the law of nations, must be pushed to the uttermost in one great and comprehensive act of violence, finally to *drive* the court of Vienna to a resistance to which it could not have been *tempted* by any one of the preceding measures, nor by them all put together. Nay more, after so much had been done, it still depended upon him who had kindled the

flame either to nourish or extinguish it: The aversion to actual war, the longing desire of setting any bounds to the evil by means of pacific negotiation, of arriving at any tolerable result, even if it was not satisfactory, at any decent compromise with duty and honour, was every where, and particularly at Vienna, so much superior to every other feeling and to every other propensity, that any proposition which had a specious appearance of justice and moderation, would have been grasped at with alacrity and joy. The union of Genoa and the failure of the Russian mission left Austria no alternative.

After the most obstinate aversion to war had been on all hands overcome by a long series of unjust and hostile measures,* the French government thought fit, pre-

* It does not belong to the list of events which preceded the rupture between Austria and Russia, but it is worth while mentioning, by way of illustrating what has been said of the conduct of the ruler of France, and his very uncommon talent of so changing the temper of the most pacific cabinets as to make enemies out of friends, that he at last succeeded in converting Prussia into his opponent.

cisely as it had done in the year 1803, on the rupture with England, violently and bitterly to complain of the natural and necessary consequence of its own provocations. It now appeared all at once as the oppressed and suffering party, now every attempt to stop its career of violence was a criminal invasion of its rights; the most justifiable measures of defence were denominated treachery; and a common effort to avert common ruin was the result of a dark conspiracy produced by British gold, or by the cabals of some ambitious ministers; the only author of the war was now converted into a panegyrist of peace, he was represented as never having entertained a more ardent wish than the preservation of peace in Europe, and those who had wantonly violated it were delivered over to the abhorrence of the present and every future age.

It was extraordinary enough that a part of these cunning complaints, however revolting their injustice may be, were not wholly divested of a certain character of speciousness. In this case, as well as in

that of England, Napoleon would not have been displeased to be delivered from a war which he had himself rendered unavoidable. What in his vocabulary is meant by peace—the liberty of doing whatever is suggested to him by the feeling of unbounded power or momentary desire, and the unconditional subjection of his neighbours to every new form of his increased and insupportable domination—that he wished to preserve and to see its enjoyment interrupted, occasioned to him serious pain. He had shortly before the breaking out of the war,* published a declaration of remarkable *naïveté* and great significance. “We wish,” said he in this declaration, “for the continuance of peace with the continental powers, *because the continental powers are now in that situation in which we have always wished that they should be.*” These few words contain more than could have been said in a hundred manifestoes. Whether he really intended and really expected to be able to pursue

* In the *Moniteur* of the 11th August.

his plans of gigantic ambition to the term of their full accomplishment, till every independent power was overthrown, and till the universal establishment of his empire without going to war in the old sense of the term, or whether the period was not yet arrived, when by a fresh irruption of his arms, he meant to destroy the remains of political liberty in those few states which still retained a small portion of it, we do not take upon us to decide; so much is certain, that at the time when Austria and Russia put themselves into a posture of defence, and adopted a tone of resistance which left him the alternative of a voluntary renunciation of some of his most extravagant pretensions, or an immediate contest; a continental war was not at all agreeable to him.*

* It was not convenient for him, either in the relation in which he then stood to England, not because it obliged him to give up or put off a serious and matured project of immediately attacking the British empire—though this has been often said, it is neither more nor less than a fable—but because the necessity in which he found himself of withdrawing his troops from the coast, suspended the *apparent* danger to which England was exposed by the continuance of these troops, and in so far effected a

It is evident that the resolution of the combined powers to oppose with a common force his formidable system of aggrandizement was, when considered in this point of view, the best and wisest they could have adopted. "Our situation—they said in reply to him—"has been for a long time "such as we did not wish it to be, and it "is our duty to bring about a change in it, "precisely because it is agreeable to *your* "wishes. If you are looking forward to "a more favourable moment for com- "pleting our ruin this is sufficient to "inform us that of all the moments still "remaining to us, that which we now "chuse is for us the least unfavourable.

change in the public opinion favourable to England. All the *immediate* gain which can result to England from the present war is confined to this temporary advantage; what it may indirectly gain from it will be decided by the issue. But this must be more splendid than the most sanguine suppositions (not wholly chimerical) can warrant us in expecting if a substantial and durable peace for England shall be the consequence of it.

The real ground of Buonaparte's aversion to a continental war in the present conjuncture, consists in his displeasure that a *common* plan of resistance should be formed between those powers which he could much more conveniently and securely crush one after another.

“ But if you have resolved to complete our
“ subjection without going to war, war is
“ the only alternative left us for the pre-
“ servation of our existence and honour ;
“ on this our only hope depends, faint as
“ it may be, from our past errors and the
“ misfortunes to which they have led.
“ The path which you point out to us
“ leads to direct and hopeless destruction.
“ To waste our energies in listless inactivity,
“ in spiritless languor or in lingering ill-
“ ness, to seclude ourselves from every
“ source of aid, support, and co-opera-
“ tion, to live insulated and forlorn, with-
“ out friends or connections, from whom
“ we can expect either sympathy or relief,
“ till at last you push us into the pit you
“ have dug for us—this is the *peace*, this
“ the mortal slumber in which you invite
“ us to indulge ; these are the wise
“ maxims in which you advise our minis-
“ ters to act. It is impossible that it can be
“ inconsistent with our interests to resolve
“ on doing the contrary of that which our
“ irreconcilable enemy advises us to do.
“ Besides this, our present situation admits
“ of no wavering between opposite sys-

“ terms, of no hesitation between choosing
“ this or that line of policy, between cau-
“ tion and courage, between concession
“ and resistance, we are urged by an im-
“ perious necessity. To fall in glorious
“ submission, or in a noble struggle, is the
“ only alternative we have left. To con-
“ quer you now is difficult; but to live
“ without having conquered you is impos-
“ sible, and to die despised and disho-
“ noured is to die twice.”

So clear and intelligible, even to the meanest capacities, was the situation of Europe at the time that the most obstinate of the French sophists fell into the most pitiful embarrassment, when it became necessary for them to oppose at least specious arguments to the respectable and uncontrovertible reasonings which the Combined Powers brought into the field of public discussion. It could not even escape their blind admirers to what miserable resources they were driven, when they were obliged to combat the strong and convincing facts, which were stated by the armed powers as the ground of the war.

It was remarkable to see in particular, what motives they ascribed to Austria, if possible to shut the eyes of the world, or, at least, of their own nation, (which was doomed to believe what was most incredible, because it had no means of learning the truth,) to the notorious and public history of the origin of the war.* They

* In regard to Russia they gave themselves less trouble and confined themselves almost entirely to coarse invectives. They incessantly threw up to the emperor of Russia his pretended conquests and usurpations against the Turks and Persians; but nothing was more characteristic than the turn they gave to most of their declarations on this head for our instruction and edification. The sense of them was almost always as follows, “What does the emperor of Russia desire? Why does he interfere in our affairs when we do not disturb him in his? Why does he molest us about trifles such as Piedmont, and Parma, and Milan, and Genoa, and Switzerland, and Holland, and so forth, when we are by no means indisposed to be silent, even if he should incorporate the half of the Ottoman empire with his dominions? —Is Europe then not large enough for two masters? Let him leave the western family to us, and manage the eastern as he chooses! Then there will be nothing more to do than to draw at our leisure one line of boundaries, and the nations of Europe, after being delivered from the coalitions, rivalships, wars, and various plagues which are constantly taking place between the different intermediate members of the confederacy, will enjoy everlasting peace, under the dominion of two absolute princes.”

had recourse to two methods of delusion for the purpose of disguising the truth. The one was the miserable story that Austria had prepared for war for the purpose of *conquering Bavaria*, and of extending its dominion in Germany; the other which had been tried a thousand times before, was that *English gold* had formed the coalition against France. The former of these deceptions could not impose on the most ignorant out of France. The manner in which Austria and Russia had expressed themselves in the note of the 3d of September, respecting the nature and object of their common preparations, did not leave even the colour of probability to such an accusation. But had they observed a complete silence respecting their views in Germany, and had this silence been interpreted as a ground of suspicion that projects of aggrandizement were entertained by the Austrian ministry—in its present situation and temper!—it must still have been made credible, that the emperor of Russia, whose clear and evident interest must have prevented him from becoming a party in such a system, had,

by some extraordinary motive, been converted into a favourer of it. But after the Allied Powers had of their own free motion declared that they absolutely had no change of the existing constitution of the empire in view—a declaration which no one called upon them to make, and which they certainly never would have made of themselves, had they had a contrary intention—it required uncommon courage to expect any effect from that complaint, even in a French manifesto. The *military occupation* of Bavaria every one perceived was a necessary, an unavoidable step, if a war was to be undertaken against France out of the Austrian territory; but that Austria's intention extended *further* than to a military occupation, this the Bavarian court never ventured to alledge, in all its bitterness against the Allies, in all its slavish subjection to France, in all its malignant allusions to occurrences of an earlier date. It looked more like a sportive joke than a serious complaint, when they pretended to accuse the emperor of attempting to *extend* his power and influence in Germany by *illegitimate* means, at a time when all the world

saw that he could scarcely employ the most *legitimate* to *maintain* that which still remained to him ; so much was the relation between this monarch and the empire shaken to its lowest foundations by the peace of Luneville, and the unfortunate negotiations at Ratisbon.

The mode of explaining political connections, the true origin of which is clear as day, by the influence of *English gold*, is one of those pitiful artifices which a man of integrity is unwilling to spend time in exposing, because it is unworthy of being made the subject of serious controversy, and has been besides so often employed as to have become quite stale and disgusting. If one sometimes advert *en passant* to such loose and absurd allegations, it is merely lest the ill-informed should infer from a total silence, that no reply can be made to them. It has been often enough shewn, that pecuniary subsidies may advance a war, alleviate its burthens, and contribute more or less to carry it on ; but that they never can produce a war. If England were in a situation to entice only one of the

principal Continental Powers by means of money to warlike enterprizes, which were in any way contrary to its true interests, it must be able to procure sums large enough to convert war into a financial speculation for the power it had so enticed; a condition, the absolute impossibility of which it is needless to prove to any one at all acquainted with the matter. Subsidies are *means* of war, and as justifiable means as soldiers, ships, and artillery; but never since wars have been waged have they been the *object* of war; and could the British ministry hold out guineas in as great abundance as flint stones, it would no where find an ally, had not motives of a higher nature, arising either out of immediate necessity or voluntary choice, independent of all subsidies, previously determined it on war. The present war was so evidently the result of pressure and necessity, that any attempt to mislead the public opinion by fabulous declamations respecting its origin, might fairly have been considered as desperate; but what may not he undertake who has imposed silence on his contemporaries! If the Austrian court after so many

provocations to resistance, had needed any external incentive, and even if we were to admit that its definitive resolution was to be ascribed to foreign influence, it would still be a wanton perversion of truth to suppose *England* to be the source of this influence. It was *Russia*, and Russia alone, which by its example, by its encouraging language, and by its mighty preparations, gave to the councils of the Austrian cabinet, not an unnatural direction which they would not have themselves taken, but merely a more precise character and a degree of stability, to which, at last, all considerations gave way. So little were the resolutions of Austria influenced by the charm of British gold, that there was not any direct negotiation, scarcely an immediate communication on the subject, between the courts of London and Vienna, previous to the actual breaking out of the war.*

* This important fact, which is established by the circumstance that no immediate treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Austria, cannot at present be fully explained in a work intended for the public eye. But when the secret history of the political transactions

It is a consolation to think, that all the worthless means which have been employed to overpower the voice of truth, will scarcely survive the day that passes over us; and that the injured world, though it may want organs with which loudly and victoriously to avenge itself, has the satisfaction of seeing the imposture discredited and despised. The consequences of this war depend upon the more or less favourable developement of many relations which are still problematical, upon the energy

of our time shall one day come to light, it will be seen with astonishment what a strange contradiction prevails between the French accusations and the real state of things.


The authors of these accusations, have, it is true, attempted to account for the effect by the *indirect* operation of their favourite theme, the influence of English gold. They have talked of individual ministers being bribed. But in this way they can at most deceive the people, for such an assertion can not impose upon any intelligent man in Europe, not even the better informed part of their own friends and dependents. Whoever knows the relations and the characters of the persons who managed the affairs of Russia and Austria in this eventful crisis, either from his own observation or the testimony of others, must be convinced that not the slightest trace of such a calumny will descend to posterity in the history of the times.

and prudence employed in execution, and upon the counsels of Providence ; but so much is certain, if the result shall turn out as fortunate as the motives were holy and just, as the resolution was praiseworthy, and as the objects were laudable and important, the hour of salvation is at hand.

THE END.

The work of M. Ancillon, referred to by M. de Gentz in the course of these Fragments, may be had at M. de Conchy's, 93, New Bond Street :

Tableau des Révolutions du Système politique de l'Europe, depuis la fin du quinzième Siècle, par FREDERIC AN-CILLON. Berlin, 1803, 4 vol. in 8vo.



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